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There is mounting evidence that an important element in explaining the impact of trade
policy on trade patterns and the behavior of rms is the role of policy uncertainty in shaping
this behavior. In a setup where rms must incur a xed cost to export, uncertainty over
future prots will decrease the incentive of rms to enter into the export market. While
uncertainty over any number of factors playing into export decisions (such as demand,
productivity, exchange rate, etc.) may aect exporters' incentives to export, I focus here on
trade policy uncertainty, specically tari rates, as this allows me to quantify the impact of
one particular type of policy uncertainty, and can provide insight into the eects of broader
policy uncertainty. Unlike most other forms of uncertainty, it is something that can be
measured empirically using tari rates. Further, understanding the eects of uncertainty
over future tari levels is important in its own right, as there is debate over whether trade
agreements that do not substantially change applied tari rates are of any value to exporters.
My dissertation will address this question, arguing that there is indeed additional value to
some trade agreements beyond that simply obtained by liberalizing taris: namely, that
there is value in reducing uncertainty over future trade policy. In order to try to quantify
this additional value, I develop a general equilibrium framework consistent with the types
of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models that are often used to evaluate the
potential value of proposed trade agreements, where my model takes into account this
additional uncertainty-reducing benet of entering into a trade agreement.
Chapter 1 introduces the topic and discusses broader implications of studying tari un-
certainty. In order to motivate the inclusion of tari uncertainty in a general equilibrium
framework, I begin in Chapter 2 by presenting empirical evidence, based on a partial equi-
librium framework, of a negative impact of future tari uncertainty on exports. In this
chapter, I extend previous empirical analysis of tari uncertainty (via tari bindings) to
a large set of countries and nd a negative signicant eect of policy uncertainty arising
from binding overhang, and that this eect is heterogeneous across importing countries. On
average, I nd that the ad valorem tari equivalent imposed by uncertainty arising from
binding overhang for the set of countries in my sample is 8.2%.
In Chapter 3, I extend the theoretical analysis of tari uncertainty in general equilibrium
to a setting with endogenous entry not only into exporting but also into production with
multiple countries and sectors. Based on this model, I obtain numerical results for the
impacts of an (exogenous) threat of reverting to a permanent non-cooperative tari level.
In a symmetric two-country setting, the eects are a 4.55% reduction in trade and a 0.02%
reduction in welfare. I am further able to derive the eect of a tari threat on third-countries
and outside sectors not directly targeted, and nd these eects to be small.
In Chapter 4, I use the model developed in Chapter 3 to analyze the trade and welfare
impacts of a particular agreement: the Chile-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA). This extends
and complements econometric analysis of the impact of uncertainty in the context of other
FTAs. I nd that a model without the tari threat eect predicts that Chilean exports to
the United States should increase by 5.78% and number of exporting rms should increase
by 2.80% as a result of the FTA, while the model with the eect of a tari threat predicts
that exports should increase by 6.98% and the number of exporters by 7.43%.
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There is mounting evidence that an important element in explaining the impact of trade
policy on trade patterns and the behavior of rms is the role of policy uncertainty in shaping
this behavior. In a setup where rms must incur a xed cost to export, uncertainty over
future prots will decrease the incentive of rms to enter into the export market. While
uncertainty over any number of factors playing into export decisions (such as demand,
productivity, exchange rate, etc.) may aect exporters' incentives to export, I focus here on
trade policy uncertainty, specically tari rates, as this allows me to quantify the impact of
one particular type of policy uncertainty, and can provide insight into the eects of broader
policy uncertainty. Unlike most other forms of uncertainty, it is something that can be
measured empirically using tari rates. Further, understanding the eects of uncertainty
over future tari levels is important in its own right, as there is debate over whether trade
agreements that do not substantially change applied tari rates are of any value to exporters.
My dissertation will address this question, arguing that there is indeed additional value to
some trade agreements beyond that simply obtained by liberalizing taris: namely, that
there is value in reducing uncertainty over future trade policy. In order to try to quantify
this additional value, I develop a general equilibrium framework consistent with the types
of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models that are often used to evaluate the
1
potential value of proposed trade agreements, where my model takes into account this
additional uncertainty-reducing benet of entering into a trade agreement.
In order to motivate the inclusion of tari uncertainty in a general equilibrium frame-
work, I begin in Chapter 2 by presenting empirical evidence, based on a partial equilibrium
framework, of a negative impact of future tari uncertainty on exports. In this chapter, I
extend previous empirical analysis of tari uncertainty (via tari bindings) to a large set
of countries and nd a negative signicant eect of policy uncertainty arising from binding
overhang, and that this eect is heterogeneous across importing countries. On average,
I nd that the ad valorem tari equivalent imposed by uncertainty arising from binding
overhang for the set of countries in my sample is 8.2%.
In Chapter 3, I extend the theoretical analysis of tari uncertainty in general equilibrium
to a setting with endogenous entry not only into exporting but also into production with
multiple countries and sectors. Based on this model, I obtain numerical results for the
impacts of an (exogenous) threat of reverting to a permanent non-cooperative tari level.
In a symmetric two-country setting, the eects are a 4.55% reduction in trade and a 0.02%
reduction in welfare. I am further able to derive the eect of a tari threat on third-countries
and outside sectors not directly targeted, and nd these eects to be small.
Using the model developed in Chapter 3, in Chapter 4, I analyze the trade and welfare
impacts of a particular agreement, the Chile-US Free Trade Agreement. This extends and
complements econometric analysis of the impact of uncertainty in the context of other FTAs.
This particular trade policy shock provides a good setting for examining the additional
value of a computable general equilibrium model which takes into account not only applied
tari changes but also changes in uncertainty over future taris as this FTA both reduced
applied taris faced by Chilean exporters and reduced the threat of future tari shocks.
Prior to implementation of the US-Chile FTA, Chilean exporters beneted from unilateral
trade preferences into the United States under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
which allowed for duty free treatment of selected goods, however, these preferences were not
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permanent, and were subject to suspension in the event that a beneciary country was
deemed to be in non-compliance with international labor standards. With the entry into
force of the US-Chile FTA, in addition to several applied taris being lowered, preferential
taris which were previously subject to unilateral revocation at any time were arguably more
certain. The general equilibrium model developed in the previous chapter is calibrated using
trade, tari, and rm data from the year 2006 and then solved in both cases with and without
the threat of GSP preference loss for Chilean exporters in order to evaluate the additional
eect of guaranteeing preferences beyond liberalizing taris. I nd that a model without
the tari threat eect predicts that Chilean exports to the United States will increase by
5.78%, the number of exporters will increase by 2.80% and utility for Chile will decrease by
0.233% as a result of the FTA, while the model with the eect of a tari threat predicts
that exports will increase by 6.98%, the number of exporters by 7.43% and that utility will
fall by 0.231%.
The issue of tari uncertainty is important in and of itself for several reasons. First,
multilateral negotiations in the WTO are over bound tari rates, and the results of a given
negotiation may not aect certain applied taris at all. In light of the conclusion that trade
policy agreements have value beyond applied tari reductions by reducing policy uncertainty,
there is arguably value in continuing to negotiate down bound tari levels, even in cases
where applied taris are already low. Second, the unilateral preference schemes (such as
GSP, AGOA, etc.) oered by several developed countries to developing countries with
the goal of promoting trade integration and increasing exports could better achieve this
goal if the preferences oered were guaranteed to remain in place forever. Currently, these
agreements tend to be approved for nite periods of time into the future, and are subject
to revocation at the discretion of the preference oering country at any time. Beyond the
importance of tari and trade policy uncertainty, however, the issue focused on in this
dissertation has broader implications for the analysis of policy in general. In cases where
up front investments must be made under policy uncertainty, either because of institutional
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uncertainty or of a lack of credibility of the policy implementer, analysis of the potential
eects of any proposed policy should account not only for the applied changes induced by
the policy, but also the degree of uncertainty associated with the policy.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of Trade Policy
Uncertainty on Exporting: An
Empirical Study
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I extend previous empirical analysis of tari uncertainty (via tari bindings)
to a large set of countries and nd a negative signicant eect of policy uncertainty arising
from binding overhang, and that this eect is heterogeneous across importing countries. On
average, I nd that the ad valorem tari equivalent imposed by uncertainty arising from
binding overhang for the set of countries in my sample is 8.2%.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides background information and
the motivation for studying this issue, Section 2.3 briey reviews the related literature,
Section 2.4 outlines the model on which the empirical specication is based, Section 2.5
describes the empirical strategy, Section 2.6 describes the data and presents some basic
summary statistics, Section 2.7 presents the results, Section 2.8 discusses the robustness of
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these results, as well as avenues of future research, and Section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 Background and Motivation
When member countries negotiate taris in the World Trade Organization (WTO), they
agree on what are known as bound tari rates, that is, rates above which they agree not
to raise taris on a given product. The tari rate that a country applies at the border is then
constrained to be less than or equal to this bound rate, and in fact, for many products and
countries, the applied rate is strictly lower than the negotiated bound rate. This results in
the existence of binding overhang: a gap between the bound and applied tari rate. While
it is only the current applied tari of a given market which aects the current period prots
of a rm exporting into that market, the bound rate provides an upper bound on future
applied tari levels. In a setup where exporters must incur an irreversible xed cost to enter
an export market, the current period decision of whether or not to export will be aected
by expectations about future prot levels, and thus will be impacted by expectations over
future applied taris. What is the relationship between tari bindings and the expected
value of future applied taris in practice? Looking at the tari schedules of applied and
bound rates across countries, one sees a great deal of variation in the applied levels and the
gap between applied and bound rates with developed countries generally exhibiting lower
applied taris and lower gaps relative to developing countries. This dierence is largely a
result of developed countries having been the key players in initial multilateral negotiations
where bound rates were negotiated down, as well as a policy of special and dierential
treatment aorded to developing countries in the WTO that allows them to retain higher
bound rates so that they have more exibility in tari policy to deal with various economic
(or political) shocks. The fact that higher bound rates are regarded as increasing the ability
of a country to change tari policy in response to shocks indicates that there is indeed
a correlation between bound tari rates and expected applied rates. For many products
in developed countries, bound rates are exactly equal to applied rates, which implies that
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future applied rates can only remain at current levels or decrease. In cases where these rates
are also zero, the bound tari eectively removes all uncertainty over future applied tari
rates as they cannot be raised. Foletti, Fugazza, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) conduct an
empirical study of historic tari rates to see how countries use the policy space aorded by
bound rates strictly above applied rates and nd that in times of economic crises, higher
gaps between initial applied and bound tari rates are correlated with higher increases in
taris applied in response to the crisis.
In this empirical study, I ultimately aim to answer the following question: Does the
uncertainty generated by a gap between bound and applied tari rates (binding overhang)
in a given market negatively impact the extensive margin of exports into that market? While
previous work addressing this question exists for a single importing country (see Section 2.3),
the current study aims to extend these results to multiple importing countries in order to
investigate whether this uncertainty eect can be observed for other importers.
While uncertainty over any number of factors playing into export decisions (such as
demand, productivity, exchange rate, etc.) may aect exporters' incentives to export, fo-
cusing on trade policy allows me to quantify the impact of one particular type of policy
uncertainty, and can provide insight into the eects of broader policy uncertainty. Unlike
most other forms of uncertainty, it is something that can be measured empirically (via bind-
ing overhang), and the variation in such uncertainty across products allows me to control
for industry and country level eects in my estimation. Further, understanding the eects
of uncertainty due to binding overhang is important in its own right, as there is debate over
whether the reduction of bound rates (without changing applied taris) via WTO negoti-
ations is of any value to exporters. This chapter will address this question, arguing that
reducing only bound rates does increase the incentive to export.
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2.3 Literature Review
This chapter builds on a strand of literature which includes both theoretical and empirical
papers attempting to identify and quantify the eects of various forms of policy uncertainty
on economic outcomes, which I briey summarize here.
One of the rst papers to model the impact of policy uncertainty on economic outcomes
is Rodrik (1991) in which the author develops a purely theoretical model to explain how
investment may respond to policy changes when there is uncertainty over the permanence
of the new policy. Dixit (1989) and Pindyck (1991) develop theoretical models for the
impact of uncertainty in a dynamic framework using an option value approach while Baldwin
and Krugman (1989) develop a theoretical model trade under exchange rate uncertainty.
These underlying theoretical models have since been applied in various settings including
the impact of tax policy uncertainty on investment (Hassett and Metcalf (1999)), the impact
of climate policy uncertainty on investment (Blyth, Bradley, Bunn, Clarke, Wilson and
Yang (2007)), and the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on exports (Baldwin (1988)).
One study which combines the strand of literature examining policy uncertainty and that
exploring cross country institutional explanations for economic outcomes is Kenyon and
Naoi (2010), in which the authors use rm-level survey data on policy uncertainty across
several countries and nd a U-shaped relationship between this uncertainty and political
regime type. That is, they nd higher policy uncertainty in hybrid regimes than in either
more authoritarian regimes or established liberal democracies.
While the above studies focus on various types of policy uncertainty and on policy un-
certainty in general, there are also some studies which have focused on the particular type
of policy uncertainty that I study here: uncertainty over the level of applied taris. Foletti,
Fugazza, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) examine the extent to which countries have used pol-
icy space allowed by binding overhang during previous economic downturns and quantify
how much of this policy space is meaningful. They further use their model to form a predic-
tion of how much taris should be expected to increase as a result of protectionist responses
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to the recent global crisis, nding this to be relatively small (on the order of 8 percent of
current tari levels). Another study looking specically at the issue of tari uncertainty as
constrained by bound tari rates is that of Francois and Martin (2004), however, this paper
focuses mainly on the theoretical welfare implications of tari variability rather than the
its impact on trade. Evenett, Gage and Kennett (2004) provide some evidence of increased
exports after WTO accession to developed countries in products with lower gaps between
preferential and Most Favored Nation (MFN) tari rates, though this evidence is somewhat
mixed. Sala, Schroder and Yalcin (2009) develop a purely theoretical model, using hetero-
geneous rms and an option value approach, and show that a reduction in bound rates can
move forward export time and that we see a larger eect for high risk destination markets.
Finally, the previous work which is most closely related to this study is that of Handley and
Limão (2012), which nds increased entry into the export market for Portuguese exporters
as a result of the reduction in uncertainty from EC accession, and Handley (forthcoming,
JIE) which nds evidence that product level uncertainty negatively impacts the level and
responsiveness of exports to applied tari reductions for exports to Australia. Handley and
Limão (2012) focuses mainly on the reduction in uncertainty associated with entering into
a preferential trade agreement, but does not address the uncertainty arising from binding
overhang. Handley (forthcoming, JIE) does focus on the uncertainty arising from binding
overhang, but does so for just one import market: Australia. The current study will build
on the ndings of Handley (forthcoming, JIE) by determining whether these results are spe-
cic to Australia, or whether they extend to a larger set of import markets. The theoretical
model and empirical strategy presented in sections 2.4 and 2.5 below are based largely on
Handley and Limão (2012) and Handley (forthcoming, JIE) respectively.
2.4 Model
The theoretical model upon which my empirical specication is based comes from Handley
and Limão (2012) and its extension to tari bindings in Handley (forthcoming, JIE), with
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a slight modication to allow for multiple exporting countries (in addition to multiple im-
porting countries). In a multi-period framework with uncertainty over future applied tari
rates, in each period, producers of dierentiated good v in each of the J exporting coun-
tries observe the current applied tari rates (which vary across products and importers) in
each of the I importing countries, as well as the bound rates (which are assumed to remain
constant over time), and decide whether or not to incur the xed cost Ke required to begin
exporting to a new market.
2.4.1 Demand
Utility in each importing country i is Cobb-Douglas over a homogeneous good traded on














where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between dierentiated goods, µ ∈ (0, 1) and
Ωi represents the set of available varieties in country i, which includes both those produced
domestically and those that are imported. Consumption levels of each variety of the dier-
entiated good and of the homogeneous good are then chosen to maximize utility subject to





where pi(v) is the price paid by the consumer in country i for variety v. This then yields













It is assumed that the homogeneous good is produced under constant returns to scale at a
unit cost of 1/wj in country j and is freely traded. Normalizing the price of this good p0 =1
and assuming that the labor market clears then implies that the wage in each country j is
given by wj .
1 The consumer price of a dierentiated good v in country i will include the
tari imposed on that good by country i. Thus, if a producer charges p(v) for the good in
his domestic market, consumers in market i will pay pi(v) = τi(v)p(v) for this good where
τi(v) ≥ 1 is one plus the MFN ad-valorem tari imposed by country i on good v.2
A rm in exporter j is identied by its unit labor requirement cj which is distributed
according to Gj(c), and which is bounded below by c
L
j . The variable costs of producing
q units for this producer are then wjcjq and so the operating prots from exporting into
market i for a rm in country j with unit labor requirement cj is then
(2.5)πij(pj) = pjqi(τipj)− wjcjqi(τipj)
Then, the rm will optimally choose to set its price pj = (wjcj)/α, the standard markup
over marginal cost, and the price for the consumer in importing country i for this good will
be τiwjcj/α. Then, the per-period operating prots for rm j from exporting into market









1−σ captures the exporter cost and importer demand conditions.
2.4.3 Decision to Enter Export Market
I assume a one-time xed cost Ke incurred by rms entering into a new export market.
In this set-up, as in Melitz (2003), in each period, a subset of rms with unit costs below
1Since this good is freely traded, its price will be the same for consumers in all importing countries, thus
I omit the i subscript and assume that pi,0 = p0 ∀i.
2For simplicity, it is assumed that taris are not permitted to vary by the origin of the good, that is,
the tari applied by country i on a given good v must be the same regardless of which country j exports
the good into i. This reects the Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle of the WTO, which requires
that member countries apply the same tari rate to all other member countries. In reality, there is some
heterogeneity of applied taris for a given importer-good across exporters due to the existence of preferential
agreements, however, the focus of this chapter is on the eect of uncertainty between non-preferential
partners. Preferential partners will ultimately be excluded from the empirical analysis, as described below.
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some threshold will pay this entry cost and begin exporting into a given market i. Also as
in Melitz (2003), rms are subject to an exogenous probability δ of death in each period.
Firms hit by the death shock exit the market and do not recoup the xed cost incurred
when they began exporting.
In the case of no uncertainty over taris (where future taris are certain to remain at
the current level), producers will choose to export into market i whenever the net present
discounted value of prots from doing so is at least as great as the sunk cost incurred by









where β = (1 − δ)/(1 + ρ) combines the probability of death in each period and the true
discount factor, ρ. This then denes a cuto unit cost, below which all producers will choose








Now turning to the case of uncertainty, in each period, rms who have already begun
exporting to a given market will continue to do so and will exit only when hit with a
death shock (since they have already paid the xed cost to export). Firms who have not
previously exported to a given market i will choose to enter into that export market when
the net present discounted value, V 1i , of being an exporter into that market exceeds the
option value, V 0i , of waiting to enter into that export market by at least the magnitude of
the xed cost of entry. That is, they will choose to begin exporting into market i when
V 1i ≥ V 0i + Ke. The net present discounted value of exporting into a market depends on
the exporter's expectations over tari levels in that market in future periods. Expectations
over future taris are assumed to be as follows: in each period, the applied (MFN) tari in
market i will be hit with a policy shock with probability γ. In the event of such a policy




above at the level of the bound tari for the given product in market i.
As shown in Handley (forthcoming, JIE), solving the system of equations dened by the
Value functions implies a cuto unit cost cUij given by
(2.9)cUij = Θ(τi)× cDij
where cDij is the cuto unit cost for entry into export market i (for a producer in country




1− β + βγ∆(τi)











. That is, relative to the deterministic
case, there is a lower unit cost cuto (higher productivity cuto) for rms to enter into the
export market under uncertainty over future tari levels.
2.5 Empirical Specication
Following Handley (forthcoming, JIE), I take advantage of the fact that trade in a given






≥ 1, where cLjI is the unit cost of the most productive rm in
industry I in country j and cUiv is the unit cost cuto (dened in the previous section)
dening the upper bound on unit cost for which producers of good v will choose (under
uncertainty) to export the good into market i. Thus, trade in product v will be observed
between importer i and exporter j whenever Zijv ≥ 1, otherwise, no trade is observed.









Assuming that xed costs are constant within importer-exporter-industry group (so that
Ke = KijI), and taking logs of both sides then yields:
(2.11)zjiv = const− σ ln τjiv + ln
[
1− β + βγ∆ (τiv)






where dijI = aij + (1 − σ) ln cLjI − kijI captures the exporter cost and importer demand
conditions (via the aij and ln c
L
jI terms) and the importer-exporter-industry specic xed
costs of exporting, εjiv ∼ N(0, σ2ε) is iid measurement error, and trade is observed when
zjiv is positive.
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Noting that the expression for ln Θσ−1iv in (2.11) fully captures the eect of uncertainty
in the model, Handley (forthcoming, JIE) takes the rst-order Taylor approximation for this
expression about γ = 0 in order to obtain an expression which is linear in γ,
(2.12)
ln Θσ−1iv = ln
[
1− β + βγ∆ (τiv)











Again, following Handley (forthcoming, JIE), to construct a measure of this last term
from applied and bound tari rates, I discretize H(τ) by assuming that with probability
pB = 1−H(τiv) an applied tari at the level of the binding is implemented in the event of













positive whenever the bound tari is greater than the MFN (applied) tari and represents
the uncertainty resulting from the binding overhang for product v in market i.
Substituting this uncertainty measure into (2.11) and (2.12) yields
zijv = const− σ ln τjiv −
βγpB
1− β
Uiv + djiI + εjiv
2.5.1 Baseline Specication
In order to move from the theoretical model to the empirical specication, I make the
assumption that the elasticity of substitution between varieties is constant across industries.
Letting Tijv = 1 [zijv ≥ 0], I model the probability that a good is traded between a given
3Note that if I instead assume only that xed costs are constant within exporter-industry, so that Ke =





+ d1ji + d2jI + εjiv where
d1ij = aij and d2jI = (1 − σ) ln cLjI − kjI . That is, the specication below would include the interaction
between importer and exporter dummies as well as that between exporter and industry dummies, but not
the full set of interactions between all three.
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importer-exporter pair as
(2.13)Pr(Tijv = 1) = F (const+ bτ ln τiv + bUUiv + djiI)
where F is a CDF. For now, I assume F to be linear and specify the following linear
probability model (LPM) as the baseline estimating equation:
(2.14)Pr(Tijv = 1) = b0 + bτ ln τiv + bUUiv + bMFNPOSMFNPOSiv + dijI
where I have also added an indicator for whether or not the MFN (applied) tari is positive,
to disentangle the political economy reverse causality eect between tari levels and imports
whereby we are more likely to see positive taris on goods that are more likely to be
traded due to protectionist pressures from domestic industry.4 Given this specication, the
estimated coecient bτ = −σ (up to a scale factor) and is thus expected to be negative. The
coecient bU = −pB βγ1−β (up to a scale factor) is also expected to be negative and contains
information about the underlying parameters pB and γ; in particular, it is proportional to
pBγ, the probability of a reversal to the binding level.
5 Finally, although not included in
the theoretical framework, I expect bMFNPOS > 0, for the political economy reasons just
mentioned.
2.5.2 Implementation
To implement the specication dened in (2.14), I run a regression on a cross section of
data for one year by pooling all observations together, including xed eects for importer,
exporter, industry, and the full set of interactions between these. While this is the most
straightforward method of implementing the specication dened in (2.14), doing so essen-
tially assigns the same weight to results from each importer and may obscure heterogeneous
eects of uncertainty arising from binding overhang across importers. Thus, in addition to
the pooled regression, I also run a separate regression for each importer, in order to check
4See Appendix A.1 for a more detailed discussion of the rationale for including this explanatory variable
and its implications.
5While the assumption that the CDF F is linear means thatF (x) = ax+ b, specication (2.14) implicitly
assumes that a = 1. This is done to avoid unnecessarily complicating notation, however, this means that
the expressions for estimated coecients in terms of model parameters given here are actually valid up to a
scale factor. This explains why the estimated values for bτ in the results below may not be anywhere near
the assumed value σ = 4.
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whether the overall eect of uncertainty is present for exports into all markets, and whether
there is any heterogeneity across importers of this eect.6
2.6 Data
I use trade and tari data to conduct a cross sectional analysis in the year 2007 of the trade
policy uncertainty eect on the probability that a good is traded. The unit of observation
is then an importer-exporter-product where product is dened at the HS6 level, and the
dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not positive trade is observed for that
importer-exporter-product.7 In order to focus on the eect of policy uncertainty arising
from the gap between MFN and bound tari rates, I include in my sample (for the baseline
specication described in Section 2.5.1) only bilateral country pairs where I expect the
applied tari to be given by the MFN tari, and where the exporting country would expect
future applied taris in the importing country to be bound by the WTO negotiated bound
rate for that country. That is, I include only bilateral pairs where: 1) both the importing and
exporting country are WTO members as of 2007, 2) the importing country bound rates have
gone into force as of 2007, and 3) the importer does not grant the exporter trade preferences
(via a bilateral, multilateral, or unilateral trade preference agreement). In all, this results in
the inclusion of 92 importing countries in my sample. In the following sections, I present a
description and some basic summary statistics for trade and tari data used in the analysis,
as well as the data used to identify bilateral pairs with preferential trade agreements.
6Note that by implementing the specication dened in (2.14), which includes the full set of interactions
between importer, exporter, and industry dummies, I am using only variation across products within a
given importer-exporter-industry to identify the eect of uncertainty arising from binding overhang. If,
in fact, the variation in uncertainty levels (for a given product) across importers aects the likelihood of
that product being exported into each market, the above specication would not take advantage of this
additional source of variation. As noted in footnote 3, by making a stricter assumption on heterogeneity of
xed costs (namely, that xed costs vary only across exporter-industry, but not across importer-exporter-
industry), then the theoretical model yields a specication which allows me to capture this additional source
of heterogeneity:
(2.15)Pr(Tijv = 1) = b0 + bτ ln τiv + bU,iUiv + bMFNPOSMFNPOSiv + d1ji + d2jI + εtjiv
Results for this specication are presented below in section 2.8.2.
7In fact, this binary indicator is set equal to 1 only when the observed trade ow is greater than or equal
to 1000 USD, and zero otherwise.
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2.6.1 Trade and Tari Data
Trade and tari data are obtained through the World Integrated Trading System (WITS)
maintained by the World Bank. Tari data come from both the WTO's Integrated Database
(IDB) and UNCTAD's Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) while the asso-
ciated trade data come from the WTO (for countries with WTO tari data) or from either
COMTRADE or TRAINS (for countries with TRAINS tari data).8 Import values as well
as MFN, preferential and bound taris are obtained for all available reporters at the HS6
digit level for year 2007.9 I dene industries by HS4 subheading and assign each HS6 prod-
uct to one of 1255 possible industries accordingly. The uncertainty measure Uiv is dened







where τiv is one plus the MFN ad-valorem tari rate and τ
B
iv is one plus the ad-valorem
bound tari rate. A value of σ = 4 is assumed.10
2.6.1.1 MFN Rates Above Bound Rate and Unbound Products
As derived in the model above, the measure of uncertainty used to capture uncertainty
arising from binding overhang given by (2.16) will satisfy 0 ≤ Uiv ≤ 1 for non-negative
MFN tari rates at or below the bound rate. Although the applied tari rate is theoretically
required to be below the bound rate, there are some instances in the data where the reported
MFN applied tari exceeds the reported bound rate. This may happen for one of several
reasons. First, the bound rates which were negotiated by WTO members as part of the
8See the tables in Appendix A.2 to nd the trade and tari data source used for each country. Here, the
trade data source will be either WTO, CMT (Comtrade), TRN (Trains), or INV, where INV indicates that
mirror export ows from COMTRADE have been used, due to the importing country not having reported
imports to any of the above sources (WTO, COMTRADE or UNCTAD(TRAINS)).
9Since taris are actually applied at a more disaggregate level for most countries, the tari rates reported
at the 6 digit level are actually simple averages of the tari rates of all tari lines within that 6-digit line.
Since the 6 digit level is the most disaggregate level for which product nomenclatures are standardizes across
countries, this is the level used for this analysis.
10In their model, Bernard et. al. (2003) nd that an assumption of σ = 3.79 (along with an assumption
for the value of a parameter governing the heterogeneity of production eciency) produces simulated results
that closely match actual export, productivity and size statistics for U.S. rms. They use 458 industries
dened at a 4-digit level. See Section 2.8 for a brief discussion of possible ways to test the robustness of my
results to alternative elasticities or industry denitions.
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Uruguay Round were agreed to in 1995, and may appear in the data as the bound rate
in eect for all years 1995 and later. However, because countries were allowed several
years to adjust their tari schedules to comply with these bound rates (see Bacchetta and
Bora (2001)), in the years following 1995 there may be cases where the reported MFN
rate remains above the negotiated bound rate.11 Second, due to the fact that product
nomenclatures change over time, it is possible for a product which was previously subject
to a higher bound rate (or no bound rate) to be reclassied into an HS6 product with a
bound rate below its applied level. In such cases, there may be an implementation phase as
previously described, or it may be the case that WTO members have agreed that despite
the reclassication, this product is not subject to the bound rate. Finally, it is conceivable
that despite having negotiated a certain bound tari for a product, a country might violate
its WTO commitment by setting a tari over this bound level. Further, because taris
reported at the 6-digit level are generally averages of taris for more disaggregate products,
it is possible that while some MFN lines are indeed below the bound rate for that HS6 line,
a high MFN on one product at the tari line level causes the average for that HS6 line to
be over the bound rate as well.
In such cases, computing the uncertainty measure according to the above formula would
yield a negative value. How to appropriately deal with this problem depends on which of
the above cases we are in. In the case where applied rates are gradually being lowered in
order to comply with the negotiated bound rate, it seems likely that exporters believe that
future applied rates will indeed be bounded above by the negotiated bound rate, and so
it may be sensible in such cases to set the uncertainty measure to its lower bound of 0.
On the other hand, if the cause of the MFN rate appearing higher than the bound rate is
that for whatever reason that product is not subject to the bound rate, or there are lines
11I attempt to avoid including importers for whom negotiated bound rates have
not yet gone into eect, using the reported implementation year for bound rates
as reported in the Data Availability for WTO-CTS data in WITS, available at
http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/Support%20Materials/ComtradeCatalog.aspx?Page=DataCatalog.
While dropping countries for whom bound rates are not yet in eect reduces the instances of MFN rates
which are greater than reported bound rates, several such cases still exist. Some of these may still be due to
implementation periods, as certain products may have been granted exceptions to overall implementation
deadlines (see Bacchetta and Bora (2001)).
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within that HS6 line not subject to the bound rate, it is conceivable for exporters of this
HS6 good to assign the maximum level of uncertainty, 1, to this product. To avoid making
an incorrect assumption about which of these cases we are in, in the baseline specication
I drop all importer-products for which the reported MFN rate is greater than the bound
rate. In section 2.8 below, I discuss the robustness of the results to instead assigning an
uncertainty measure of 0 or 1 to such products.
Another case in which there is some ambiguity about how the uncertainty measure should
be derived is for products for which no bound tari rate exists. For some countries, this
may be the case for most products (see Appendix A.2). Theoretically, MFN taris for such
products could be set at arbitrarily high levels in future periods, thus it seems reasonable
to assign an uncertainty measure of 1, the value corresponding to a bound rate of innity,
to such products. This is the method used for dealing with unbound product lines in the
baseline results presented below, while the robustness of these results to instead dropping
unbound product lines is discussed in Section 2.8.
2.6.1.2 AVE Tari Rates
Some tari rates reported in WITS are not actual ad valorem taris, but rather ad valorem
equivalents (AVEs) computed using UNCTAD method 1.12 For my analysis, I treat applied
taris which are AVEs the same as actual ad valorem tari rates, however, I drop from my
sample products which exhibit AVE bound rates. This is because in my model, bound rates
are xed over time and give an upper bound on the distribution of future taris, however,
a bound rate which is in the form of a specic tari (or some other non-ad valorem tari)
can change over time. For most importers, less than 1% of products have bound rates with
AVEs. The nine importers for whom this is not the case are listed in Table 2.1.
12See http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/wits/WITSHELP/Content/Data_Retrieval/P/Intro/C2.Ad_valorem_Equivalents.htm.
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Table 2.1: Bound Tari Ad Valorem Equivalents
Country Total Number of HS6 Products Share of Products with Bound Tari AVEs
Switzerland 5051 85.8%
Norway 5040 12.4%
United States 4985 9.3%
Japan 5051 4.2%
Canada 5048 3.4%
European Union 5019 3.4%
New Zealand 5035 2.2%
Malaysia 5189 2.1%
India 5052 1.0%
2.6.1.3 Tari Summary Statistics
Summary statistics on applied and bound taris, as well as the uncertainty measure derived
therefrom, are given for each country in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 and Appendix A.2.
Summary statistics of these by-importer statistics across importers are presented in
Table 2.2. Unless otherwise noted, these summary statistics are computed after dropping
importer-products for which the bound rate is given as an AVE or the MFN rate exceeds
the bound rate, and assigning an uncertainty measure of Utiv = 1 for importer-products
which are unbound.13
From Table 2.2, we can see by comparing the mean and median of the share of unbound
lines across countries that at least half the countries in the sample exhibit tari bindings
on the vast majority of products, but that there exist some importers with large shares of
HS6 lines that are unbound. We also see that there is a higher degree of variation across
countries of average and median bound tari rates than for average and median MFN tari
rates, but within countries, there appears to be a higher degree of variation (as measured
by the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean) of MFN tari rates than of bound tari
rates. These summary statistics merely present an overall picture of the cross sectional
tari data; in order to compare the degree of variation in applied taris to the variation
in uncertainty measure exhibited across products by each importer, Figure 2.3 depicts the
13Note that in the analysis presented in section 2.7, unbound lines have been assigned the maximum
uncertainty measure of Utiv = 1 (which would be the limit of the uncertainty measure as τBtiv → ∞),
however the robustness of the results to dierent treatment of unbound lines (including dropping them from
the analysis) is discussed in section 2.8.
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Figure 2.1: Applied Tari Summary Statistics
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Figure 2.2: Tari Uncertainty Summary Statistics





























































































Average and Median Uncertainty
Measures by Importer, 2007
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Mean MFN Tari 0.078 0.077 0.039
Median MFN Tari 0.054 0.049 0.040
Std Dev of MFN
Tari
0.068 0.062 0.034






















a. The number of products and share of lines which are unbound or have MFN rates exceeding bound are
all computed using the raw tari data, that is, prior to dropping any observations. All other statistics in
this table are computed on the umdrop-ub1 version of the data, that is, where lines with MFN exceeding
Bound rates have been dropped and where the uncertainty measure for unbound lines has been set equal to
1, as this is the version of the data used in the baseline regressions.
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*Two outliers have been dropped from this graph to allow for a legible scale: Singapore, which has
(cv_MFN = 58.98, cv_U = 0.81); and Macedonia, which has (cv_MFN = 1.18, cv_U = 12.38).
coecients of variation (equal to the standard deviation divided by the mean) for applied
taris and uncertainty measures for each importer. The fact that most importers lie below
the 45 degree line in this gure indicates that most countries exhibit a higher degree of
variation in MFN taris than for uncertainty measure, although I note that several of the
exceptions to this are represented by countries which make up a large share of world trade
(including the United States, the European Union, China, and Japan).
2.6.1.4 Preferential Tari Rates
In order to identify bilateral pairs for which the vast majority of applied tari lines are
MFN (rather than preferential) taris, indicators are created for each year at the importer-
exporter-product level, indicating whether a preferential tari rate exists, and then importer-
exporter pairs are assigned a preference indicator equal to 1 whenever the share of HS6 lines
for which a preferential tari exists exceeds some cuto, with the baseline cuto being 25%,
and cutos of 10% and 50% used to check the robustness of results to the cuto level.14 The
14Depending on the source of the tari data (either TRAINS or WTO-IDB), preferential taris may
be identied in one of two ways. For TRAINS data, preferential taris are reported, and so a preference
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table in Appendix A.3 lists, by exporter, the number of partners for whom the preference
indicator is set to 1 in each year, using each possible cuto value.
As a further check for the existence of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), the PTA
database developed by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) is used to assign preference indicators to
any bilateral pairs engaged in a Free Trade Agreement, Customs Union, Common Market,
or Economic Union that may have been missed using the preferential tari data as described
in the preceding paragraph.15 Then, in the baseline specication, importer-exporter pairs
with a preference indicator equal to one will be excluded from the analysis.
2.7 Results
In this section, I present the results of the baseline specication, rst implementing this as a
pooled regression and then running separate regressions by importer. All results presented in
this section are for the sample of countries identied as non-preferential partners according to
the 25% cuto and Baier Bergstrand data (see section 2.6.1.4), and, except where otherwise
noted, is based on data for which products with MFN rates exceeding bound rates have
been dropped and the uncertainty measure for unbound lines has been set equal to one.16
Further, the regression is run after dropping observations within industry-bilateral pairs
where either all products exhibit positive trade ows (that is, where Tijv = 1 ∀v ∈ I) or no
products exhibit positive trade ows (that is, where Tijv = 0 ∀v ∈ I).17 In all, this yields
4,344,637 observations at the importer-exporter-product level.
indicator is set to one for any importer-exporter-product for which such a tari exists, even if the preferential
tari rate is equal to the MFN rate. For IDB data, preferential taris are not reported, however, eective
applied rates are given at the bilateral product level, and will be dierent from the MFN rate whenever a
preferential tari (not equal to the MFN rate) exists. In the latter case, the existence of an eective applied
rate unequal to the MFN rate is used as the criteria for assigning an indicator equal to 1 for a preferential
tari.
15This database is available on Jeery Bergstrand's website, http://www.nd.edu/~jbergstr/#Links.
16All possible combinations of assigning uncertainty measures of 0, 1, or dropping observations with MFN
> Bound, assigning uncertainty measures of 1 or dropping unbound lines, and cuto values of 50% and 10%
of HS6 lines exhibiting preferential taris in assigning preference indicators were implemented as well. The
robustness of the results presented here to these dierent methods of dealing with such products is discussed
in the following section.
17Leaving all such observations in, I still obtain signicant point estimates of the expected sign for all
coecients, however, the magnitudes of these point estimates are biased down by the inclusion of these
observations.
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bτ (-) -0.427*** (0.0114)
bU (-) -0.0914*** (0.00243)
bMFNPOS (+) 0.0999*** (0.00166)
No. Obs. 4,307,329
R-squared 0.239
†Signicance at the 1% level is represented by ***, 5% is ** and 10% is *, using heteroskedastic-robust standard
errors.







bτ (-) -0.610*** (0.0139)
bU (-) -0.116*** (0.00471)
bMFNPOS (+) 0.110*** (0.00177)
No. Obs. 3,452,925
R-squared 0.240
†Signicance at the 1% level is represented by ***, 5% is ** and 10% is *, using heteroskedastic-robust standard
errors.
2.7.1 Pooled Regressions
As described in the previous sections, I rst implement specication (2.14) on the pooled
sample of all importer-exporter-product observations. That is, I run the following regression:
Pr(Tijv = 1) = b0 + bτ ln τiv + bUUiv + bMFNPOSMFNPOSiv + djiI
Table 2.3 presents the results of this pooled regression. While pooling the observations
together in this way assumes no heterogeneity in the marginal eects of taris and un-
certainty across importers, it does allow me to compute overall point estimates for these
eects.
These results are all signicant (at the 1% level) and reect the expected signs. While
the robustness of the various results presented in this section is mainly left to the discussion
below, I present here as well (in Table 2.4) the results obtained from the pooled regression
after dropping all unbound lines (rather than setting the uncertainty measure equal to 1 for
these lines), in order to check whether the signicant eect of the uncertainty measure is
due entirely to the uncertainty eect for unbound versus bound lines.
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Comparing the results in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, we see that the point estimates for all three
coecients appear to be largely consistent across the two data treatments (although we
do see a slight increase in the magnitude of the uncertainty eect when dropping unbound
products, suggesting that assigning an uncertainty measure of 1 to unbound lines may be
overstating the actual uncertainty for these products).
To interpret the magnitude of the coecient estimates, recall that bτ is the coecient
of the log of τ (where τ is 1 plus the ad valorem tari). Thus, turning back to the results
in Table 2.3, we can interpret the magnitude of the point estimate of bτ to indicate that, an
increase in τ of 1% (which would be about the same as a 1 percentage point increase in the
ad-valorem tari for taris near 0) would correspond to a decrease in the likelihood of the
good being traded by 0.427 percentage points.18 As for the uncertainty eect, again looking
at the results in Table 2.3, b̂U = −0.0914 indicates that an increase in the uncertainty
measure by one standard deviation (0.3599) would be expected to increase the probability
of that good being traded by 3.3 percentage points. Keep in mind that although I estimate
a linear probability model, thus assuming a linear eect of the uncertainty measure, this
comes from using a linear approximation around γ = 0 (see equation 2.12) to obtain the
applied specications. As γ increases, this approximation becomes less accurate, and in
fact, we know from the true theoretical model that for γ > 0, the relationship between the
probability of trade and the uncertainty measure is non-linear and concave in U (see the
left hand equation in 2.12).
Similarly, the results of the regression using the subset of data for which all product lines
have bound rates specied, the coecient estimates in table 2.4 indicate that a 1% increase
in τ would correspond to a decrease in the probability of a good being traded by 0.61
percentage points while an increase in the uncertainty measure by one standard deviation
(0.2987 for this subset of the data) would correspond to a decrease in the probability of the
18In interpreting these coecients, it is important to remember that the sample includes only products
for the given importer-exporter-industry contains some products that are traded and some that are not.
Thus, this prediction about the eect of a change in taris (or uncertainty measures) applies only to such
products.
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bτ 70.3 59.3 26.4 14.3 -1.3 -2 -0.557 -0.685 11.3 12.7
bMFNPOS 17.6 7.7 76.9 70.3 0.156 0.192 0.118 0.127 0.765 0.838
bU 69.2 54.9 30.8 19.8 1 -0.0836 -0.0995 -0.117 10.2 0.364
bτ AND bU 49.5 35.2 9.9 5.5
R-squared 0.218 0.226
No. importers = 91
*Signicance is at the 5% level, using heteroskedastic-robust standard errors.
good being traded by 3.5 percentage points.
To compare the relative magnitudes of the impact of a change in applied tari versus a
change in the uncertainty measure, I note that for a product with mean (across countries of
country-level means) uncertainty measure 0.525, the reduction in probability of this good
being traded due to uncertainty is equivalent to that which would be implied by a tari
of 11.2% (=.525 ∗ β̂U
β̂τ
). In other words, the ad valorem tari equivalent of the uncertainty
imposed by binding overhang and unbound taris is 11.2% on average, based on the results
of the pooled regression. Using the point estimates from the specication in which unbound
tari lines are dropped, we get that the ad valorem equivalent of the uncertainty imposed
by binding overhang is equal to 8.2% (=.429 ∗ β̂U
β̂τ
).19
2.7.2 Regressions By Importer
In addition to the regression on the pooled sample, I run an analogous regression separately
for each importer. That is, the following regression is implemented for each importer i:
(2.17)Pr(Tijv = 1) = b0,i + bτ,i ln τiv + bU,iUiv + bMFNPOS,iMFNPOSiv + djiI
2.7.2.1 Summary
The results of the importer-specic estimates are summarized in Table 2.5.
19In this calculation .429 is used as the average uncertainty measure rather than .525 as the latter was
computed across all tari lines setting the uncertainty measure equal to 1 for unbound lines while the former
is the average uncertainty measure across only bound lines.
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Overall, the by-importer regression estimates reect the expected signs and reinforce the
results of the pooled regression. From columns 2-5 of Table 2.5, we see that for all three
coecient estimates of explanatory variables, a majority of the by-importer regressions yield
estimates which are signicant with the expected sign.20 The percentage of importers for
which bτ and bU are either both negative (and signicant) or both positive (and signicant)
is also presented. We see that although 70.3% of importers yield a negative estimate for bτ
and 69.2% yield a negative estimate for bU , these are not the same set of importers, as only
49.5% of importers yield negative estimates for both coecients. Still, this is much greater
than the share with positive estimates for both (9.9%), and there are 35.2% of importers
which yield negative and signicant coecients for both bτ and bU , while only 5.5% yield
positive signicant estimates for both. At the same time, it is clear that the expected
results are not obtained for all importers, and that the results of the pooled regression do in
fact mask a fair amount of heterogeneity in eects across importers. This heterogeneity is
also evident in looking at the standard deviation of these point estimates across importers
(standard deviations across all regressions and across those for which the point estimate is
signicant are given in Columns 10 and 11 respectively of Table 2.5), which are larger (for
all estimated coecients) in magnitude than the coecient mean.
Columns 6-9 of Tables (2.5) give the mean and median of the point estimates across
all importers, as well as across the subset of point estimates which are signicant at the
5% level in order to give some sense of the magnitude of these coecient estimates. The
median signicant point estimate of -0.685 for bτ indicates that for this median exporter, an
increase in τ of 1% (which would be about the same as a 1 percentage point increase in the
ad-valorem tari for taris near 0) would correspond to a decrease in the likelihood of the
good being traded by .685 percentage points. As for the uncertainty eect, again looking at
the median signicant point estimate, bU = −0.117 indicates that for this median exporter,
20The statistics presented here use a signicance denition at the 5% level, however the patterns described
here are all robust to using either 1% or 10% signicance levels. At each signicance level, we still nd a
majority of importers reecting signicant results with the expected sign with one exception: the percent
of importers with negative and signicant estimates for bU where signicance is at the 1% level is only 44%,
that is, not the majority, however this is still a much larger share than that for which this estimate is positive
and signicant (15.4%).
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for a previously unbound tari line (for which the uncertainty measure is set to 1) setting
the bound rate at the applied rate would be expected to increase the probability of that
good being traded by 11.7 percentage points. The magnitudes of these median signicant
coecients are somewhat in line with the point estimates of the coecients in the pooled
regression (see Section 2.7.1), with this median estimate being larger than that from the
pooled regression (by a factor of about 1.3 for bU , and 1.6 for bτ ).
In order to give a more complete picture of the distribution of point estimates for βU
across importers, Figure 2.4 presents the kernel density function estimated from these nor-
malized point estimates.
Overall, the by-importer regressions yield a majority of importers reecting signicant
point estimates with the expected sign, however, they also indicate that there is fair amount
of heterogeneity across importers in these eects. This heterogeneity is something that I
may study and attempt to explain in future work, as discussed in Section 2.8.
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Table 2.6: Australia Results









Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.7.2.2 Select Importers
Due to the large number of countries, I do not include the full set of regression results for
each importer as summarized in Table 2.5. Instead, I present here the results for a select
few importers of interest.
First, I present the by-importer regression results where Australia is the importing coun-
try (Table 2.6) in order to compare these to the results of Handley (forthcoming, JIE), which
focuses on the eect of binding overhang for exports to Australia. I include results from
both the baseline treatment of the data (where products with MFN > bound rates are
dropped and the uncertainty measure for unbound lines set to 1) as well as those obtained
after dropping both products with MFN > bound rates and unbound products.
As in Handley (forthcoming, JIE), I nd that the probability of a good being exported
into Australia is positively correlated with a positive applied tari, and is negatively im-
pacted by the level of the applied tari on the good as well as by level of uncertainty due to
binding overhang. The underlying data used in his study is not identical to that used here;
Handley (forthcoming, JIE) uses data from years 2004 and 2006 (pooling these together in
one regression), while my data is for year 2007. Further, his data are at a more disaggregate
level (10 digit), while mine are at the 6-digit level, implying that tari rates used in my
analysis may actually be averages of tari rates applied at a higher level of disaggregation.
Noting this, I compute the ratio of of the estimated coecients b̂U
b̂τ
obtained for Australia
in my study, which is equal to 0.0889 in the baseline data treatment and 0.142 in the case
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Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
where unbound lines are dropped. The analogous ratio from the baseline regression in Han-
dley (forthcoming, JIE) is 0.102, which is of the same order of magnitude as my estimates.
Further, using the same methodology as above to write the ad valorem tari equivalent of
binding overhang uncertainty implied by these point estimates, I obtain that this AVE is
1.8% (=.208∗ b̂U
b̂τ
) using the results of the baseline specication (presented in Table 2.6) and
the average uncertainty measure for Australian imports in the case where unbound tari
lines are assigned an uncertainty measure of 1. In the case where unbound lines are dropped,
this average uncertainty measure is .184 and so the implied AVE of uncertainty due only to
binding overhang on tari lines which are bound is given by .184∗ b̂U
b̂τ
= 2.6%. Performing the
same calculation to obtain the AVE implied by the results and average uncertainty measure
reported in Handley (forthcoming, JIE) yields an AVE for binding uncertainty of 2.1%, so
my results match fairly well with this previous study.
I also present here the results of the by-importer regressions for two special cases that
allow me to avoid any possible misspecication of how applied tari levels enter in the
decision to export. In 2007, Hong Kong and Macao have tari schedules with an MFN tari
that is constant across all products (0% for all products in both cases). Though there is
no variation in MFN rates for these countries, both exhibit variation in their uncertainty
measures; only some products have tari bindings (which are all bound at zero), while the
unbound lines have uncertainty measures set to 1.
Table 2.7 presents the by-importer regression results for the importers whose tari struc-
tures exhibit variation in the uncertainty measure but no variation in MFN taris. In both
cases, we obtain a negative and signicant point estimate for the impact of this uncertainty
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on the probability of export. Noting that for these two importers, since all products have
an uncertainty measure of either 0 (for lines bound at the MFN rate of 0) or 1 (for un-
bound lines), these point estimates of bU can be interpreted as the dierence in probability
of export between these two types of products. Specically, for Hong Kong, these results
would imply that for products within HS4 industries where some trade is observed with a
given exporter, binding a previously unbound line at the MFN rate of 0% would increase
the probability of trade of that good from the given exporter into Macao by 8.68 percentage
points, while for Macao, it would increase this probability by 13.4 percentage points.21
2.7.3 Quantication
While the results presented above include some discussion of the relative magnitudes of the
eects of applied taris versus that of uncertainty on entry into a given export market, it
is not obvious how big of an overall impact changes in applied or bound taris would be
expected to have on trade ows. To quantify this, we need to know not only the marginal
eect of a tari or uncertainty reduction on trade ows for each importer, but also the initial
tari structure in the import market being considered. Given this, one can then use the
point estimates from the above regressions to quantify how much new entry into exporting
one would expect to occur following a given policy change. In this section, I perform exactly
this exercise for each bilateral pair, for each of the following three policy shock scenarios
implemented in the importing country:
1. All applied (MFN) tari rates are reduced to zero; bound taris remain in place;
2. All applied (MFN) tari rates remain in place; bound taris are reduced to equal the
applied rate;
3. All applied and bound taris are reduced to zero.
21I note here that these two import markets are also special cases in that many imports to Macao and
Hong Kong are then re-exported to China, so that the incentives of rms exporting to these destinations
may be dierent from those exporting to nal destination countries.
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Using the point estimates of the by-importer regressions summarized in Section 2.7.2, I
compute, at the bilateral level, the number of new products for which we would expect to
observe positive trade ows following such a policy change, where this number is dened as
the sum over all included products of the predicted change in probability of trade.22 Figure
2.5 shows the mean (across exporters) percent increase in number of products exported to
each importer following each of the above three policy scenarios.23 While this gives some
sense of relative potential eect of tari policy changes across importers, it is the case that
some of these predictions are based on point estimates from the by-importer regressions
which are not signicant. Thus, Figure 2.6 shows these mean predicted increases only for
importers for whom the point estimates for applied taris and the uncertainty measure
were both signicant (at the 5% level, see Table A.3 in Appendix A.4). Due to the fact that
most importers with signicant point estimates have estimates with the expected sign (see
Section 2.7.2), we see that for most importers, each of the three policy changes results in a
prediction of an increase in goods exported to these markets and that this increase caused
by setting all MFN taris to zero is further increased by also reducing the bound rates to
zero.24 A casual comparison between the ranking of importers in Figures 2.5 and 2.6 and
that in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 seems to indicate that this ranking is driven not just by initial
tari structure in importing countries, but that the heterogeneous marginal eects of taris
and uncertainty across these importers plays a large role in determining which importers
would see the largest changes in trade ows following such a policy change.
The estimated changes in the number of products traded following the above policy
changes in this exercise come with two important caveats. First, the empirical specication
22As with the sample for the regressions, this quantication exercise is done after dropping product-
exporter-importer observations where it is the case that within the given hs4 industry-bilateral pair either
all products are traded or all are not traded, as for these products, the tari/uncertainty eects are not
identied. Thus, for each importer, the increase in the number of products traded by each exporter is
divided by the number of included products exported by this exporter in order to determine the percent
increase in number of products traded for this bilateral pair.
23See Table A.3 in Appendix A.4 for by Importer summary statistics on the percent increase in products
traded under each policy scenario for each exporter.
24Note that even for importers with point estimates of the expected sign for all coecients, we may observe
a decrease in the average predicted number of products imported after setting all MFN rates to zero while
leaving bound rates as is. This is possible when the eect of the increased uncertainty created by lowering
these bound rates outweighs the direct eect of the lower applied rates.
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Figure 2.5: Predicted Increase in Number of Products Traded


























































































Average Log Percent Increase In
Bilateral Number of Products Imported
MFN tariffs to zero
Bound tariffs to MFN
Bound and MFN tariffs to zero
*Note: Kuwait and Chile have been dropped from this graph they are extreme outliers (with a predicted
40680% decrease and 3703% increase respectively in the number of products traded under policy scenario
3) and render the scale unreadable.
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Figure 2.6: Predicted Increase in Number of Products Traded for Signicant Results
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from which the estimated eects of applied and bound tari rates comes is based on a
partial equilibrium theoretical model. In reality, if all exporters into a given import market
face reduced taris and/or uncertainty, competition in this market would increase, thus
osetting some of the positive eects on exporting for each individual exporter. Second, to
take the results of this quantication exercise literally, we must assume that the empirical
specication does not suer from omitted variable bias. In reality, the uncertainty measure
arising from the gap between applied and bound tari rates may be proxying for other
types of uncertainty as well; for example, I would expect that products with a high degree
of tari uncertainty due to political economy pressures from domestic lobbies to maintain
high bound rates might also be subject to a great deal of uncertainty on the application of
other protectionist measures, such as antidumping duties. Thus, the estimate of the number
of new products traded due to a reduction in uncertainty implied by a reduction in bound
tari rates should be interpreted more accurately as the number of new products that I
would expect to be traded in the event that all uncertainty correlated with the binding
overhang uncertainty were removed from that product. In other words, reducing the bound
tari rate to the applied rate may not result in as large an increase in trade as implied by
this exercise if other forms of trade policy uncertainty persist.
2.8 Discussion
In this section I address the sensitivity of my results to various assumptions and data
treatments.
2.8.1 Alternative Data Treatments
Recall that in the baseline data treatment on which the results presented above are based,
products for which the MFN exceeded the bound rate were dropped, the uncertainty measure
for products with no bound rate was set to one, and the preference indicator was dened
according to a 25% (of product lines with preferences) cuto (further supplemented by
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the PTAs identied in the Baier Bergstrand dataset). In order to check the robustness
of these results to alternative methods of dealing with MFN rates exceeding bound rates,
unbound lines, and alternative preference cutos, I re-run both the pooled and the by-
importer regressions under several dierent treatments of the data. A detailed description
of these alternative data treatments as well as a table summarizing the output of each
regression are contained in Appendix A.4.
Overall, the results presented in Section 2.7 appear to be robust to the alternative data
treatments, with the exception of the way products with MFN rates exceeding bound rates
are handled. Namely, we see strong support for the model prediction that the uncertainty
arising from the gap between bound and applied taris rates for a given importer-product
has a negative and signicant impact on the probability of that good being exported into
that market for various data treatments, except for the case when products with MFN rates
exceeding bound rates are assigned an uncertainty measure of 1. Given the discussion of
possible reasons for the existence of such lines in Section 2.6.1.1, however, it seems that the
most reasonable way of dealing with such lines ex-ante would be to either drop them, or set
the uncertainty measure to zero, as the reason for which the MFN tari exceeds the bound
rate seems to be due to gradual implementation. In the cases where these lines are either
dropped or assigned an uncertainty measure equal to zero, we do see the expected results.
It is however somewhat surprising that the treatment of such lines has such a substantial
impact on the results, given the small share of products for which this problem occurs in
most importers (see Table 2.2).
Despite this overall eect observed in the pooled regressions, the by-importer regressions
reveal a great degree of heterogeneity in this eect across importing countries. While there
are more importing countries displaying the a signicant negative impact of uncertainty than
there are displaying a positive signicant eect, there are importers in both categories. Such
heterogeneity requires explanation, and is something that I aim to explore in future work.
In particular, the current specication assumes a constant value for γ, the probability of the
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arrival of a tari shock in each period, across importers. In reality, there are many reasons
to think that exporters may have expectations about the probability of tari changes that
dier across dierent importing markets. For example, political economy characteristics
such as the institutional structure of government or the degree of inuence exerted by
lobbying groups may dier across importers. Additionally, past behavior of governments in
altering tari schedules is likely to shape the expectations of exporters about future tari
shocks. In future work, I plan to exploit variation in such political economy characteristics
and historical tari rates across importing countries to attempt to explain the heterogeneity
observed here in the impact of binding overhang levels on the probability of export.
2.8.2 Alternative Specications
In this section, I summarize and interpret the results of various specications run on dierent
subsamples of my data in testing for the eect of uncertainty due to binding overhang on
the probability of export. The dierent dimensions along which I change the set-up are:
• The level of interaction between the dummy variables for importer, exporter, and
industry: In the baseline specication given by (2.14), I include a dummy for each
importer-exporter-industry, based on the assumption that xed costs to export vary
across bilateral pair-industry. If instead, I assume that these vary only across exporter-
industry, the appropriate specication would include separate xed eects at the level
of the bilateral pair, and the exporter-industry as given in (2.15), that is, Pr(Tijv =
1) = b0 + bτ ln τiv + bUUiv + bMFNPOSMFNPOSiv + d1ij + d2jI . Implementing this
specication allows me to use variation in uncertainty measures across products and
importers (within a given industry) in estimating the eect of this uncertainty, rather
than just across products within a given importer-industry. Under this set-up, I no
longer assume that there are xed importer-exporter-industry eects, so that I no
longer need to drop all observations that were excluded in the baseline set-up, but
rather here only observations for which all products in a given exporter-industry are
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bτ (-) -0.427*** 0.0110*** -0.0865*** -0.0281***
bU (-) -0.0914*** -0.0294*** -0.00215*** -0.00195***
bMFNPOS
(+)
0.0999*** 0.0267*** 0.0102*** 0.00904***
No. Obs. 4,307,329 13,893,512 28,620,297 48,774,542
R-squared 0.239 0.330 ~0.37 ~0.33
†Signicance at the 1% level is represented by ***, 5% is ** and 10% is *, using heteroskedastic-robust
standard errors.
††Standard errors for specications where importer-exporter and exporter-industry xed eects are included
separately are computed using a bootstrap method with 50 iterations.
not traded (or all traded), that is, to EVERY possible import partner. This allows
me to include far more observations than in the previous case, but also relies on this
assumption that importer-exporter-industry eects are not present.
• The denition of industry: In the results presented above, industry is dened at
the HS4 level, yielding 1255 industries. Here, I implement the same specications
described above with industry dened at the HS2 level, yielding 97 industries.
The results of the four possible combinations of interaction level and industry denition are
presented in Table 2.8.
We see here that in each specication, the point estimates of all explanatory variables
are signicant and of the expected sign, with the exception of the coecient for log τ in the
case with fully interacted dummies when industry is dened at the HS2 level, in which case
this coecient is signicant and positive. One possible explanation for this dierence (in
the fully interacted specications) is the fact that at the HS2 level, for a given exporter-
importer, products may actually be complements rather than substitutes, while they are
more generally substitutes at the HS4 level. The fact that this discrepancy does not occur
for the HS2 denition in the case where importer-exporter and exporter-industry eects are
included separately indicates that any within importer eects going in the opposite of the
expected direction for applied tari are outweighed by the between importer eects going
in the expected (negative) direction. Another possibility is that this unexpectedly positive
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eect of applied taris on trade for the fully interacted case when industry = HS2 only
occurs for certain types of products, which is explored below.
Based on the estimates in Table 2.8 above, Table 2.9 presents the ad valorem equivalent
tari rate imposed on average by uncertainty from binding overhang. I do not include here
calculations for the fully interacted dummy specication with industry at the HS2 level
(results for which are given in Table 2.8) as the point estimate on log tau in this case
in positive (thus the ad valorem equivalent of the eect of uncertainty implied by these
estimates would be positive).
Clearly, the specications that include separate xed eects for importer-exporter and
exporter-industry (columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.9, which represent these results using industry
dened at the HS4 and HS2 level respectively) yield estimates indicating a smaller magnitude
of the eect of both applied taris and uncertainty on the probability of trade, as well as a
smaller eect of uncertainty relative to that of applied taris. This dierence may be due
to the dierent sample of observations included in each case (that is, in the fully interacted
case, column 1, I include only observations where there is variation in trade/no trade within
importer-exporter-industry, thus these results may reect a stronger eect of taris and
uncertainty for such products relative to those where either all products or no products are
traded for the particular importer-exporter-industry).
To make this point more clearly, consider the variation being captured in the specication
where only importer-exporter and exporter-industry eects are included (in the case where
industry = HS4, this specication corresponds to column 2 of Table 2.9). For a given
exporter, this specication measures the eect of uncertainty (as well as of applied taris)
using variation across products within a given industry both within a given importer, as
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well as across importers. Now, consider an HS4 category in which country B exports at
least some products, but does not export any to country A. For the specication in column
1, all observations for this HS4 category where country B is exporter will be dropped from
the sample. The specication in column 2, however, adds these observations back in. What
is their eect on the point estimate for uncertainty (and of applied taris)? Since there
may be variation in the uncertainty measures (and taris) across these products for country
A, but since no positive trade is observed for these products from country B to A, the
eect of including these observations must necessarily reduce (in absolute value) the point
estimate of uncertainty (and taris). Similarly, consider another set of observations which
were excluded from the column 1 specication: where all products in a given HS4 category
exhibit positive trade ows from country B to A. Again, under the column 1 specication, all
products in this HS4 category with exporter = country B are thrown out of the sample. By
adding them back in for the column 2 specication, we again necessarily obtain a smaller
estimate of the eect of uncertainty (and taris), since again, these products in market
A may exhibit variation in uncertainty measures and applied taris, but no variation is
observed for this country-pair-HS4 in trade ows.
Of course, the assumptions in implementing the specication in column 2 are that a
lack of variation in trade ows for a given importer-exporter-HS4, despite a variation in
uncertainty across these observations, indicates a lack of uncertainty eect, and therefore
that my point estimate should be reduced (relative to column 1). However, this speci-
cation, though controlling for importer-exporter eects, does not control for importer-HS4
eects, and therefore may be failing to capture the true reason for no trade (or all products
traded) within a given importer-exporter-HS4. That is, there may be some characteristic
of the relationship between the given importer-exporter for that particular HS4 which is
not related to tari uncertainty, but which explains the zero (or all positive) trade ows in
that industry for the country pair. In other words, one might say that this industry is not
marginal for that country pair in the sense that changes in uncertainty will not aect the
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Table 2.10: Summary of Results
Fully Interacted Imp-Exp; Exp-Ind†† Imp-Exp; Exp-Ind;
fully interacted
sample††
HS2 HS4 HS2 HS4 HS2 HS4
bτ 0.0110*** -0.427*** -0.0281*** -0.0865*** -0.0865*** -0.267***
bU -0.0294*** -0.0914*** -0.00195*** -0.00215*** -0.0135*** -0.0208***
bMFNPOS 0.0267*** 0.0999*** 0.00904*** 0.0102*** 0.0278*** 0.0393***
Signicance at the 1% level is represented by ***, 5% is ** and 10% is *, using heteroskedastic-robust
standard errors.
††Signicance inferred using a bootstrap method with 50 iterations.
probability of trade, due to the existence of some other factor preventing trade from being
observed (or causing all products to be traded) for that particular industry and country
pair. One possible way to deal with this would be to eliminate observations belonging to
countrypair-industries which are not marginal, that is, to drop observations where either
all products or no products for the given importer-exporter-HS4 are traded. Indeed, by
doing so, I implement the specication with importer-exporter and exporter-industry xed
eects included separately on the same sample of data that was used in the fully interacted
importer-exporter-industry specication. Table 2.10 shows that indeed, by dropping obser-
vations from these importer-exporter-industries where either all products or no products are
traded, we see stronger eect of both taris and uncertainty. Using these point estimates
to compute the ad valorem equivalent of uncertainty associated with binding overhang (as
presented in Table 2.9), we obtain that in the specication with separate import-exporter
and exporter-HS4 xed eects this ad valorem equivalent is 4.1% while in the case of the
separate importer-exporter and exporter-HS2 xed eects, the implied AVE of uncertainty
is 8.2%. Thus, the observations included appear to account at least partly for the dierence
in magnitude of coecients between the two types of specications (although not for the
nding of a positive eect of applied taris in the case of the fully interacted specication
with industry = HS2).
In addition to the specications above, I also check whether the eects of each explana-
tory variable are specic to product type by level of dierentiation, separating products into
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Table 2.11: Summary of Results by Rauch classication
Fully Interacted Imp-Exp; Exp-Ind
HS2 HS4 HS2 HS4
h_logtau 0.0162*** -0.333*** -0.00787*** -0.0418***
n_logtau -0.0304*** -0.431*** -0.0493*** -0.111***
h_UM -0.0144*** -0.0419*** 0.012*** 0.018***
n_UM -0.0254*** -0.104*** -0.00781*** -0.0112***
h_MFNpos 0.0158*** 0.0698*** 0.00711*** 0.00939***
n_MFNpos 0.0343*** 0.114*** 0.0104*** 0.00989***





from specications not allowing heterogeneous eects of explanatory vars:
b_log_tau 0.0110*** -0.427*** -0.0281*** -0.0865***
b_U_M -0.0294*** -0.0914*** -0.00195*** -0.00215***
b_MFN_pos 0.0267*** 0.0999*** 0.00904*** 0.0102***
homogeneous and dierentiated categories based on the Rauch (1999) liberal classication
scheme, and grouping Rauch's homogeneous and reference-priced goods into one category.25
The above specications are run using an assumed value of 4 for the elasticity of substi-
tution between products, however, in identifying each HS6 line as either homogeneous or
dierentiated based on the classication provided by Rauch (1999), I now also use corrected
elasticities of σh = 3.2, and σn = 2.1 based on the estimated median elasticity for each type
of product in Broda and Weinstein (2006) for the liberal Rauch classication scheme. Table
2.11 presents the results of these specications.
In general, the results of Table 2.11 seem to reect signicantly dierent estimates on all
explanatory variables across product type (dierentiated vs. not), with the results for dier-
entiated products appearing to be stronger than for not dierentiated (and in the non-fully
interacted case, we also don't see the expected sign of uncertainty for the non-dierentiated
products).26 One possibility for the dierent estimates is that exporters place dierent prob-
abilities of reversion to bound tari rates across the two product types. Another possibility
25Results presented here are qualitatively unaected by using instead Rauch's conservative classication
scheme.
26Note that, although not reported here, the 'anomalous' results of a positive estimate for taris in the
fully interacted case goes away when we switch to the umdrop_ubdrop version of the data, that is, after
dropping unbound lines from the analysis, rather than assigning them with the maximum uncertainty level
of 1.
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is that the estimates for non-dierentiated products are biased towards zero due to the fact
that these products are more likely to represent multiple rms, despite my assumption that
there is one rm for each product. Thus, it may be the case that I am failing to capture
action on the extensive margin (the decision of individual rms to enter the export market)
more for these products when using the HS6 product denition to proxy for rms. To check
if this is the case, I re-run the above specications using import value (rather than the binary
indicator for whether or not positive trade ows are observed) as my dependent variable. If
the dierences above are due to this diering number of rms for dierent products types, I
would expect this dierence in estimates to go away when looking at estimates of the eect
of taris and uncertainty on the intensive margin (import value). The results of this (not
presented here) do not provide much evidence for this hypothesis, as dierences persist in
estimates across the two product types. As a check for whether taris have tended to be
more likely to increase (decrease) for one product type over another, thus lending plausi-
bility to the idea that exporters place dierent probabilities of reversal to bindings on the
two products types, I also analyze summary statistics (across countries) by product type of
applied taris over the time period from 1996-2006, however, I do not nd any signicant
dierences between the two product types.
2.8.3 Explaining Heterogeneous Results Across Importers
Table 2.5 summarizes the results of the by-importer regressions and indicates that there
is, in fact, heterogeneity across importers in these results. I have attempted to run second
stage regressions on the point estimates for uncertainty from these regressions, as well as
on indicators for whether or not the point estimates on applied taris and uncertainty were
of the expected sign and signicant at the 5% level in order to see if I could explain why
some importers yield expected results while others do not. As the explanatory variables in
this stage, I use summary statistics on the bound rate, average statistics on real interest
rate and GDP of trading partners included in my sample, the number of these trading
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partners, summary statistics on the number of industries per partner and risk indexes for
political, economic and nancial risk of the importing country. Thus far, I do not nd any
strong evidence suggesting that any of these factors can explain much of the variation in
point estimates by importer, although there does seem to be weak evidence of a positive
correlation between the average real interest rate of trading partners with probability of
obtaining a negative signicant estimate on the uncertainty measure as well as a negative
correlation between this probability and the average bound rate of the importing country.
2.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have demonstrated that uncertainty arising from the gap between applied
MFN taris and bound taris has a negative impact on exports and that this eect is
present for multiple import markets. On average, I nd that the ad valorem tari equivalent
imposed by uncertainty arising from binding overhang for the set of countries in my sample
is 8.2%. I have further presented results indicating that the impact of binding overhang on
the extensive margin of export diers across importers, however, am not currently able to




Trade Under the Threat of Tari
Hikes in General Equilibrium
3.1 Introduction
In the policy world, trade agreements are often evaluated using Computable General Equi-
librium (CGE) models to simulate the eects of a particular trade policy shock. Generally,
this is done by using estimates of price elasticities to simulate the eect of reducing applied
taris as prescribed by the agreement in a general equilibrium framework. Recently, how-
ever, a strand of literature has been developed that examines a potential secondary eect of
trade agreements; namely the reduction in policy uncertainty provided by such agreements.
Due to the static nature of CGE models, this eect is generally not taken into account when
modeling the impact of trade agreements, despite the fact that recent empirical evidence
has shown that trade policy uncertainty can negatively impact a rm's entry decision into
a given export market. Indeed, certain trade agreements may have no impact on applied
tari rates, while still reducing uncertainty over future applied taris for exporters. For
example, multilateral negotiations in the WTO often include agreements on bound tari
rates which have no eect on applied tari rates, but may well induce rms to enter an
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export market where they have increased certainty that they will not be subjected to tari
spikes in the future. In order to evaluate the likely impact of a given trade policy agreement
that takes this change in tari expectations into account, it is necessary to build a dynamic
model that is able to capture both the direct eect of applied tari reduction and the eect
of changes in tari expectations in a general equilibrium setting. In this chapter, I extend
theoretical analysis of tari uncertainty in general equilibrium to a setting with endogenous
entry not only into exporting but also into production with multiple countries and sectors.
Based on this model, I obtain numerical results for the impacts of an (exogenous) threat of
reverting to a permanent non-cooperative tari level. In a symmetric two-country setting,
the eects are a 4.55% reduction in trade and a 0.02% reduction in welfare. I am further
able to derive the eect of a tari threat on third-countries and outside sectors not directly
targeted, and nd these eects to be small.
3.2 Related Literature
This chapter is related to many studies modeling trade in a general equilibrium framework,
though as mentioned above, typical CGE models do not include a stochastic component.
It is also the case that CGE models tend to assume homogeneous rms, and therefore are
not able to generate extensive margin eects of trade liberalization that have been identi-
ed as important by several empirical studies using a Melitz-type model. One exception
to this is Zhai (2008) which introduces a Melitz framework with heterogeneous rms into
a traditional CGE model and runs various simulations to demonstrate the additional wel-
fare gains that may be obtained following a trade liberalization when allowing for eects
through the extensive margin. Similarly, Balistreri and Rutherford (2012) develop a richer
CGE model including rms heterogeneous in productivity, two factors of production and
multiple industries, each of which may be modeled as either Armington, Krugman or Melitz.
Arkolakis et al. (2009) investigate the theoretical implications for welfare eects of trade
liberalization under various assumptions in such micro-founded models and provide condi-
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tions under which welfare implications depend on two sucient statistics. Unlike the model
presented here, however, these papers all present the results for a steady state equilibrium
in a deterministic framework.
In regards to methodology, this chapter is more closely related to the strand of macro
literature which simulates the eect of shocks in a DSGE framework. Alessandria and Choi
(2012) attempt to infer the change in iceberg trade costs over time using US establishment
data and their model's prediction that total amount exported relative to total sales among
exporters is solely determined by iceberg costs. They create model with a heterogeneous
rms, sunk costs of exporting, and uncertainty over both idiosyncratic productivity and
xed export costs, each of which is assumed to follow a Markov process. Another paper
which develops a heterogeneous rms model in general equilibrium with uncertainty over
idiosyncratic productivity is Impullitti et al. (2013), in which the authors allow for contin-
uous time. Because the stochastic variables these models are idiosyncratic, one is able to
dene steady state aggregate variables which are not stochastic, which is not the case in my
model, where I allow stochastic taris, which aect aggregate variables.
Another paper closely related to this chapter is Limão and Maggi (2013), which also
explores the role of trade policy uncertainty in a general equilibrium framework. Unlike
this chapter, however, their focus is primarily on the uncertainty-managing incentives to
form trade agreements in an environment with underlying political economy (or economic)
shocks. That is, in their model, they allow trade policy to be endogenous and explore the
conditions under which an agreement maximizing joint welfare between contracting parties
will reduce or increase trade policy uncertainty. In my case, I take trade policy (with a
stochastic component) as exogenous and ask how the presence of the stochastic component
aects endogenous variables of interest (such as utility, trade ows, etc.).
The underlying hypothesis behind constructing a model with tari uncertainty is that
this has an impact on exporter behavior. Recent empirical work provides several examples
of studies that support this hypothesis while recent theoretical work provides mechanisms
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through which this may occur. Evenett et al. (2004) provide some evidence of increased
exports after WTO accession to developed countries in products with lower gaps between
preferential and Most Favored Nation (MFN) tari rates, though this evidence is somewhat
mixed. Sala et al. (2009) develop a purely theoretical model, using heterogeneous rms and
an option value approach, and show that a reduction in bound rates can move forward export
time and that we see a larger eect for high risk destination markets. Handley and Limão
(2012) nd increased entry into the export market for Portuguese exporters as a result of the
reduction in uncertainty from EC accession, and Handley (forthcoming, JIE) nds evidence
that product level uncertainty negatively impacts the level and responsiveness of exports
to applied tari reductions for exports to Australia. Handley and Limão (2013) is perhaps
most closely related to the model presented in this chapter as they examine the impact
of uncertainty faced by Chinese exporters to the United States in a general equilibrium
framework prior to the granting of Permanent Normal Trade Relations to China in 2001.
They also provide estimates of the welfare impact of trade policy uncertainty in this context.
Pierce and Schott (2014) provide further evidence that the reduction in tari uncertainty
for Chinese exporters to the United States following the granting of Permanent Normal
Trade Relations to China in 2001 contributed to an increase in Chinese exports as well
as a reduction in US manufacturing employment in sectors with larger reductions in tari
uncertainty.
The model I present here oers several extensions beyond what has been done in other
general equilibrium frameworks. First, I allow for free entry of rms rather than assuming a
xed number of rms as is done in Handley and Limão (2013). This results in a model whose
structure aligns more closely with standard CGE models used to evaluate trade agreements
and allows us to understand the eects of tari threats not only on the mass of exporters,
but the number of producing rms in general equilibrium. Additionally, I am able to include
arbitrarily many countries and dierentiated goods industries in my model, rendering it a
practical framework in which to study trade agreements which may aect trade in multiple
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countries and/or industries. This also speaks to the added value of considering the eect of
tari threats in a general equilibrium as opposed to a partial equilibrium framework; while
a given trade agreement may directly impact the taris and tari uncertainty for a bilateral
pair or regional group, in general equilibrium these taris/potential taris will aect the
economies of all regions. My model allows one to quantify such eects not just for countries
party to a particular agreement, but also eects on their trading partners. For example,
while previous partial equilibrium or two-country general equilibrium models allow one to
examine the eects of tari uncertainty faced by China prior to joining the WTO, my model
allows one to examine the eects of this tari uncertainty on third country trading partners,
such as Mexico.
3.3 Model
I model a world with C ≥ 2 countries, K dierentiated goods industries and one industry
which produces a homogenous good. In a multi-period framework with uncertain taris,
in each period, producers of dierentiated good k in country r decide whether or not to
incur the one time sunk cost fexpk,r,s required to begin exporting to market s. In this set-up,
there are K industries that produces dierentiated goods (in all countries), and there is a
continuum of dierentiated goods within each industry. Consumers (in each country) have
a constant elasticity of substitution between varieties, σ. Countries are indexed by r or s,
sector by k, and varieties by ω.
3.3.1 Consumer Demand
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where Ωk,s,r is the set of industry k varieties produced in market s available for purchase
in market r and qs,r(ω) is the quantity consumed in r of variety ω produced in s. Parameters
λk,r,s are preference share parameters to allow for non-symmetric preferences across domestic
vs. foreign varieties.1
Maximizing the utility as dened in (3.1) subject to a budget constraint yields the Dixit-












Where pk,s,r(ω) is the price received by the industry k, region s rm producing variety
ω and selling in market r. It is assumed that the consumer will pay this rm price times
a factor τk,s,r for imported goods where τ represents 1 plus the ad valorem tari (and
it is assumed that τk,r,r = 1∀k). Tari revenue is paid to the government, which then
redistributes all tari revenue as a lump sum in each period to the population.
The compensated demand function for each domestic and foreign variety in each industry






Because of the Cobb-Douglas utility assumption, expenditures Ek,r on dierentiated
goods sector k will be equal to a constant share of GDP (total expenditures in the economy):
Ek,r = µkGDPr
and aggregate quantity Qk,r can be thought of as the nominal expenditures in dierentiated




1These parameters are included so that when applying the model to actual data, these can be calibrated
to account for diering trade ows between partners which could not be accounted for in the price index
Pk,r in a model with more than two countries, as this would be xed across bilateral pairs (r, s). These
preference parameters can alternatively be thought of as sector-bilateral pair specic iceberg trade costs such




the product is actually consumed (enters into the utility function).
2I assume that consumers are credit constrained and also do not allow for inter-temporal substitution by
saving; they solve a static optimization problem in each period.
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3.3.2 Supply
Turning to supply, I assume that the homogenous good is produced in each country with
constant marginal product of labor, and is freely traded on world markets. I assume that
each variety in a dierentiated goods sector is produced using only one factor of production
(labor) which has factor price wr. Throughout the model, I will impose the assumption that
the labor force in each country is suciently large that the homogenous good is produced
in every country in equilibrium. This then xes the wage in each country at wr = ws,
regardless of the state of the economy, and taking the homogenous good as the numeraire,
we have that wr = ws = 1.
3
Prospective rms in an industry k, region r face a sunk entry cost fsunkk,r which much
be paid to receive a productivity draw and begin production. Prospective rms observe
the current period tari before making their entry decision, and after paying the sunk
cost, receive a random productivity draw ϕ from distribution G(ϕ) which determines their
marginal cost of production, wr/ϕ. After learning their (time invariant) productivity, the
rm begins producing and sells in the domestic market. At the end of each period, the rm
faces a δ probability of being hit by an exogenous death shock in which case it exits. If it
survives until the next period, it can then choose to enter into export market s by paying
the sunk cost of exporting, fexpk,r,s. I assume no per-period xed costs to sell in either the
domestic or the export market (once the sunk cost has been paid) so that once rms have
entered into production, they will always choose to sell in the domestic market, and once
they have paid the sunk cost of exporting, they will continue to export for as long as they
survive. Firms are monopolistically competitive, and so in any market where they choose








where σ is the constant elasticity of demand (equal to the elasticity of substitution between
varieties).
3In the notation below, I retain the country specic subscript on w.
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so that the gross prots realized by a rm of productivity ϕ in sector k region r are πϕ,k,r,r =
ϕσ−1Ak,r,r from domestic sales and πϕ,k,r,s = ϕ
σ−1Ak,r,s from exports to country s 6= r, for
rms suciently productive to export.
3.3.3 Tari Process
I assume a simple tari shock process that allows me to maintain a tractable model under
the assumption of free entry. Bilateral taris applied to sector k exports from country s into
country r can take on only two values: Lk,s,r or Hk,s,r, with Lk,s,r ≤ Hk,s,r. In the initial
period, taris are (and have always been) at Lk,s,r in each country r. In each subsequent
period for which taris have always been at L, there is a probability γ that taris will go
up to H. Once this happens, taris remain at level H forever after.
The timing is as as follows: at the beginning of each period, there are Nk,r rms in sector
k, region r who have already produced in the previous period and survived the death shock.
The current period tari is observed. Then, potential rms decide whether or not to incur
the sunk entry cost and NEk,r new rms enter and can sell only in the domestic market
for this period (they can begin exporting in the next period if they so choose). Then, the
death shock arrives, killing a share δ of the Nk,r +NEk,r rms so that the state transition
equation is: N ′k,r = (1− δ)(Nk,r +NEk,r).
I assume that prior to the arrival of the high tari shock, the economy is in a steady
state equilibrium (that is, all endogenous variables are the same in any state with low
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taris), and so the number of rms in this state will be determined by the relationship
δ
(1−δ)Nk,r = NEk,r.
In this set-up, in each period the economy will be in one of the following discrete states
ζ: L in the case that the high tari shock has not arrived (so that taris are at level Lk,s,r in
country r for sector k goods imported from s), or H(n), n ∈ 0, 1, . . . where H(0) is the state
in which the high tari shock arrives, H(1) is the state the following period, etc. The state
describes not only the current tari level(s), but also the distribution and mass of rms who
are present in the domestic and export markets. Because of the sunk cost to export, once
a rm chooses to begin exporting, he will continue to do so even after a shock arrives that
causes his protability to fall below the protability of the cuto rm who is just indierent
between entering the export market or not. Thus, after the arrival of the high tari shock,
in state H(0), there may be exporters with productivity levels such that they would not
choose to enter the export market under current conditions had they not already paid the
sunk cost to export, but will continue to export in this and all future periods (until hit by
the exogenous death shock); I refer to these as legacy rms. I let Hdet refer to the steady
state of the deterministic model with taris at level H in all periods.
3.3.4 Preliminary Denitions
As will be shown in the following sections, in equilibrium in each state ζ, there will exist
a cuto productivity ϕck.r,s(ζ) such that all sector k, country r rms with ϕ < ϕ
c
k.r,s(ζ)
will not choose to enter export market s, while rms with ϕ ≥ ϕck.r,s(ζ) will want to enter
into this export market. That is, I let ϕck.r,s(L) be the cuto productivity for a sector k,
country r rm to want to enter into export market s when the state is L, and similarly I let
ϕck,r,s(H
(n)) be the cuto productivity for entering into this export market when the state
is H(n).4 Once the high tari shock has arrived, legacy rms may remain, though a share
δ of them will be killed in each subsequent period, and not replaced in the export market.
4Throughout the paper I maintain the assumption that the sunk cost to begin exporting in any market,
fexp, is suciently large that the lowest productivity rm will never choose to export.
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Thus, once the high tari shock arrives, in each subsequent period, conditions will change,
and the cuto productivity for exporting may depend on how many periods have passed
since the high tari shock was rst realized. In order for the model to be tractable, I make
the explicit assumption that any change in export cuto for a given bilateral ow is either
non-decreasing or non increasing in n, that is, I assume that for any sector k and any pair
of countries r and s, it is either the case that ϕck,r,s(H
(n+1)) ≤ ϕck,r,s(H(n))∀n = 0, 1, 2, . . .
or that ϕck,r,s(H
(n+1)) ≥ ϕck,r,s(H(n))∀n = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Under the further assumption that
the economy eventually reaches its long-term steady state equilibrium, it turns out to be









det) is the cuto productivity to enter export market s in a deterministic
model where taris are at level H in every period and the economy is in its steady state
(see Appendix B.1 for proof of this result). Also shown in this appendix, as a corollary to
this result, it will be the case that aggregate economic conditions, Ak,r,s(H
(n)) do not vary
with n, and so I dene Ak,r,s(H) ≡ Ak,r,s(H(n)) = Ak,r,s(H(n+1)) = Ak,r,s(Hdet)∀n.
In the limit as n → ∞, the mass of legacy rms approaches zero and all endogenous
variables X approach their deterministic steady state level: X(H(n+1))→ X(Hdet).
Under the above assumptions, each k − r − s productivity cuto to export in state L
versus that in state H(n) must be ranked in one of two ways: either
RANKING A : ϕck,r,s(L) ≤ ϕck,r,s(H)
or (3.8)




In a perfectly symmetric setup where the high tari threat level is symmetric across all
countries and there is only one dierentiated goods industry, we will be in the rst case for
each country, that is, the arrival of a high tari shock resulting in a high tari that is the
same in all countries will result in higher productivity cutos in all countries. As we will
see below, however, in asymmetric settings (for example when the tari shock aects only
one bilateral tari), it may be the case that the arrival of the tari shock H actually lowers
the productivity cuto to export in one of the regions. I let 1RankBk,r,sbe a binary indicator
equal to 1 if ϕck,r,s(L) > ϕ
c
k,r,s(H) and zero otherwise.
Letting F be the distribution from which productivity is drawn (which I will later as-
sume to be Pareto) and assuming a lower bound of b for the support of this distribu-






σ−1 which does not depend on the state since the distribution of
rms remains constant over time with exit occurring only via the exogenous death shock. I
also dene the (state contingent) average export productivity for sector k exporters5 from





Note that under the assumption that ϕ follows a Pareto distribution with shape pa-
rameter a, it will be the case the average export productivity can be written as a constant










3.3.5 Value Functions and Entry
For a rm of productivity level ϕ in sector k, region r, I let Vϕ,k,r,s(ζ) be the present
discounted value of selling in market s in state ζ, taking into account current and expected
future prot ows from exporting from r to s (or selling domestically for r = s).
The value of being a sector k region r producer selling in region s in each state for a
5Here, exporters means the set of rms above the productivity cuto for exporting; it does not include
legacy rms.
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productivity ϕ rm is then:
Vϕ,k,r,s(L) = ϕ
σ−1Ak,r,s(L) + (1− δ)
[
(1− γ)Vϕ,k,r,s(L) + γVϕ,k,r,s(H(0))
]
⇒ Vϕ,r,s(L) =
ϕσ−1Ak,r,s(L) + (1− δ)γVϕ,k,r,s(H(0))













while the value of waiting to enter a given export market is:


























For a given state ζ, the value of entering into production for a rm who draws produc-
tivity ϕ will be:
(3.14)














and so the ex-ante (prior to drawing a productivity) value of entry for a prospective rm in
sector k region r will be:
(3.15)V entryk,r (ζ) =
∫
ϕ
V entryϕ,k,r (ζ)dF (ϕ)
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I assume that the death shock applies equally to current and potential rms so that
the same discount factor is used by all when discounting future periods. Then, the value of
waiting to enter into production in a given state will be given by
(3.16)










V wait to enterk,r (ζ
′)
]
where the nal equality follows from the fact that in equilibrium, free entry implies that
V entryk,r (ζ) − wrfsunkk,r ≤ V wait to enterk,r (ζ)∀ζ (with strict inequality only in the case when
the constraint NEk,r(ζ) ≥ 0 is binding).6 I make the assumption that no tari shock is
suciently large to cause the constraint NEk,r(ζ) ≥ 0 to bind, so that in equilibrium,
V entryk,r (ζ) − wrfsunkk,r = V wait to enterk,r (ζ). Writing out the expression for V
entry
k,r (ζ) and sim-
plifying (see Appendix B.2 for details) we obtain the free entry condition determining the




































(1 − γ)γ(1 − δ)
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 1σ−1 , ϕck,r,s(L) 6= ϕck,r,s(H)
is the average productivity level between high and low state cutos.
6Note that V wait to enterk,r indexed by one country denotes the value of waiting to enter into production
while VWaitk,r,s indexed by two countries denotes the value of waiting to begin exporting to region s. These
are two distinct values.
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The complete derivations of both conditions are detailed in Appendix B.2.
3.3.6 Export Productivity Cutos
In a given state ζ, sector k-region r rms who have entered into production in some previous
period will choose to incur the sunk cost fexpk,r,s and begin exporting to s if the value of
exporting exceeds the value of waiting to begin exporting to s by at least the amount of this
sunk cost. That is, in state ζ a country r rm with productivity ϕ will enter export market
s if
Vϕ,k,r,s(ζ)− V waitϕ,k,r,s(ζ) ≥ wrf
exp
k,r,s
As shown in Appendix B.3, for a sector k region r with export cutos to s ranked












Note that one can show that this cuto is increasing in γ (see Appendix B.4) under
certain conditions. That is, for a country with ϕck,r,s(L) ≤ ϕck,r,s(Hdet), it is also the case
that the export cuto productivity in state L is increasing in γ, the probability that the
high tari shock will arrive in any given period.
For a sector k region r with export cutos to s ranked according to Ranking B, as shown













The cuto productivity in high tari states, ϕck,r,s(H













3.3.7 Number of Exporters
Here, I let Mk,r,s(ζ) denote the mass of sector k rms in country r at state ζ who lie above
the export cuto ϕck,r,s(ζ) in that state and export to s. Because new entrants this period
cannot export, this will be given by the share of the Nk,r(ζ) rms who lie above this cuto,
that is:
Mk,r,s(ζ) = Nk,r(ζ)(1− F (ϕck,r,s(ζ)) for ζ
∈ {L,H(0), H(1), . . .}
In states where legacy rms are present, the total number of sector k region r exporters











, 1RankBk,r,s = 0
0 , 1RankBk,r,s = 1
because there will be no legacy exporters in states where the tari remains at the low level,
and in state H(n) only rms who were present when the high tari shock rst arrives (that
is, those who form part of the mass Nk,r(H
(0)) = Nk,r(L)) and who have not been killed





3.3.8 Number of New Exporters
I denote the mass of new exporters to country s from country r in sector k and state ζ by
NXk,r,s(ζ). In state L (for which I assume we are in a steady-state equilibrium), this will




For 1RankBk,r,s = 0 (see (3.8)), new exporters in states H
(n) will include the share of new
entrants in the previous period who have survived and are above today's cuto. This gives:
NXk,r,s(H







, 1RankBk,r,s = 0
NXk,r,s(H















, n = 2, 3, . . .
The equations determining the number of new k − s exporters in regions r with cutos
ranked according to ranking B will be the same in each state with the exception of state
H(0) for which we have:
NXk,r,s(H














because in this case, the cuto export productivity in state H(0) is lower than that in state
L, so rms who have already entered into production when the high tari shock arrives and
who have productivity ϕck,r,s(H
(0)) ≤ ϕ ≤ ϕck,r,s(L) will also enter the export market in
state H(0).
3.3.9 Price Index
The price index in country r, sector k in state ζ will be aected by the rm level prices of
domestic rms and foreign rms exporting into r, which themselves are made up of rms
above the current state export cuto and legacy exporters.















where p̃k,s,r(ζ) is the rm level price charged by the rm of average productivity ϕ̃k,s,r, and
p̃legk,s,r(H





















3.3.10 Labor Market Clearing Condition
I assume that the population in each country is suciently large for the numeraire good to
always be produced in all countries in equilibrium, which implies that wages in all countries
and all periods will be pinned down at wr (which I take to be equal to 1 in each country),
independent of the state ζ.
3.3.11 Income-Expenditure Closure
Finally, in each region, total income must equal total expenditure:















































Here, income is equal to the sum of labor income, tari revenue and rm level prots
minus the sunk costs incurred by rms to begin production or exporting.
3.4 Computation
Here, I summarize the set of equations and complementarity conditions determining the
equilibrium values of all endogenous variables under the tari process and set-up described
above. Recall that some of these derivations relied on the assumption that no tari shock
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is large enough to cause the condition NEk,r ≥ 0 to bind and that xed costs of exporting
are suciently large that the productivity cuto to export in any market is strictly greater
than the minimum productivity draw, b, so I must verify that this is the case in equilibrium.
Appendix B.5 lists the set of complementarity conditions that dene equilibrium under the
assumptions of Pareto distributed productivity with parameters a and b, and suciently
large labor forces in each country such that the wage wr is not state-dependent.
3.4.1 Solution Method
The equations and complementarity conditions in the table in Appendix B.5 yield a square
system of C ∗ (n+ 3) ∗ [3 + 10KC + 2(C − 1)K] endogenous variables and the same number
of equations determining these where C is the number of regions in the model, K is the
number of sectors, and n = 1, 2, . . . is the number of periods that have passed since the
initial arrival of the high tari shock. In order to reduce the system to a nite number of
equations and unknowns, I assume that after period n∗ the economy has returned to its
steady state Hdet, the equilibrium of the deterministic model with taris at level H in
every period. I take n∗ = 100, and then check that increasing this value has no eect on
my equilibrium values.
This then yields a square mixed complementarity problem which is straightforward to
program and solve using GAMS software. I use the PATH solver, a generalization of New-
ton's method to solve the system (Ferris and Munson (2000)).
3.4.2 Parametrization
For all results presented in this section, I assume the baseline parameter values reported in
Table 3.1, except where otherwise noted. The parameter values in rows 7-11 are based on
simulated data. The values reported here are those calibrated using the two-country, one
dierentiated good industry deterministic model with zero taris and assumed values in the
dierentiated sector of 80 for domestic sales, 20 for imports and 100 domestic rms in the
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Table 3.1: Assumed Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
δ Exogenous probability of death each period 0.1
a Pareto shape parameter 4.6
b Minimum Productivity Level 0.5
σ Elasticity of Substitution between Varieties 3.8
µ0 Share of Total Expenditures on Homogenous Good Sector 0.3
γ Probability of a High Tari Shock in each period 0.03
λr,r,r = R1, R2 Preference parameter for domestic goods 0.046
λr,s,r 6= s Preference parameter for imported goods 0.032
fsunkr ,r = R1, R2 xed cost to enter into production (in units of Labor) 2.183
fexpr,s ,r 6= s xed cost to enter into exporting (in units of Labor) 2.059
L̄r,r = R1, R2 Labor Supply 143
dierentiated goods sector (prior to entry) with 10 of these exporting.7
The value chosen for 1 − µ0, the share of total expenditures which go towards the
dierentiated goods sector, is admittedly somewhat arbitrary, though may be rationalized
by assuming that the economy is comprised of agriculture, which is characterized by constant
returns to scale, and manufacturing, as in Krugman (1991). Using this framework, I choose
a value of 70% for expenditures on the non-agricultural sector, as this is close to the share
of spending in the United States. Section 3.7 provides a detailed analysis of the sensitivity
of the main results presented below to the assumed parameter values for δ, a, σ, µ0, and γ,
showing that in general, these results are not sensitive to the assumed parameter value of
µ0, somewhat sensitive to the assumed values of a and σ, and quite sensitive to the assumed
values for δ and γ.
3.5 Results
In this section, I present the equilibrium values for endogenous variables of interest for
various scenarios where taris are at level L but there exists the threat of a tari hike to
level H, and compare these values to the equilibrium values which would be obtained in a
deterministic version of the model with taris at level L in all periods. Thus, I am able to
7In the case of more than two countries, these same simulated data points are used to calibrate the
model, using 80 for domestic sales, 20 for imports from any other market, and 10 of the 100 domestic rms
exporting to any given market.
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isolate the eect of the mere threat of a tari hike by comparing equilibrium values from
two scenarios, both of which have the same current applied taris, but where in one case,
applied taris in future periods may rise. In cases where understanding the dynamics of
endogenous variables following the realization of a tari threat are useful in understanding
the results of these static comparisons, I also present these dynamics.
3.5.1 Symmetric Two-Country, One Dierentiated Industry Model
Here, I present the equilibrium of the model where it is assumed that the two countries are
perfectly symmetric (including labor endowments, preference parameters λ, and high and
low tari levels). I assume that the low tari in each region is 0%, while the high tari (which
may arrive in any subsequent period with probability γ) is assumed to be (τH − 1) ∗ 100%,
that is, in any period where the high tari shock has not yet arrived, with probability γ it
will arrive and set the taris in both countries to 19% in the case where τH = 1.19. This
particular level is chosen as the high tari level in this example because it corresponds to
the optimal tari which will be set by each country in a non-cooperative equilibrium.8 As
such, in interpreting the results below in Table 3.2, one can view the dierence between the
equilibrium where taris are locked in at the low tari level and that where there exists a
threat of each country imposing the optimal tari in a non-cooperative equilibrium (that is,
between columns (1) and (2) or (1) and (3)) as representing the value of a trade agreement
in a scenario where without the agreement, there exists a positive probability that the
countries will enter into a tari war, ending with each country imposing the optimal tari
in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
The nal two columns of table 3.2, present the analogous results for a higher tari threat
level, in order to provide an idea of how a change in the magnitude of the tari threat level
8In a perfectly symmetric deterministic set-up where rms are modeled as heterogeneous in productivity
and face xed costs to sell in any given market, it turns out there is an analytic expression which implicitly
denes the optimal tari of each country in the non-cooperative equilibrium (see Felbermayr et al. (2013)).
As the ratio of xed export to xed domestic costs approaches innity, this expression implies an explicit
expression which this optimal tari approaches. Because I have no per period xed costs to sell in the
domestic market in my set-up, I am able to use this to obtain an explicit expression for the optimal tari
in the symmetric country set-up which depends only on the elasticity of substitution and productivity
dispersion parameters. For my assumed parameters, this yields τoptimal = 1 + σ−1
aσ−(σ−1) = 1.190736.
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Equilibrium in state τ = L = 1 Equilibrium in state τ = L = 1
with τr,s = 1 Under Uncertainty (τ
H = 1.19) Under Uncertainty (τH = 2)
Variable γ = 0 γ = 0.03 γ = 0.10 γ = 0.03 γ = 0.10
E 100.000 100.104 100.285 100.283 100.576
M 10.000 8.651 7.048 7.272 4.283
N 100.000 100.645 101.139 100.955 102.085
NE 11.111 11.183 11.238 11.217 11.343
NX 1.000 0.865 0.705 0.727 0.428
P 1.000 1.002 1.006 1.005 1.014
Q 100.000 99.921 99.735 99.752 99.195
U 77.554 77.536 77.477 77.485 77.250
ϕc 0.825 0.852 0.892 0.886 0.996
will aect the equilibrium.
The rst column of Table 3.2 presents the equilibrium values of endogenous variables in
a deterministic version of the model where taris are at their initial (L) level in every period.
Columns two and three present these equilibrium values in the low tari state where there
is now a positive probability in each period of a high tari shock. We can see by comparing
columns one and two that the threat of a tari hike actually causes the equilibrium mass of
producing rms to increase relative to the deterministic setting. This increase in the mass
of producing rms induced by uncertainty over future taris is however more than oset
by an increase in cuto productivity to export, yielding a smaller mass of exporters in this
symmetric model with a positive threat of tari hikes in the future. The mass of exporters
in each region under the presence of a tari threat is 13.49% lower than in the case without
a tari hike threat. Further, total utility (U) in each region is lower by 0.02% when there
exists a positive probability of tari hikes relative to the deterministic model. The value of
exports from each region under the tari threat is 4.55% lower than without the threat.9
Comparing columns two and three (or four and ve), we see that the direction change of
endogenous variables from a scenario with no threat to one with a positive threat is the
9Note that while this eect may seem somewhat large for only a 3% chance of tari hike to 19%, a back of
the envelope calculation shows that the expected reduction in log trade value in a deterministic model where
the tari is raised by 0.57% (the expected tari in the next period, =0.03*0.19) is a σ
σ−1 ∗ 0.0057 = 0.03558,
that is, a 3.6% reduction in trade, which accounts for most of this 4.55% reduction. That is, this reduction
in trade results not from simply reducing uncertainty over future applied tari rates, but largely from the
change in expected tari value, which in the long run, is given by the tari threat level of 19%.
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same as from the scenario with a positive threat, to one with an even higher probability of
tari hikes.
The nal two columns present more comparative statics, now for a higher magnitude
tari shock, τH = 2, that is, an ad-valorem tari of 100% which may arrive in any subsequent
period with probability γ. As expected, the threat of a higher tari decreases the mass of
exporters and increases the export productivity cuto, as seen by comparing columns two
and four (or three and ve). I note that the cumulative eect on number of exporters of both
raising the tari hike probability from 3% to 10% and raising the tari shock magnitude
from 19% to 100% is greater than the sum of each individual eect.
The positive correlation between probability (or magnitude) of a tari hike and number
of rms N (or entry, NE) can be understood intuitively by noting that in a symmetric
set-up, higher tari levels in both regions imply less domestic competition from imports and
thus higher protability from domestic sales; this implies a direct channel through which
rm entry will increase. As will be seen later in an asymmetric set-up (See section 3.5.2),
in a model with asymmetric high tari levels, the equilibrium mass of producing rms in
the country threatening a tari hike is higher than that of the other country, as these rms
face less import competition in the event that the tari threat is realized. The fact that N
increases in the presence of a symmetric tari threat is also partially driven by the increase in
aggregate expenditures, which themselves are a result of higher GDP. GDP increases in the
presence of a tari threat though higher domestic prots and decreased xed cost payments
of new exporters which together outweigh the decrease in export prots and increase in
aggregate entry costs.10
As another way to measure the importance of the tari threat on the economy in equi-
librium, I compute the ad-valorem tari(s) that would yield the same equilibrium values in
column 3 for either Utility (U), Mass of Exporters (M), or Export Productivity Cuto (ϕc)
in a deterministic model. In this symmetric model, the applied tari in each country which
10This channel is not obvious in the one-sector example shown here, however, later in Section 3.5.3.2 when
an outside sector is present for which domestic and export protability do not change with the presence of a
tari threat on the other sector, we still see an increase in the equilibrium number of rms in both sectors.
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Table 3.3: Applied Tari Equivalents of Tari Threat
Tari threat: 19% Tari threat: 100%
Equivalence Variable γ = 0.03 γ = 0.1 γ = 0.03 γ = 0.1
U : Utility 1.30% (2) 3.96% (2) 3.63% (1) 10.53% (1)
M : Mass of Exporters 3.09% (5) 7.42% (4) 6.76% (2) 17.97% (1)
ϕc: Export productivity cuto 3.03% (5) 7.22% (4) 6.56% (2) 17.52% (1)
Decline in Dierentiated Good Trade
(share of Level in case with no threat)
4.55% 10.57% 9.62% 24.03%
*Value in parentheses indicates number of periods in the future before expected applied
tari will be greater than this applied tari equivalent.
would yield the same outcome utility in each country as the threat of a 19% tari (with
0.03 probability) in a future period is 1.3%. The applied tari which would yield the same
mass of exporters is 3.09% and that which would yield the same cuto productivity in each
country is 3.03%. The value of bilateral trade in the dierentiated good sector predicted by
the model decreases from 20 units to 19.1 units in the case where there exists a 3% threat
of a 19% tari hike. Thus, the model indicates that the eect of the threat of a tari hike
to 19% (with a 3% chance of the shock arriving each period) in both countries is roughly
equivalent to an applied tari of between 1.3 and 3.1 percent in each country, and causes
bilateral trade to be 4.55% lower than would be expected without the presence of the tari
threat. Table 3.3 presents the applied tari equivalents as well as the share of lost trade
computed for the dierent tari threat scenarios discussed above in this symmetric model.
3.5.2 Asymmetric Case: Single Policy Active Country
Here, I present the equilibrium values of endogenous variables for the general equilibrium
model with symmetric country size and parameters, but now assume that the threat of a
tari hike exists in only one of the two regions. Specically, I assume that in the initial
state taris in both regions are 0, and that in each subsequent period there is a probability
γ = 0.03 that the tari in region 1 will jump to 25.3%, remaining there forever after, while
the region 2 tari remains 0 in all states. This tari threat level for region 1 is chosen
because this is the tari that maximizes R1 utility in the case where R2 is constrained to
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Table 3.4: Asymmetric Case: One Policy Active Country
Equilibrium in Deterministic Model Equilibrium in state τLR1,R2 = τ
L
R2,R1 = 1
τR1,R2 = τR2,R1 = 1 Under R1 Threat (τ
H
R2,R1 = 1.253), γ = 0.03
Region Region
Variable r = R1, s = R2 r = R2, s = R1 r = R1, s = R2 r = R2, s = R1
Er 100.000 100.000 99.970 100.139
GDPr 142.857 142.857 142.814 143.055
Mr,s 10.000 10.000 10.534 7.780
Nr 100.000 100.000 103.262 97.650
NEr 11.111 11.111 11.474 10.850
NXr,s 1.000 1.000 1.053 0.778
Pr 1.000 1.000 0.998 1.004
Qr 100.000 100.000 100.140 99.756
Ur 77.555 77.555 77.623 77.454
ϕcr,s 0.825 0.825 0.821 0.867
leave its tari at zero.11 In terms of real world examples, one can think of a case where
perhaps R2 is committed to leave its tari rates at zero in the event of a tari hike by R1
because of some international agreement, such as MFN rates in the WTO, while R1 may
have the ability to raise its rates because its initially low tari rates were only granted as
part of a unilateral preference scheme, such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
schemes oered by several developed nations towards developing nations.12
Here we see that the eect of tari uncertainty inducing entry into the domestic market
appears to have been a consequence of the symmetric set-up previously assumed. When I
allow a positive threat of a tari hike in only one region (R1, in this case), this induces higher
entry into the domestic market in R1, as one might expect given that a higher tari in R1
reduces import competition for domestic rms. In R2, where exporters face the possibility
of a high tari level in R1 in the future, uncertainty leads to a lower equilibrium mass of
rms. Similarly, uncertainty over the taris that will be applied on region 1 imports leads to
a lower equilibrium mass of exporters and higher productivity cuto in R2, and the opposite
in R1. This is due to the expectations that the region 1 import tari may rise, leading to
improved export conditions for region 1 exporters driven by the increase in the price index
11This optimal tari is computed numerically.
12Of course, to properly model such a scenario would require including more than two countries, and
likely more than one industry. Such an example is presented in Chapter 4 of this dissertation for the case
of Chile-USA trade in the context of a four region, multi-sector model.
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of the dierentiated goods sector in region 2, which itself will be driven by the decrease in
the number of rms producing in region 2.
For region 1, the presence of the tari threat implies an increase in utility by 0.09%, an
increase in the mass of exporters of 5.34% and an increase in the value of dierentiated goods
exports by 5.35%. For region 2, this tari threat induces a 0.13% decrease in utility level, a
22.2% decrease in the mass of exporters, and a 11.1% decrease in the value of dierentiated
goods exports.
As in the previous section, I compute the applied tari level that would need to be
imposed by region R1 on imports in a deterministic model in order to yield the same
equilibrium value of utility (U), mass of exporters (M), and export productivity cuto
(ϕc) for region 2. These applied tari equivalents in this case are 0.52% for equivalent
utility eect, 3.01% for equivalent eect on mass of exporters 3.49% for equivalent export
productivity cuto. In terms of trade ows, the level of dierentiated good exports from R2
to R1 will be 11.1% lower with the threat of the tari hike than without, while dierentiated
good exports from R1 to R2 will be 5.3% higher with the threat.
An Optimal γ
In this example, it is clearly to region R1's benet to maintain a threat of raising taris.
Of course, if R1 has control over this parameter γ (by sending signals about the likelihood
of a tari hike) it is obvious that if the goal is to maximize welfare in the current L state,
setting γ = 1 will produce the highest utility for region 1. If, however, the policy maker in
region 1 is able to credibly commit to some other γ and cares not just about current period
and long term utility levels but rather the present discounted value (PDV) of expected
utility for region 1, it turns out that γ = 1 is not optimal. Under the assumption that a
high shock will arrive with probability γ in any subsequent period, the present discounted
value of expected utility for a region is given by:
(3.20)PDV EUr =
δ








Figure 3.1: Utility Dynamics
In order to understand how the utility levels Ur(H
(n)) evolve in each region following the
arrival of a high tari shock, I present here gure 3.1. We see that although the imposition
of a high tari by R1 will leave it with higher utility in the long run, transitioning from
the low tari state requires going through several periods of low utility levels. The main
mechanism driving this lower utility in the short run is due to the presence of legacy rms
exporting from R2 to R1, whose mass gradually decreases over time as they are randomly
hit by the exogenous death shock. The presence of these legacy rms raises the price index
in R1 because consumers in this region must now pay the price of the dierentiated goods
as well as the tari markup resulting from the R1 imposed tari. Figure 3.2 presents the
dynamics of these two endogenous variables following a high tari shock.
We now see from these gures and equation (3.20) that there exists a tradeo for region
1 with respect to γ: a higher level of γ raises current period utility U(L) and utility levels
further than about 6 periods into the future, however it also increases the weight given to
utility in periods just after the imposition of the high tari, which are lower. I numerically
compute the optimal level of γ from the perspective of R1 where this is the level that
maximizes PDV of R1 utility, under the assumption that the high tari shock does indeed
have a probability γ of arriving in any future period. This yields a value of γ = .69. In
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Figure 3.2: Price and Legacy Firm Dynamics
73
terms of real world applications, however, it is dicult to imagine a situation where a region
can commit to it's probability of invoking a tari in the future. More reasonable, perhaps,
is a situation where a policy maker may intend to leave taris at their low level (L), and
therefore optimizes only utility in this low tari state, U(L), by sending signals about raising
taris in the future. In the example presented in this section, it is to this policy maker's
advantage to generate signals as close to γ = 1 as possible, though in practice, he may
experience a lack of credibility if the tari is never raised.
3.5.3 Broader Tari Threat Eects
In this section, I present the results of versions of the model that include countries or sectors
not directly targeted by the tari threat in order to assess the general equilibrium eects
that such a threat has on outside countries and sectors. This is an important topic, as the
eects of Preferential Trade Agreements on non member countries as well as the eects of
such agreements on incentives for multilateral trade liberalization have become a topic of
debate over the past two decades (see, for example, Baldwin (1997) and Bhagwati (1998)).
By including the uncertainty reducing eects of trade agreements in a general equilibrium
model with multiple regions and sectors, I allow for another mechanism, apart from the
direct eect of applied taris, through which the trade, welfare, and incentive to enter into
multilateral agreements of non-member countries to a given agreement may be aected by
the presence of the agreement.
3.5.3.1 Third Country Eects
Here I present the equilibrium values of endogenous variables for a model similar to that
presented in section 3.5.1 where two symmetric countries threaten to raise taris against
each other, but I now add in a third symmetric country (R3) whose taris remain at level
L in all periods, as do the taris faced by its exporters to regions R1 and R2. That is,
initially all taris are zero (state L) and when the high tari shock arrives (which happens
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with probability γ in each subsequent period), it causes only the taris governing region 2
exports to region 1 (R2-R1) and region 1 exports to region 2 (R1-R2) to rise to 17.5%, the
non-cooperative equilibrium tari level for R1 and R2 when all R3 imports are constrained
to have zero taris. One may think of this as a situation where initially two of the three
pairs of countries in this 3-country model, (R1,R3) and (R2,R3) have an explicit agreement
(such as an FTA) constraining taris to remain at 0% while the zero taris imposed by
regions R1 and R2 are not locked in by any explicit contract. In a partial equilibrium model
where the eects of a tari shock do not aect aggregate expenditure and price indexes, we
would see no eect of this tari uncertainty on the equilibrium for the third country, R3. In
this general equilibrium framework, however, region 3 will be aected by the imposition of
a tari on R1-R2 bilateral trade ows, and so its state L equilibrium is also aected by the
mere threat of such a tari hike. I now focus on the eect of this uncertainty over future
taris between R1 and R2 not on the outcomes for these countries, as these will be similar
to those presented in section 3.5.1, but for the outside region, R3.
Table 3.5 presents the equilibrium values of endogenous variables for region R3 in both
the deterministic model with taris at zero in all states and the L state of the model with a
positive threat of a tari hike on R1-R2 and R2-R1 trade ows in some future period. We
see that although the threatened tari hike will have no direct impact on region 3, it does
aect this region in general equilibrium. Specically, compared with the case of no tari
threat, we see a lower productivity cuto and higher mass of exporters to regions R1 and
R2 (where, in the event of the imposition high taris, the price index of the dierentiated
goods sector will rise, making it more attractive as an export market). Overall, R3 benets
from this tari threat that directly aects only the other two countries, and realizes a utility
level slightly higher than it would in the case where zero taris are locked in between all
pairs.
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Until now, I have only presented the results of models where there is one dierentiated
goods sector. I now expand this to include two such sectors, labeled K1 and K2, in a two-
country model, and present the equilibrium values of endogenous variables for this model
when the event of a high tari shock results in the imposition of a 19.25% tari on all trade
ows for sector K1 goods, where this tari level is chosen because it is the tari that will
be optimally chosen by both regions in sector K1 in the non-cooperative equilibrium when
sector K2 taris are constrained to remain at zero. In the results presented here, I explore
whether the addition of another sector (of the same size as K1) which is not subject to a
tari hike qualitatively changes the eect of this tari threat on equilibrium values in sector
K1, as well as how the indirect general equilibrium eects of a tari threat in sector K1
aect sector K2. As with the previous section, where there was an additional region not
aected directly by the tari shock, here, in the absence of general equilibrium eects, there
would be no eect of this tari threat on sector K2. We will see that this is not the case
in general equilibrium, and will explore the channels through which this outside sector is
aected.
I do not present here the equilibrium values of endogenous variables for sector K1, as
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Table 3.6: Cross-Sector Eects
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they are qualitatively the same as those found in the 2-country 1-sector model presented in
section 3.5.1, namely that higher export productivity cutos in both regions for sector K1
and a smaller mass of exporters in this sector.
Table 3.6 shows these equilibrium values for sector K2. In this sector, not directly
aected by the potential tari hike, we see that export productivity cutos in each country
remain unaected by the threat of a tari hike in sector 1 (see Appendix B.6 for a discussion
of the hypothesis that this will hold under the assumption of Pareto distributed productivity
for any sector not directly impacted by tari changes). Thus, any eect on the number
of sector K2 exporters occurs as a result of a change in the number of rms producing
domestically in this sector. We see that the equilibrium mass of sector K2 rms producing
in each region is higher when there exists the threat of a symmetric tari hike on sector
K1. This can be understood as a sort of spillover eect resulting from the slightly higher
GDP, and therefore sector level expenditures resulting from the tari threat in sector K1.
As mentioned in the symmetric two-country one-sector model (see section 3.5.1), this higher
GDP in the presence of a tari threat is the result of higher aggregate domestic revenue in
both sectors which outweighs the decreased export revenues of sector K1 and the increase in
aggregate sunk costs which must be paid in both sectors. I note that although the number
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of decimals presented in table 3.6 do not show a dierence in the price index for sector K2,
it is the case that this price is slightly lower in the presence of the sector K1 tari threat
(due to the increased number of domestic rms and imports in K2) which balances the
slight increase in Q in this sector such that aggregate economic conditions remain the same
in K2 with or without the presence of a tari threat in K1.
3.6 Discussion
In this section I discuss the added value obtained by using a general equilibrium rather than
a partial equilibrium framework to model the eects of tari threats as well as the reasons
for and implications of various assumptions, and the economic forces that act to maintain
constant cuto productivities in all states after the arrival of the tari shock, even as legacy
rms decay away.
3.6.1 Added Value of General Equilibrium Analysis
As already noted in the results sections above, one immediate advantage to using a general
equilibrium framework is that it allows us to analyze the eects of tari threats and shocks
on countries not directly impacted by the taris, but whose trade may be aected by the
policies. Similarly, in a multi-sector setting, one can obtain results for the eects of tari
policies on sectors not directly targeted.
Beyond this, however, the general equilibrium model captures additional feedback eects
that would be absent in a partial equilibrium analysis. Turning to back to the results of
the two-country, one-industry model where there exists the threat of a tari hike to 25.3%
on R1 imports from R2 (see Section 3.5.2), one can ask how the general equilibrium results
obtained compare with a those from a partial equilibrium framework which does not take
into account general equilibrium eects on aggregate region 1 variables. Specically, I note
that the equation governing the productivity cuto for region 2 exports to region 1 in states
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Recall that AR2,R1 summarizes aggregate economic conditions for a region R2 exporter to


















in a given state. In a partial equilibrium analysis,
one may assume that QR1and PR1 are unaected by the arrival of a high tari shock in
region 1, and a tari threat will still result in a lower export productivity cuto in R2 as the
forward looking exporter takes into account future economic conditions AR2,R1(H) which
include the direct eect of the tari, τR2,R1. In general equilibrium, however, any additional
feedback eects on QR1 and PR1 are also taken into account when the exporter makes his
decision. Using the equilibrium Q and P values for R1 from the initial L state (one could














= 41.1. That is, if we ignore the additional general equilibrium
eects that cause QR1 to rise and PR1 to fall once region 1 imposes a tari on imports,
we obtain a higher value for AR2,R1(H) and thus a lower cuto productivity ϕ
c
R2,R1(L) for
region 2 exporters than if we take these feedback eects into account. In other words, in
this case, using a partial equilibrium model to evaluate the eects of a tari threat would
underestimate the impact on the export productivity cuto in the region directly impacted
by the tari. What are the mechanisms driving these feedback eects? After the high tari
shock arrives, in region 1 we have that Q rises while P falls (in the long term; in the short
term the opposite is true, however QPσremains constant once the shock arrives). The lower
price index results from more domestic rms entering over time as import competition is
decreased and (for suciently large σ) this eect is enough to outweigh the rise in demand,
Q that results, yielding a lower value of QPσ in state H relative to state L.14
13I have taken advantage of the fact that Ar,s remains constant in all H(n) periods to simplify the
expression given in (3.17). See Appendix B.1 for proof of this fact.
14In the short term, the mechanisms driving the higher P are that import prices are now higher, as they
take into account the tari, and many R2 legacy rms remain, so that there are still a substantial mass of
rms exporting from region 2 and driving up the price index, which also decreases demand, Q, in region 1.
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In a similar vein, I note that without allowing the number of producing rms to be
determined endogenously via the free-entry condition (as might be the case in certain partial
equilibrium analyses), the post-shock mass of exporters from region 2 predicted by the model
would be higher than is the case here, since in general equilibrium, fewer rms produce
domestically and so for a given fraction of producers who export, this mass will also be
reduced. That is, in a partial equilibrium analysis that takes the number of domestic rms
as given, one would underestimate the eect of an applied tari or a tari threat on the
mass of exporting rms.
3.6.2 No Per-Period Fixed Costs
The assumption of no per-period xed costs to sell either domestically or in a given export
market, though not very realistic, is made in order to maintain tractability of the model in
the presence of uncertain future tari levels. Positive per-period xed costs to sell domes-
tically and/or in a given export market would generate an endogenous productivity cuto
below which rms would exit the given market, and forward looking potential rms would
take this into account when making their entry decision. This would greatly complicate
the model, as in this case, expressions (3.10) and (3.11) would need to take into account
the probability of falling below an endogenous exit cuto when computing the present dis-
counted value of selling in a given market. It is not clear that this added feature would
allow additional insight about the mechanisms causing reduced entry in the presence of a
threatened tari hike with sunk entry costs, which is my main focus. For this reason, I do
not include xer per-period costs, but may wish to explore this in the future.
3.6.3 One-Period Delay to Begin Exporting
The primary rationale for not allowing rms to begin exporting until they have produced
domestically for at least one period is so that rms can learn their productivity (which, in
practice, would require one to actually produce) before deciding whether or not to enter a
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given export market. If the timing of the model were changed so that rms could export
immediately (but still know their productivity level when making the export decision),
this would not aect the results in any signicant way; it would simply change the mass of
exporters to be the share of the N+NE rms above the export cuto (rather than the share
of N), and would cause the consideration of potential export prots to appear in the entry
decision equation without the time discount (1− δ) coecient. Under this alternate timing
scenario, the proof that ϕcr,s(H
(n+1)) = ϕcr,s(H
(n)) = ϕcr,s(H
det)∀n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , ∀r, s will
be slightly more complicated, as in this case the period H(n) free entry equation involving
ϕcr,s(H
(n)) will involve not only variables in future states but also state H(n), however, the
result will continue to hold.
3.6.4 Economic Intuition of Constant Productivity Cutos in states
H(n)
As shown in Appendix B.1, under the assumption that the economy does eventually reach its
steady state equilibrium, we have that the productivity cutos to enter a given export market
remain constant once the high tari shock arrives, despite the changes in other endogenous
variables. What are the economic forces at work to maintain constant export cutos? First,
the cutos are constant multiples of the aggregate economic conditions, Ak,r,s(H
(n)), which







. In this model, the
tari process is such that τk,r,s(H
(n)) does not change with n (once the high tari shock




Looking at the two-country, one-industry results presented in section 3.5.2 as an example,
we see that after the arrival of the high tari shock imposed on region 1 imports, the price
index in region 2 gradually rises as entry into production in that region becomes less valuable
with the imposition of the tari, and so the number of rms decreases as rms die and are
not completely replaced by new entrants (see gure 3.3). This fall in the price index increases
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Figure 3.3: Dynamics for Selected Endogenous Variables
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demand Q so that the aggregate quantity QPσremains constant. That this remains constant
across periods where the tari is not changing is a direct result of the free-entry condition
and the assumption of no xed costs to produce domestically. As conditions change over time
following the arrival of of the high tari shock, the number of new entrants into production
adjusts until the value of entry into production (minus the value of waiting to enter) is
exactly equal to the sunk cost of entry; because exit is entirely exogenous, this value is
directly linked to the aggregate economic conditions in each country, and so the number of
new entrants adjusts until QPσ is at its constant (over n for all states H(n)) level.
3.7 Robustness to Alternative Parametrization
In order to assess the sensitivity of the results presented above to the parameter val-
ues assumed, I allow several parameters to vary within a certain range, and see how
this changes the magnitude of the impact of a tari hike threat on utility, mass of ex-
porters, and total trade value. Recall that for my assumed baseline parameters of a =
4.6, σ = 3.8, µ0 = 0.3, δ = 0.1, γ = 0.03, the model indicated that for the 2-country, 1-
industry model presented in section 3.5.1, a reversion to the non-cooperative equilibrium
that was feared to occur with probability γ in any future period had the eect of reduc-
ing each country's utility by 0.02%, the mass of exporters by 13.49%, and the value of
exports by 4.55%. Below, I allow the parameters to vary between the following values:
3.6 ≤ a ≤ 5.6, 2.8 ≤ σ ≤ 4.8, 0.1 ≤ µ0 ≤ 0.4, 0.05 ≤ δ ≤ 0.5, 0.01 ≤ γ ≤ 0.2 and look at the
range of percent changes in utility, mass of exporters, and total trade value implied by this
range of parameters for this symmetric 2-country, 1-industry model.15 In the graphs pre-
sented in this section, I show how variables of interest change along with a given parameter
for every other possible combination of parameter values in this set, highlighting the case
where all other parameters are at their baseline value. In general, I nd that the results
presented above are not sensitive to the assumed parameter value of µ0, somewhat sensitive
15Similar graphs for other scenarios with results presented above are available upon request.
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Figure 3.4: Robustness Check: Firm Dispersion
to the assumed values of a and σ, and quite sensitive to the assumed values for δ and γ.
3.7.1 Productivity Dispersion Parameter
The Pareto parameter a governs the shape of the Pareto distribution from which rm level
productivity is drawn. As a increases, the dispersion of rm productivity decreases such that
as a→∞, we reach the degenerate distribution where all rms share the same productivity
level, while as a decreases, the distribution becomes closer to a uniform distribution. Figure
3.4 shows the relative change in utility, exporter mass, and trade value obtained in the
symmetric model by going from a model with no tari threat to one with a tari hike
threat, for various values of a, holding all other parameters constant. The black line shows
these values for the set of parameter values where all other parameters are at their baseline
value (the values assumed for results presented above) while the red marker on this line
represents the point where all parameters (including a) are at these baseline values. We see
that the higher the value of a , that is, the more compressed the productivity distribution
such that there is less dispersion in productivity, the larger the eect of a tari threat on
all three measures. For the baseline values assumed for all other parameters, allowing the
Pareto shape parameter to vary between 3.6 and 5.6, we obtain relative losses in utility of
between 0.02%-0.03%, in exporter mass of 11.1%-15.8%, and in trade value of 2%-7.1%.
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Figure 3.5: Robustness Check: Elasticity of Substitution
3.7.2 Elasticity of Substitution
The parameter σ, which governs substitutability between varieties of goods in consumers'
utility function, is varied between 2.8 and 4.8. As this assumed parameter value increases,
that is, goods become more substitutable, we see that there are smaller eects of the tari
threat on utility, exporter mass and total export value. Allowing all other parameters to
remain xed at their baseline values, we see that as σ varies between 2.8 and 4.8, the decrease
in utility goes from 0.05% to 0.01%, the decrease in exporter mass from 15.3% to 12.6%,
and the decrease in export value from 8.5% to 1.8%.
3.7.3 Share of Expenditures towards Homogenous Good Sector
Here, I allow the parameter governing the share of expenditures going towards the homoge-
nous good, µ0, to vary between 0.1 and 0.4. In general, this parameter has very little eect
on the overall eect of a tari threat for utility, and especially for exporter mass and trade
value. For baseline values of other parameters, as µ0 increases from 0.1 to 0.4, the utility,
exporter mass, and trade value decrease resulting from a tari hike threat increases only
very slightly in magnitude, with all exhibiting the same percent change (to one decimal
place).
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Figure 3.6: Robustness Check: Expenditure Share on Homogenous Good Sector
Figure 3.7: Robustness Check: Discount Factor
3.7.4 Discount Factor
The discount factor 1 − δ governs the rate at which agents in the model discount future
periods. For high values of δ, forward looking agents (such as prot maximizing rms) place
less weight on expected values in future periods, and so it makes sense that as δ increases,
we see the magnitude of the eect of a tari threat on utility, exporter mass, and export
value decrease. That is, in a limiting case where δ → 1, rms making export decisions based
on beliefs about the future will act just like rms in a deterministic model with xed taris
because they are concerned only with their prots in the current period. As I allow δ to vary
between 0.05 and 0.5 (holding all other parameters constant at baseline values), I obtain
a negative eect of tari threat presence in the model of between 0.054% and 0.007% for
utility, between 22.9% and 1.68% for exporter mass, and between 8.2% and 0.4% for trade
value.
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Figure 3.8: Robustness Check: Probability of Tari Hike
3.7.5 Probability of Realization of Tari Threat
Finally, I experiment with various assumed values for γ, the parameter governing the proba-
bility with which agents believe a the tari threat may be realized in any subsequent period.
As would be expected, larger values of γ, meaning a more likely high tari imposition, lead
to a larger magnitude eect of a tari hike threat on utility, exporter mass, and export
value. Holding other parameters constant at assumed baseline values, varying γ between
0.01 and 0.2 yields an eect of the tari threat that reduces utility by between 0.006% and
0.193%, reduces exporter mass by between 5.3% and 39.7% and reduces export value by
between 1.7% and 14.7%.
3.8 Conclusion
I have presented a simple multi-country, multi-industry general equilibrium model of trade
with heterogeneous rms in which exporters face uncertainty over future tari levels and
must incur a sunk cost to begin exporting. In this set-up, assuming a simple Markov process
for taris, I have shown that in a steady state equilibrium where taris have been at their
current level for all time, the equilibrium number of rms who choose to export is lower when
there exists a threat of a tari hike on the tari that they will face in future periods relative
to the case where taris are deterministic and remain at current levels in all periods. For the
parameter values assumed, the model nds that for a global economy with one dierentiated
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goods industry and two identical countries, compared with the equilibrium where taris are
set at zero and expected to remain there forever, in an equilibrium where there exists a 3%
chance that in any future period the countries will revert to the non-cooperative equilibrium
(of each imposing a 19% tari on the dierentiated good sector), utility levels for each region
will be lowered by 0.02%, the mass of exporters will be lowered by 13.49%, and the value
of exports will be lowered by 4.55%. This corresponds to an applied tari equivalent to
generate the same utility loss of 1.3%, an applied tari equivalent of 3.09% with respect to
mass of exporters, and of 3.03% with respect to export productivity cuto level.
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Chapter 4
Simulating the Eect of the
US-Chile Free Trade Agreement
on Chilean Exporters
4.1 Overview
In this chapter, I present an application of the CGE model developed in Chapter 3 which
incorporates the impact of tari uncertainty faced by Chilean rms exporting to the US
market. Specically, I simulate the impact on the economy of the reduction in both applied
tari rates and tari uncertainty experienced by Chilean rms as a result of the entry into
force of the US-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA). This particular trade policy shock pro-
vides a good setting for examining the additional value of a computable general equilibrium
model which takes into account not only applied tari changes but also changes in uncer-
tainty over future taris as this FTA reduced applied taris faced by Chilean exporters and
the threat of future tari shocks. Prior to implementation of the US-Chile FTA, Chilean
exporters beneted from unilateral trade preferences into the United States under the Gen-
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eralized System of Preferences (GSP) which allowed for duty free treatment of selected
goods, however, these preferences were not permanent, and were subject to suspension at
the discretion of the United States. With the entry into force of the US-Chile FTA, in
addition to several applied taris being lowered, preferential taris which were previously
subject to unilateral revocation at any time became arguably more certain. The general
equilibrium model developed in the previous chapter is calibrated using trade, tari, and
rm data from the year 2006 and then solved in both cases with and without the threat of
preference loss for Chilean exporters in order to evaluate the additional eect in the model
beyond liberalizing taris of guaranteeing preferences. For certain parameter assumptions, I
nd that a model without the tari threat eect predicts that Chilean exports to the United
States will increase by 49.40%, the number of exporters will increase by 8.91% and utility
for Chile will increase by 0.057% as a result of the FTA, while the model with the eect
of a tari threat predicts that exports will increase by 53.41%, the number of exporters by
15.26% and utility by 0.064%.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 reviews related literature, Section 4.3
provides background on US-Chile trade and trade policy, Section 4.4 presents some reduced
form evidence motivating the application, Section 4.5 summarizes the key features of the
theoretical model, Section 4.6 describes the data used as well as the calibration methodology,
Section 4.7 presents the results of the simulation and compares with data, Section 4.8
discusses the sensitivity of the results to various assumptions as well as the possible reasons
for discrepancies with observed data, and Section 4.9 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
Prior to the implementation of the Chile-US FTA, several studies using Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) models were conducted in attempt to quantify the probable eects of
this and related agreements, including Brown et al. (1995) , Harrison et al. (1997), and
USITC (2003). The latter two models employed in these studies assume constant returns
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to scale while Brown et al. (1995) includes monopolistic competition and allows for variety
eects of trade liberalization, however none include rms heterogeneous in productivity as
in the Melitz model. Furthermore, these studies quantify the expected impact of certain
trade agreements based on the level of applied tari liberalization and do not address any
potential impact via reduction of trade policy uncertainty, as I do in this dissertation.
One closely related study to the application presented in this chapter is Handley and
Limão (2012) in which the authors analyze the impact on trade from the accession of Por-
tugal to the EC in 1986. Employing a heterogeneous rms framework similar to that in the
model presented in Chapter 3, they nd that despite very little change in applied preferences
to the European market, Portuguese exports to Europe increased substantially as a result of
the accession, and they show empirical support for a model in which the accession increases
export incentives by decreasing trade policy uncertainty. Unlike the model presented here,
however, the model in Handley and Limão (2012) does not include endogenous determina-
tion of the number of producing rms and general equilibrium eects. Furthermore, the
focus in their study is on the eects of the accession on Portugal. While I primarily focus
on the trade and welfare eects of the Chile-US FTA for Chile, I am also able to assess the
impact of the agreement on countries not party to the agreement.
4.3 Background on Chile-US Trade
4.3.1 Trade Patterns
For most of the rst half of the period from 1997 to 2013, the United States represented
the largest export market by value for Chilean exports, followed by Japan and China. From
2007 on, China has overtaken as the largest export market, followed by the US, Japan, Brazil
and Korea. The largest export sector by value throughout the period is metals, followed by
minerals and then vegetables, wood, food products, animals, and chemicals. Considering
only export ows to the United States, metals became the largest sector after 2004, while
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prior to this metals and vegetables alternated for the top position, followed closely by wood
and animal products.
4.3.2 History of US Tari Preferences for Chile
The United States Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a set of unilateral trade pref-
erences aorded to developing countries by the United States, was rst enacted in 1976, at
which time Chile was included in the list of designated beneciary countries. GSP provides
duty free treatment for selected goods, including most manufactured products as well as se-
lect agricultural products. Because these preferences are extended unilaterally by the United
States and for a xed time period, they are arguably viewed by exporters as uncertain, in
that they may expire or be revoked. In a June 2003 interview with Bloomberg Businessweek,
Osvaldo Rosales, director of international economic relations at Chile's Foreign Relations
Ministry stated:
Under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), many Chilean products
[already] entered the U.S. with zero tari, but GSP is a voluntary, unilateral
mechanism that can be revoked. Under this new trade agreement, all of those
products will have permanent zero taris. That permanence changes our invest-
ment panorama radically.1
In fact, Chile's GSP beneciary status was revoked by the United States in 1988 for failure
to satisfy workers' rights conditions, and was reinstated three years later. Negotiations for
a bilateral agreement between Chile and the US began in the early 1990s, and aspirations
to add Chile as a member party to NAFTA during the Clinton administration failed to
be realized when the president was unable to get Fast-Track authority from Congress
to negotiate a deal.2 On August 1, 2002, the U.S Senate granted fast-track authority to
President George W. Bush, paving the way for a deal to be negotiated with Chile. On
1See O'Connell (2003)
2Fast-track or Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) grants the executive branch of the US government the
ability to negotiate trade deals and them submit them to Congress for an up-down vote, without allowing
Congress to amend the agreement.
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December 11, 2002, the U.S Trade Representative Robert Zoellick announced that such an
agreement had been reached, and by late January 2003, President Bush had signaled his
intention to sign the agreement within 90 days.
On January 1, 2004, the US-Chile Free Trade agreement went into eect, thus replacing
GSP preferences for Chilean exports to the United States with the equal or better preferences
allowed under the FTA. The preferences aorded under the bilateral free trade agreement are
arguably more certain than those under the GSP program as unlike GSP, the program has
no expiration date and cannot be unilaterally revoked by the United States. Though it does
contain conditionalities similar to those found in GSP (for example, minimum workers' rights
policies), in the event of a violation, the agreement triggers a bilateral dispute settlement
mechanism, rather than allowing one party to withdraw from the agreement. The tari free
treatment on bilateral trade ows agreed to under this FTA is phased in over a period of 12
years, so that it is not until 2016 that zero taris on substantially all goods will be realized.
However, as shown below in table 4.1, by 2006 (the post-FTA year for which data is fed into
the model), most sectors have US taris for Chilean exports equal 0 to zero.
The free trade agreement with the United States is not the only FTA in force for Chile;
indeed there are many others. In the simulation presented in this chapter, I focus primarily
on the eect of the implementation of the US-Chile agreement. For the period of time under
consideration (the few years prior to and several after the implementation of the US-Chile
FTA), there are other major trading partners with whom Chile enters into an FTA, most
notably the European Union, which implements an FTA with Chile in 2003, and China,
which implements an FTA with Chile in 2006 and goes on to become Chile's largest trading
partner thereafter. This is important to keep in mind when interpreting the simulation
results below; though the applied taris resulting from these other FTAs are included in
the model when calibrating on 2006 data, the simulated equilibria in 2001 (with CHL-USA
tari uncertainty and without) do not account for any tari uncertainty faced by Chilean
exporters to non-US markets at the time.
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Table 4.1 presents both the applied taris pre and post FTA agreement that governed
Chilean exports into the US as well as the MFN taris in place prior to the FTA, which
I treat as the tari threat level to which taris would revert in the event that unilateral
GSP preferences to Chile are revoked by the United States. This is the relevant threat
level because in the event that GSP preferences were taken away, the US would still be
bound under WTO rules to apply the same taris oered to all other non-preferential WTO
partners to Chile; these common taris are the Most-Favored Nation or MFN taris.
The tari levels presented here represent eectively applied tari rates as computed by
TRAINS, which means that these tari rates take into account the actual preference program
under which a product enters the US market.3 These are the sector-level tari rates which
are later fed into the general equilibrium model.4
4.3.3 Use of Preference Schemes by Chilean Exporters to US
In gure 4.1, we can see the breakdown by preference scheme of imports from Chile into the
US in terms of value. Use of GSP was fairly consistent over the period until it was replaced
by the Chile-US FTA preferences in 2004. After the implementation of this FTA, the value
of trade ows from Chile to the US increased dramatically until 2006, after which there
was a sizable contraction in trade during the global recession, and then by 2011 trade ows
appear to have recovered to their pre-recession levels. We see that the increase in trade
following implementation of the Chile-US FTA does appear to be driven by an increase
3That is, were I instead to report the trade-weighted averages of GSP taris in 2001, this may under-
report the actual tari faced by exporters, as some products which qualify for GSP based on the product
code may not actually enter under GSP for a variety of reasons including administrative barriers faced by the
exporter, or failure to meet Rules of Origin requirements. See table C.2 in Appendix C.3 for a comparison
of the two tari aggregation methods.
4In general, applied taris remain the same or are lowered by the implementation of the FTA, even prior
to full implementation. There are however several exceptions to this. The applied tari on Base Metals for
Chilean exports to the US is actually higher in 2011, under the FTA, than the eectively applied tari in
2001. This is mainly due to the taris being reported as their eectively applied rates across the sector, such
that if taris don't change greatly between the two years but products with higher taris represent a larger
share of the import basket, the tari will appear to increase. There are, however, also specic products
for which applied taris under the FTA during the phase-in period are in fact higher than was the case in
2001 under GSP. Examples of this include, in the Plastics sector, products 40112010 and 40111010, certain
pneumatic rubber tires which had received tari free treatment under GSP, exhibited a tari of 4% in 2006,
the MFN level. In the vegetable products sector, taris on Avocados were also raised well above GSP levels
(and in fact higher that 2001 MFN levels, as the MFN levels were also increased) during phase-in years of
the agreement.
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1 Live Animals 0.2% 0.5% 0.1% 9.8%
2 Veg Products 0.8% 1.0% 0.7% 15.2%
3 Fats and Oils 0.2% 3.8% 0.0% 0.0%
4 Prepared Food 1.6% 2.7% 2.2% 4.0%
5 Minerals 0.7% 0.3% 0.1% 4.4%
6 Chemicals 0.0% 2.1% 0.0% 2.8%
7 Plastics 0.1% 3.8% 1.3% 0.8%
8 Hides and Skin 1.8% 6.3% 0.6% 0.0%
9 Wood 0.3% 1.1% 0.0% 11.0%
10 Pulp 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.5%
11 Textiles 15.0% 17.4% 0.0% 0.4%
12 Footwear 6.2% 7.7% 0.7% 0.0%
13 Stone/Ceramics 0.0% 3.7% 0.1% 0.4%
14 Precious Stones/Metal 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.5%
15 Base Metals 0.8% 0.9% 0.0% 45.1%
16 Machinery 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 0.5%
17 Vehicles 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.1%
18 Precision Instruments 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 0.0%
19 Arms and Ammunition 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
20 Misc. Manufacturing 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5%
Source: TRAINS eectively applied tari data, including AVEs computed using UNCTAD
method 1.
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Figure 4.1: US Imports from Chile by Preference Scheme
Source: US International Trade Commission.
in trade of products that receive preferential treatment under the FTA. See gure C.1 in
Appendix C.1 for a breakdown of preference use by number of products traded.
In order to get a sense of how important preferences were at the sector level under GSP
and later under the Chile-US FTA, gure 4.2 presents the share of Chile-US exports in 2001
that entered under GSP and the share in 2006 that entered under the Chile-US FTA for
each sector. The sectors for which the largest share of Chilean exports to the US market
enter under GSP preferences in 2001 are Plastics, Stone/Ceramics, Fats and Oils, Hides and
Skins, and Chemicals. For each of these sectors, the share of of goods entering under GSP
is over 60% (see gure 4.2) and in each of the top three sectors, preferences continue to be
heavily used under the FTA in 2006. Thus, these are the sectors in which I might expect
to see a substantial eect of the reduction tari uncertainty implied by the FTA. In other
sectors, such as Textiles, Minerals, and Base Metals where use of the FTA preferences are
much larger than the use of GSP preferences, I would expect the FTA to have an eect
mainly via applied tari reduction, and less so via uncertainty reduction. For the analogous
graph showing preference use in each sector by value rather than share, see gure C.2 in
Appendix C.1.
96
Figure 4.2: US Imports from Chile by Preference Scheme
Source: US International Trade Commission.
4.3.4 Firm Level Trade Patterns
From 2003 until 2009, the United States represented the largest export destination for Chile
both in value and number of exporters. In 2007, China surpassed the US as the largest
export market by value. After the US, Peru, Argentina, and Bolivia represent the markets
with the largest number of Chilean exporters over this period.5 Figure 4.3 presents the
number of rms exporting from Chile to the US in sectors with an average of over 150
exporters in each year. We see that the largest export sectors by rm count are Vegetable
Products, Machinery and Electronics, and Prepared food, and that most sectors experienced
a noticeable increase in number of exporters around 2002, the year in which it was announced
by the US Trade Representative that an agreement for a Free Trade Agreement with Chile
had been reached.
5Source: Exporter Dynamics Database, World Bank.
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Figure 4.3: Chilean Exporters to USA by Sector
Source: Aduenas Chile
4.4 Reduced Form Evidence
In order to motivate the inclusion in a general equilibrium model of the tari uncertainty
reducing eect for Chile of entering into a bilateral FTA with the United States, I present
here some reduced form evidence that this eect exists. Looking rst at trade ow values of
Chilean exports to all export destinations over the period of time from 1997 to 2013, I run
a simple dierence in dierence regression, controlling for year and importer specic eects,
on the increase in trade value between 1997 and each year, including a binary explanatory
variable indicating whether or not Chile had entered into a free trade agreement with the
partner country in the given year. That is, I implement the following specication:
∆LogExportst,s = βo + βt + βs + βFTAFTAt,s + εt,s
where FTAt,s is a binary indicator equal to one if a free trade agreement is in force in year
t between Chile and country s.
Columns (1) and (2) of table 4.2 present the results of this regression (1), as well as a
second specication (2), where indicators for years one and two years prior to the imple-
mentation of the FTA are also included. These lags are included because in some cases,
expectations that a free trade agreement will be implemented in the near future may be high
in the years just before implementation; it is conceivable that one might see an eect on
trade in these years. Here, we do not see any signicant eect on log trade value of having
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Table 4.2: Regression Results: FTA Impact on Trade
Dependent Var: Change in Log Export Value Change in Log No. Exporters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year 0.158*** 0.159*** 0.0619*** 0.0549***
(0.00563) (0.00577) (0.00580) (0.00594)
FTA -0.147* -0.0795 0.273*** 0.0284





Constant -315.8*** -318.1*** -123.7*** -109.6***
(11.29) (11.56) (11.61) (11.89)
Observations 2,021 2,021 1,572 1,572
R-squared 0.754 0.754 0.669 0.675
Standard errors reported in parentheses; signicance reported as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
entered into an FTA with Chile (except for a negative eect in the rst specication).6 This
seems to be driven by the smaller exporters to Chile; re-running these two specications
weighted by trade value yields a positive signicant eect in the year that the FTA is im-
plemented, both in the specication with and without indicators for years leading up to the
FTA implementation (see Appendix C.2). I interpret this as indicating that there does seem
to be a positive signicant eect of having an FTA on trade ows to Chile, but this eect
seems to be present only for large trade partners. Further, the fact that this eect appears
only once the FTA is implemented, rather than prior to implementation, seems to indicate
that the increase in trade ow values provide evidence of an eect of the FTA via applied
tari but not necessarily through a reduction in tari uncertainty. The two specications are
now repeated using the log number of exporting rms from Chile as the dependent variable
rather than the log trade ow value, with the results reported in columns (3) and (4) of
table 4.2. Here, there appears to be a positive signicant eect on the number of exporters
to a given destination of having a FTA in force, and in this case, including indicators for
6Note that the indicator FTAlagn is equal to 0 more than n years prior to the implementation of an
FTA and equal to one in all other years. Thus, a positive signicant eect on FTAlag2 but no signicant
eect on FTAlag1 (as in the case of results in column (4)) does not mean that there is no positive eect on
exporters in the year prior to FTA implementation, rather, it means that there is no additional eect in this
year beyond the eect of being in year FTAlag2 or later. Several alternate specications with more FTA lag
years and/or post-FTA year indicators were also run; none yielded any signicant eect of any post FTA
year or pre-FTA years farther than 2 years prior to implementation.
99
one and two years preceding the ocial implementation of an FTA, we see that the eect
on exporters occurs two years in advance of the ocial implementation. Together, these
results seem to indicate a strong eect on the extensive margin of exporting two years prior
to an FTA being ocially implemented, with a strong eect on the intensive margin (for
large trade partners) once the agreement has gone into force.
Of course the results presented in 4.2 are merely suggestive, and do not disentangle the
eect on trade of an FTA via applied tari liberalization and tari uncertainty reduction.
To focus more on this eect and on the FTA between Chile and the US specically, I present
here the results of another simple specication where each observation is now the change
in log export value (or change in log number of exporters) from Chile to the United States
in a given sector year relative to the base year, 1997. Including year and sector specic
eects, I now include as well the applied tari level and a binary indicator for whether the
FTA was in force in the given year interacted with the share of exports for the given sector
that entered the US under GSP preferences in 2001. That is, I implement the following
specication:
∆LogExportst,k = βo + βt + βk + βFTAGSPFTAt ∗GSPshrk + εt,k
where k indexes sector, t time, and GSPshrk is the share of sector k exports from Chile to
the US that entered under GSP preferences in year 2001. The motivation for this regression
is that the tari should capture all of the applied liberalization eects of the FTA, while any
additional tari uncertainty reducing eect should be strongest in sectors where GSP (the
uncertain preferences) was important. Table 4.3 presents the results of this specication.
Although the interacted FTA*GSPshare has a positive estimate, the standard error is large.
We also see that the tari variable points to a problem of endogenous tari levels; higher
taris here correspond to larger export values, reecting a tari increasing behavior by the
United States for sectors with increased imports from Chile.
Columns (3) and (4) of table 4.3 present the results of this regression where the dependent
variable is now the log change in number of exporting rms. We see again here that there
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Table 4.3: Regression Results: Chile-US FTA Impact on Trade
Dependent Var: Change in log Export Value Change in log No. Exporters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year 0.0539*** 0.0560*** 0.0497*** 0.0363***
(0.0119) (0.0123) (0.00915) (0.00975)
tari 0.0448* 0.0470* 0.00921 0.00294
(0.0254) (0.0256) (0.0116) (0.0113)
FTA*GSPshr 0.213 0.194 -0.169 -0.235*





Constant -107.8*** -112.0*** -99.14*** -72.41***
(23.92) (24.60) (18.31) (19.51)
Observations 315 315 176 176
R-squared 0.751 0.752 0.659 0.687
Standard errors reported in parentheses; signicance reported as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
appears to be a large, signicant eect on the number of exporters not in the year the FTA
is implemented, but rather two years prior to this, in sectors where GSP preferences are
heavily used. In the case of the Chile-US FTA, FTAlag2 goes from zero to one in year 2002.
That this would be the year in which we see the largest eect on exporters concerned about
the uncertainty of GSP preferences makes sense, as this was the year in which the US Trade
Representative announced that an agreement had been reached, and in which the President
obtained fast-track authority to sign such a deal, thus rendering the probability of the
agreement much higher (see section 4.3.2).
4.5 Model
In order to simulate the eects of this particular Free Trade Agreement in a framework
comparable to the CGE framework commonly used to assess the direct impact of FTAs
via applied tari reduction, I construct a general equilibrium model of trade between four
regions where rms, which are heterogeneous in productivity in a Melitz-type framework,
observe current tari levels and have some expectations about future tari draws. In the
context of this example, prior to the FTA, Chilean rms that export to the US receive
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preferential treatment under GSP for certain products, however, they have the expectation
that in each period for which the preferences persist, there is a probability γ that the GSP
preferences will be unilaterally revoked by the US, in which case the taris faced will be
given by the MFN tari rate for the given product. The entry into force of the Chile-US
FTA in this model will generate increased trade due to the reduction in applied taris as
well as through the elimination of uncertainty over future tari levels for Chilean exports
to the US. For details on the model I have mind, please refer to Chapter 3.
4.6 Data
In order to calibrate the model, I use a variety of data sources on trade, taris, rm level
exports and macro economic statistics. All raw data (unless otherwise noted) are obtained
in the Harmonized System nomenclature for traded products and are then aggregated up
to the sector level, where each sector contains one or more HS2 chapters and is dened
according to the 21 standard sections.7 The model is calibrated using year 2006 data and so
the simulated equilibrium in year 2006 will be identical to reported data in year 2006. Given
the parameters of the calibrated model, the equilibrium values of endogenous variables are
solved for in year 2001 in both a model where there exists a threat of a future tari hike and
one without. Given these equilibrium values, in the results presented in the next section, I
compare the dierence between 2001 and 2006 values of endogenous variables produced by
the model with a tari threat to that without.
4.6.1 Trade and Tari Data
Trade and tari data is downloaded from Comtrade and TRAINS respectively via WITS.
Trade values are simply summed up to the sector level while applied tari data is the Eec-
tive Applied Tari as reported in WITS at the HS2 level, then aggregated to the sector level
7For a list of these sections, see http://hts.usitc.gov/. Throughout the analysis, I drop sector 21 Works
of Art, as this does not seem to t well into the dierentiated manufactured good model I have in mind.
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using bilateral trade weights.8 MFN taris for the United States in year 2001, as reported
at the HS2 level in WITS, are aggregated up to the sector level using trade ow weights.
These are the tari threat levels faced by Chilean exporters prior to implementation of
the Chile-US FTA.9
4.6.2 Firm Level Data
I obtain customs data from Aduenas Chile which provides the HS6 code, destination country,
and rm id for rms exporting from Chile over the period from 1997 to 2006.10 In order to
obtain a count of the number of rms exporting from the other three regions in each sector,
I make the assumption that the sector specic average value exported per rm, as computed
from the customs data for Chilean exporters in each sector to the ROW region, is the same
for each bilateral ow. I then use the value of each trade ow, as reported by Comtrade, to
obtain a count of the number of exporting rms.
Next, to get the number of producing rms in each sector-region, Nk,r, I divide the
number of exporters to ROW, Mk,r,ROW by the share of rms in the given country-sector
that export, ShExpk,r. For USA, data for this share parameter is taken from Bernard,
Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007), which provides the share of US rms by NAICS industry
that are (either direct or indirect) exporters in year 2002. For Chile, I take the share of
exporting rms by sector in 2007 (the most recent year available) from Pellandra (2013)
which reports these as descriptive statistics computed using data from the manufacturing
survey Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (ENIA) and administrative customs data. For
8As an alternative to the eective applied tari, I have also aggregated tari line level applied taris
for CHL-USA ows where the applied tari is taken to be the minimum of any preferential taris and the
MFN tari on a given tari line and aggregated up to the sector level using bilateral trade ows as weights.
The two methods can yield somewhat dierent applied tari levels at the sector level, due to the fact that
the latter assumes that the applied tari is the lowest reported tari for the given product, while in reality
some products that appear to qualify for preferential treatment may fail to do so because of rules of origin,
or exporters may choose not to use the preferential tari due to administrative barriers. For this reason, I
use the eective applied tari as the applied tari level fed into my model. For most sectors, this does noes
not make a large dierence, with the exception of Sector 1, Live Animals., and to a lesser degree, Sector 4,
Food Products. See Table C.2 in Appendix C.3 for a comparison of the sector level tari found using each
aggregation method.
9See the last paragraph of section 4.3.2 for an explanation of why this is the relevant threat tari.
10Thank you to Ricardo Espinoza, a graduate student at University of Maryland, for providing access to
this data.
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Mercosur, I use the share of exporting rms by sector for Brazil as reported in the World
Bank Enterprise Survey for 2009.11 Finally, for the share of ROW rms that export, I assume
that 5% of rms in each sector export to the United States. Generally, because the ROW
region contains all countries apart from USA and Chile, one would expect a substantially
lower share of total rms to export to one particular destination relative to the share of
rms who export at all. This is why I assume a low value for the share that export to
the US. Note that such a small percentage of rms exporting to a particular destination
is equivalent to assuming a very high calibrated xed cost to export from ROW to either
of the other two regions. This is sensible given that taking ROW as one aggregate region
in this set-up, one would expect that the cuto to export to either of these two specic
regions is suciently high up the distribution that general equilibrium changes in this cuto
resulting from a change in the CHL-USA tari schedule will be relatively small. Indeed,
when the cuto is high, we are on a relatively at portion of the Pareto distribution, and
so an assumption of a small number of exporters to USA or CHL from ROW relative to the
total number of producers in ROW leads to this sensible prediction.
Table 4.4 lists the data used to calibrate the model and the source for each, while the
following subsections detail the methodology used in computing certain parameters.
4.6.3 Parametrization and Calibration
The parameter values governing the Pareto distribution of rms, the elasticity of substitution
and the discount factor are all taken from Balistreri and Rutherford (2012), who in turn
draw from a variety of other sources in the literature. As shown in Chapter 3, the results
of a given simulation may be sensitive to these parameter values (see Section 3.7).
Normalizing all prices in the base year to P = 1, I am able to calibrate the deterministic
version of my current model using the data and parameters as given in Table 4.4; that is, I
can extract the preference, xed and sunk cost, and input stock (Labor) parameters using
11See www.enterprisesurveys.org.
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Table 4.4: Data and Sources for Model Calibration
Parameter Description Source/Methodology
vx0k,r,s, r 6= s fob export value for sector k exports
from r to s in base year
Comtrade
τk,r,s 1+ad valorem applied tari in s for
sector k imports from r
TRAINS (eective applied tari and
reported MFN)
M0k,r,s number of sector k rms in r
exporting to s in base year
Aduenas Chile data for CHL,
assumption using $/rm for all other
bilateral ows
GDP0r GDP of country r in base year WDI
N0k,r number of sector k rms operating in r Using M0 and data on share of rms
that export [USA-Bernard et al.
(2007); CHL-Pellandra (2013); MERC
- World Bank Enterprise Survey for
Brazil; ROW-assume 5%]
µ0r share of total expenditures going
towards the homogeneous goods sector
in country r
assumed = 0.3
µk,r share of total expenditures going
towards sector k in country r
Proxied by import value shares in year
2006 (Comtrade)
a Pareto shape parameter assumed = 4.6 (see section 4.6.3)
b Lower bound on productivity assumed = 0.5 (see section 4.6.3)
σ Elasticity of Substitution assumed = 3.8 (see section 4.6.3)
δ Exogenous Death Rate assumed = 0.1 (see section 4.6.3)
equations that follow from the equilibrium conditions.12 A list of these equations is given
in Appendix C.6.
The parameter value for γ used in the simulations below is chosen by minimizing an
objective function based comparing simulated to actual trade changes between Chile and
the US. The rst is based on the sector-wise percent increase in number of exporters from
Chile to the US, while the second is based on the sector-wise percent increase in trade value.
In the rst case, (γ, δ) is chosen to minimize the sum over all sectors of the square of the
dierence between the observed increase in the log number of exporters and the simulated
log increase in the number of exporters. That is, the model is solved repeatedly for various
12Were this exercise actually being conducted prior to the implementation of the FTA, such that post-FTA
data was not available for calibrating the model, one would have to use pre-FTA year data for calibration.
The calibration equations listed in Appendix C.6 assume that the data comes from a deterministic steady
state where applied taris are expected to remain the same forever. This is why I use a post-FTA year to
calibrate the model, as I assume that these taris are expected to remain in place forever. If one did not
have access to post-FTA year data, the model could theoretically only be calibrated, taking into account the
uncertainty over future taris, by using calibration equations taken from the full model with uncertainty in
Chapter 2, however, doing so would require data on the equilibrium values of trade ows and rm numbers
in the hypothetical High tari state, which will generally not have been realized (at least in the case of
the Chile-US FTA). Thus, in order to implement the type of analysis done here prior to the implementation
of an FTA, a reasonable approximation for model parameter values may be those obtained by calibrating
using pre-FTA year data, assuming that taris are deterministic and not expected to change.
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[ln (Mk,CHL,USA,2006)− ln (Mk,CHL,USA,y)]
is approximately the average (over years y = 1997 − 2001) percent increase in the number







[ln (Mk,CHL,USA,2006)− ln (Msimk,CHL,USA,y)]
is the average percent increase between the steady state equilibrium value of the number of
exporters from Chile to the US in sector k in the steady state where taris are at level L
(that is, GSP preferences are in place as reported in year y) and there exists a γ probability
each period of taris being permanently set to MFN levels versus the simulated steady state
under the Free Trade Agreement (which will be the equilibrium in a state where all US <->
Chile trade ows are subjected to zero taris while all other trade ows are subject to the
applied tari rate that was in force in pre-FTA year y).
To compute the parameter values for γ and δ which most closely match trade data, the
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Figure 4.4: Choice of γ Parameter
is the average percent increase between the steady state equilibrium value of exports from
Chile to the US in sector k in the steady state where taris are at level L (that is, GSP
preferences are in place as reported in year y) and there exists a γ probability each period
of taris being permanently set to MFN levels versus the simulated steady state under the
Free Trade Agreement (which will be the equilibrium in a state where all US <-> Chile
trade ows are subjected to zero taris while all other trade ows are subject to the applied
tari rate that was in force in pre-FTA year y).
Figure 4.4 shows the values of ∆M plotted for various values of γ, given that δ = 0.0571
and various values of δ, given that γ = 0.0998.13 The values of γ and δ which yield a
simulation output with increases in the number of exporters closest to those observed in
the data is γ = 0.0998, δ = 0.0571, while the value which minimizes the criteria based on
export value from Chile to the US is γ = 1, δ = 0.06.14 In the simulation results presented
below, parameter values of γ = 0.0998, δ = 0.0571 are assumed. I note that these are
not econometric estimates of the true parameter values, but rather each is a parameter
that I have crudely backed out of my general equilibrium model by minimizing (4.1). In
13These values were found numerically by simulating the model multiple times across a increasingly ner
grids of (δ, γ) values and choosing the point at which the objective function was minimized.
14The fact that γ = 1 minimizes the objective function based on trade ow values can be understood to
reect the fact that in general across sectors, trade ow values increased by more in the data than the model
predicts, such that the model is brought closest to the data by setting the probability of GSP preference loss
prior to the FTA equal to its maximum possible value. There are several possible reasons for this: rst, the
simulation that I run assumes a policy change that only eliminates bilateral taris between Chile and the
US, leaving all others untouched, while in reality, other taris changed over this period. This is not the only
explanation, however, as running the analogous simulation where post-FTA taris are predicted perfectly
(using 2006 tari data) still yields a value of γ = 1 as being the parameter value which brings the model
simulation closest to observed increased in trade ows. Another factor may be nominal growth (ination)
over this period, as well as real growth, which the model does not take into account at all.
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addition to minimizing the objective function based on increases in exporter mass across
sectors presented in (4.1), I have also found parameter values that minimize a weighted
version of this expression where each sector is weighted by the level of trade ows from
Chile to the US in 2006. In this case, the γ value which minimizes this objective function
is γ = 0.102, while the δ value is <0.001. In order to check the robustness of the results
presented below to the parameter values assumed for δ and γ, I run simulations over a range
of these values, with δ ranging from 0.01 to 0.16 and γ ranging from 0.05 to 0.30.15 Thus,
I present the example in this chapter as an illustration of how including tari threats in a
general equilibrium model with heterogeneous rms can impact the simulation results of a
trade policy shock and provide the magnitude of these eects for certain assumed γ values,
however these magnitudes should be not be taken too literally. In future evaluations of
preferential trade agreements which use this methodology to assess the potential impacts of
the agreement through both applied tari reduction and the reduction in policy uncertainty,
γ should ideally be estimated econometrically and then fed into the model.
4.7 Results
In this section I present the simulation results for a four region, twenty sector model of a
policy shock that sets all taris to zero on Chile<->US trade ows and all other taris
at eectively applied rates reported in 2001. The four regions are Chile (CHL), United
States (USA), Mercosur (MERC), and Rest of World (ROW). To be clear, I calibrate the
model using 2006 data, taking into account reported applied taris in this year, in order to
obtain values for sunk costs and preference parameters λ. I then use the model, given its
calibrated parameters, to simulate the equilibrium prior to the FTA (assuming taris are
at 2001 levels), and after the implementation of the FTA (assuming all taris remain the
same except for US<->Chile taris which are set to zero). I do this once using a model that
assumes no tari threat is present in 2001, and again assuming that there exists a 9.98%
15See section 4.8.
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threat of taris on Chile-US moving from GSP to MFN levels. In each case, in computing
the pre-FTA equilibrium, I assume that agents expect all non CHL-US bilateral taris to
remain at year 2001 applied levels forever. I then compute, for certain variables of interest,
the dierence between the pre-FTA equilibrium and post-FTA equilibrium, rst in the case
where there is no tari threat in the pre-FTA simulation, and the in the case where there
exists a 9.98% tari threat prior to FTA implementation. In doing so, I am able to compare
how my model would evaluate the impacts of this particular Free Trade agreement relative
to another model which is identical in all respects except for the fact that it does not take
into account the eect of the tari hike threat.16
4.7.1 Chile-US Results
Table 4.5 presents the equilibrium values of utility, total trade value, and number of exporters
in the post-FTA equilibrium, and in the pre-FTA equilibrium, where the simulated pre-
FTA values are generated once under the assumption of no tari threat and once under the
assumption of a 9.98% chance of losing GSP preferences. For trade ows from Chile to the
US, the model simulates an increase in trade value of 5.78% and an increase in exporter
mass of 2.8% from applied tari changes following implementation of the FTA, and a 6.98%
increase in trade value and 7.43% increase in exporter mass from applied tari changes plus
the removal of the tari threat. Utility is predicted to fall by 0.233% in Chile following
the implementation of the agreement, under the assumption that no tari threat is initially
present, while it is predicted to fall by slightly less, 0.231% in the case where the tari threat
existed prior to the FTA.
16I have also conducted a closely related simulation in which the policy shock removes the threat of a
tari hike on CHL-USA taris and sets all USA-CHL taris to zero, but now sets all other applied taris at
their 2006 levels. The results of this steady state equilibrium can be compared to the two counterfactuals
as described above, and yield qualitatively similar results of the eects of including the eect of a tari hike
threat. In the results presented below however, as I am conducting an exercise in evaluating the eects of
the FTA ex-ante, I assume that that non Chile-US taris in the years following the FTA implementation
are not known.
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Table 4.5: Simulation Results: Chile-USA





(Millions of USD) Exporters
post FTA simulation 17,428 10,141 3,158
pre-FTA simulation without Tari Uncertainty 17,400 7,135 3,041
pre-FTA simulation with Tari Uncertainty 17,400 7,055 2,909
Percent Increase, pre to post FTA without tari uncertainty -0.233 5.78 2.80
Percent Increase, pre to post FTA with tari uncertainty -0.231 6.98 7.43
4.7.1.1 By-Sector Impact: Firm Counts
One of the primary endogenous variables of interest in this model is the number of rms
exporting from Chile to the United States, as this is negatively aected by the presence of a
tari hike threat on Chilean imports into the US. Figure 4.5 presents the model simulation
results for the percentage increase in the number of exporters from Chile to the US by sector
under the two alternative models, while gure 4.6 presents these same results after dropping
the textile/apparel and footwear sectors as these each experience much larger predicted
growth following the FTA to to the elimination of relatively high taris faced prior to the
agreement. The rst set of bars, shown in blue, represent the percent increase in the mass of
exporters resulting from the implementation of the Chile-US FTA obtained by only taking
into account the eect of the applied tari liberalization resulting from eliminating taris
between Chile and the US. The red bars indicate the percentage increase implied by the
model once the additional eect of the uncertainty over unilateral preferences prior to the
establishment of the FTA is taken into account.
We see that in sectors where applied tari changes are smaller, the elimination of the
tari threat present prior to the implementation of the Chile-US FTA can have a non-
negligible impact on entry into the export market relative to the impact resulting only from
applied tari changes. Indeed, in some sectors, Chemicals, Plastics, and Stone/Ceramics, a
heterogeneous rms model which does not account for a positive probability of preference
loss prior to the FTA will simulate a contraction in the mass of exporters from Chile to
the USA following the FTA, while the additional eect of eliminating the tari hike threat
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Figure 4.5: Simulated Increase in Exporters: CHL to USA
Figure 4.6: Simulated Increase in Exporters: CHL to USA
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counters this eect of applied tari changes and yields a net positive eect on exporting.
The contraction in exporter mass resulting from the change in applied taris associated with
the FTA in this sector is itself a result of the fact that under unilateral GSP preferences,
Chile already received zero (or close to zero) applied taris while imposing a positive tari
on US imports. Following the implementation of the FTA, experiencing no change in the
tari faced to export to the US, but liberalizing the import tari creates more competition
in this sector in Chile, lowering the equilibrium mass of domestic rms in that sector, which
in turn results in a smaller mass of rms exporting from Chile to the US. These are the
mechanisms leading to a contraction of exporter mass in these sectors in a model which
doesn't take into account the negative eect on exporter mass of the presence of a tari
hike threat. Taking this into account, in this case assuming a 9.98% chance in any given
period that unilateral preferences for Chile to the US market will be revoked, we see that
the combined eect of liberalizing taris and eliminating this tari hike threat now results
in an increase in the mass of exporters from Chile to the US in these sectors.
To see how these simulated changes in the number of exporters per sector from Chile to
the US compare with the data, gure 4.7 presents a scatter plot of these predicted increases
versus the increase observed in the data for Mk,CHL,USA, the number of exporters from
Chile to the US for each sector k along with the 45 degree line showing where the two would
match exactly. Simulated increases are shown for two models, one showing the increase
in M from the deterministic steady state in 2001 to the new deterministic steady state in
2006, and the other, the increase from the steady state in 2001 where there exists the threat
of tari hikes, to the deterministic steady state in 2006. I note that the sector for which
including the eect of uncertainty makes the biggest dierence in terms of reducing the
distance between the data and the model simulation is Plastics, which is also the sector in
which GSP preferences were most heavily used by Chilean exporters prior to the FTA (see
Figure C.2). For this sector, the model without tari uncertainty predicts a decrease in the
mass of exporters form Chile to the US, however, once the added eect of the elimination of
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Figure 4.7: Simulated vs. Actual Change in Exporters
future tari hikes is included, the model predicts that following implementation of the FTA
the mass of exporters will increase.
For results by sector on the implied impact of the FTA from the two simulations for
Chilean trade with the Rest of World (ROW) region and on the number of domestic pro-
ducers in Chile, see Appendix C.4.
4.7.1.2 By-Sector Impact: Trade Flow Values
Another question which is often the focus when evaluating potential trade agreements is the
how the volume of trade between countries will change as a result of the agreement. In order
to evaluate how the current model (taking into account the eect of eliminating a tari hike
threat) would simulate trade ows relative to a model that does not include this additional
potential eect, I present here analogous results to those presented in the previous section,
now for trade ow value between bilateral pairs. Figure 4.8 presents the percent increase in
trade ow value from CHL to USA under the two dierent model simulations. The percent
increases here are highly correlated with the changes in the mass of exporting rms shown
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Figure 4.8: Simulated Increase in Trade: CHL to USA
*Textiles/apparel and footwear sectors have been dropped to allow for a more legible scale,
as each is simulated to experience large increases in export value following implementation
of the FTA.
in Figure 4.5, though not identical. In the case of the Chemicals sector, for example, the
model taking into account the elimination of the tari threat simulates an increase in the
mass of exporters, but a decrease in the total value of exports, indicating that the FTA
causes the export cuto productivity to fall such that the mass of exporters increases, but
the average productivity of the set of exporters then falls suciently such that total revenue
falls. For by-sector results in levels rather than percentages, see gure C.5 in Appendix C.4.
As done for exporter mass, gure 4.9 shows the predicted increase in (log) trade value
from Chile to the US under the two model simulations against the actual change observed
in the data.
4.7.2 Third-Country Eects
To illustrate one of the desirable features of using a general equilibrium model to study
the impact of preferential trading agreements, I present here the results of the model for
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Figure 4.9: Simulated vs. Actual Change in Log Trade Flows
Sectors Arms and Ammunition and Fats and Oils, which exhibit large decreases and increases in
trade respectively, are dropped here to allow for a more legible scale.
simulated impacts on third-party countries that are not directly aected by the implemen-
tation of the agreement. In the case of the Chile-US FTA, I have included Mercosur, a large
regional trading partner of Chile in order to assess how including the additional eect of
eliminating tari uncertainty of Chile's US taris aects the trade of this outside region.
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present the equilibrium values of utility, exports to Chile (US, respec-
tively), and number of exporting rms to Chile (US, respectively) in each the post-FTA
simulated equilibrium, the pre-FTA simulated equilibrium without a tari threat, and the
pre-FTA simulated equilibrium with a tari threat. In percentage terms, the dierential ef-
fects on utility, trade ows and exporter mass between the models with and without a tari
threat on CHL-USA trade ows are much smaller than the eects on Chile, as one might
expect. For results by sector on the implied impact of the FTA from the two simulations
for Mercosur trade with the Rest of World (ROW) region and USA, see Appendix C.5.
115
Table 4.6: Simulation Results: MERC-CHL





(Millions of USD) Exporters
post FTA simulation 156,868 9,192 12,704
pre-FTA simulation without Tari Uncertainty 156,290 7,210 8,897
pre-FTA simulation with Tari Uncertainty 156,290 7,202 8,893
Percent Increase, pre to post FTA without tari uncertainty -0.0015 -0.9810 -0.2285
Percent Increase, pre to post FTA with tari uncertainty -0.0016 -1.0922 -0.2791
Table 4.7: Simulation Results: MERC-USA
Total Trade Value Number of
Year (Millions of USD) Exporters
post FTA simulation 32,031 59,965
pre-FTA simulation without Tari Uncertainty 31,053 61,105
pre-FTA simulation with Tari Uncertainty 31,050 61,104
Percent Increase, pre to post FTA without tari uncertainty -0.0555 -0.0357
Percent Increase, pre to post FTA with tari uncertainty -0.0640 -0.0375
4.7.3 Trade Restrictiveness Index
In order to provide another frame of reference for the quantitative eect of the threat of
losing GSP preferences into the United States on Chilean welfare and exports into the US,
I compute a Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) for each model based on either welfare,
total value of trade from Chile to the US, or total number of exporters from Chile to the
US. The TRI is computed to be the tari level that would have to be imposed uniformly
across all sectors on Chilean exports into the United States in order to generate the same
i) welfare level in Chile, ii) total value of exports from Chile to the United States, or iii)
total number of exporters from Chile to the United States as that which is realized with
actual applied rates plus the threat of tari hikes. The TRIs in year 2001 (before the FTA
was implemented, and there was a risk for Chile of losing GSP status) computed using rst
the model without the threat of tari hike and then with the threat (assuming again that
γ = 0.0998) are presented in Table 4.8.
The rst thing to note from this index, in the case of the rst model which takes into
account only the eect of applied taris, is that the uniform tari which would result in
the same eects as the year 2001 applied taris on Chilean goods exported to the US are
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Table 4.8: Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) for CHL-USA Exports
Utility Total Exports Total No. Exporters
Deterministic Model without Threat of Tari Hikes 0.72% 0.58% 0.72%
Dynamic Model with Threat of Tari Hikes 0.75% 0.65% 1.19%
quite low, reecting the fact that Chilean exporters already enjoyed relatively low applied
tari rates into the US market, prior to the implementation of the Chile-US FTA. Indeed,
for this very reason, the argument was made in the US Congress in favor of passing the
agreement because it would not oer any real new advantage to Chile but rather to the
US, who which would experience much larger applied tari cuts on exports to Chile.17 This
argument ignores the eect of the FTA in locking in preferences for Chilean exporters, and
the relative importance of this eect, under the assumed model parameters, is reected in
comparing the TRI for the dynamic model with that of the static model. In terms of total
number of exporters, the TRI computed taking into account the prospect of losing GSP is
nearly double that based only on applied tari rates.
4.8 Discussion
As mentioned above, the quantitative values of this simulation are subject to several caveats.
The assumed values of γ = 0.0998 and δ = 0.0571 are chosen as they minimize the sum of the
distance between model simulations and actual data on the number of Chile-US exporters in
each sector, however as mentioned above, this value is sensitive to the minimization criteria
and pre-FTA years of data used to compute changes pre and post agreement. For this
reason, all results presented above are replicated for a range of γ and δ values around this
point with δ ranging from 0.01 to 0.16 and γ ranging from 0.05 to 0.30. Figures 4.10 and
4.11 present the eect of allowing γ and δ to vary over this range on the simulated increase
in utility, mass of exporters, and total export value from Chile to the US generated by the
model where there exists a positive threat of preference loss prior to the FTA. In each graph,
the dotted black line indicates the change in utility, number of exporters, or value of exports
17See http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt224/html/CRPT-108hrpt224-pt2.htm.
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Figure 4.10: Robustness Check: Probability of Tari Hike
Figure 4.11: Robustness Check: Probability of Death Shock
respectively simulated by the model where no threat of preference loss exists prior to the
FTA. We see that an increase in either γ, the probability with which exporters expect they
may lose GSP preferences in any given period, or in 1 − δ, the weight assigned to future
periods, the increase in utility, exporters and exports are all larger, with changes in utility
ranging from -0.226% to -0.232%, changes in the mass of exporters ranging from 4.35% to
10.44%, and changes in the value of exports ranging from 6.27% to 8.43%.
In addition to the sensitivity of the magnitude of predicted changes to various parameter
values, it is important to keep in mind that there are many factors not modeled in this
framework which are likely to have also impacted rm entry and export value, including
aggregate growth (in my model I assume no growth in aggregate productivity between 2001
and 2006), expectations about trade policy with other countries apart from the United
States, and intermediate linkages between sectors, which I do not have in this model. On a
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similar note, data are applied to this model at a fairly aggregate level (HS section), whereas
in reality, taris are imposed on at least a six digit product disaggregation, and thus I
may be missing important trade-os made between products within the same sector that
have dierent tari rates. The challenge in applying this framework to a more disaggregated
dataset is not obtaining the data, but rather solving a Mixed Complementarity problem such
as this becomes computationally infeasible for large numbers of sectors. This is something
I hope to pursue and improve on in future work.
4.9 Conclusion
In this Chapter, I have presented an application of the CGE model developed in Chapter 3
which incorporates the impact of uncertainty faced by Chilean rms on rm entry into the
US market. After calibrating this model using trade, tari, and rm data from the year 2006
and then solved for the equilibrium in both cases with and without the threat of preference
loss for Chilean exporters, I nd that a model without the tari threat eect predicts that
Chilean exports to the United States will increase by 5.8%, the number of exporters will
increase by 2.8% and utility for Chile will decrease by 0.233% as a result of the FTA, while
the model with the eect of a tari threat predicts that exports will increase by 7.0%, the




A.1 Endogeneity of Applied Taris
As mentioned in section 2.5.1, I include an indicator,MFNPOS, for whether or not product
has a positive applied MFN tari, as an independent variable that contributes to explaining
the probability of whether or not positive trade ows are observed for the given bilateral
pair-product. The assumption underlying this is that taris are not exogenous to trade
ows, and in fact, it is reasonable to think that products for a given bilateral pair can be
classied into two categories: one for which no political pressure has ever been applied to
demand a tari to protect the domestic industry, and the other comprised of products for
which political pressure (lobbying) has resulted in the imposition of a non-zero tari. In
reality, lobbying groups may exert their inuence in order to aect not only whether or not
a tari is imposed, but may also aect the level of the tari chosen. However, in order to
maintain a tractable specication, I make the assumption that in the underlying political
economy model, lobbying groups for domestic industries may lobby their government to
impose a tari or not, but have no control over the level of the tari applied. Given this
assumption, one would expect the relationship between import ows and applied taris to
resemble that depicted in gure A.1, that is, zero imports result in no lobbying and therefore
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Figure A.1: Imports vs. Applied Taris
no (or zero) tari being imposed, while for positive import levels, domestic groups lobby for
a positive tari, which I then assume to be imposed by the government, exogenous to trade
ows. Then, for these products, one would expect a negative relationship between taris
and import ows, as higher taris decrease protability for exporters.
The inclusion of the MFNPOS indicator in the empirical specication determining the
probability that a good is traded will then account for the dierential probability that a
good is traded given that it has a zero applied tari, which under the assumptions above,
means that it has no domestic opposition specically because it is not imported. Without
the inclusion of this variable, because of the presence of many zero tari products in the
data, one would expect, assuming the relationship depicted in gure A.1, that there may
be an overall positive correlation between applied taris and probability of positive trade.
Indeed, this is reected in a positive coecient on ln τ in such a specication. What about
the eect on the estimated coecient for the uncertainty measure, U? If we take as given
the assumed relationship between applied taris and imports as arising from the lobbying
story described above, it would be reasonable to expect that products with applied taris
of zero (due to lack of domestic lobbying for positive taris) would either remain unbound
(as there are no imports in the given product and therefore no foreign lobbying pressure
to bind the tari rate), or be bound at zero, as there is no political cost to the domestic
government of imposing a zero binding. In the rst case, the uncertainty measure would be
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equal to 1 in the baseline results, however, these lines would all have been dropped in the
alternative data treatment where unbound lines are dropped from the sample. The results
continue to hold in both cases. If instead we are in the second case, where products with a
zero applied tari rate also have a zero bound rate, then U = 0, and we would expect the
same dierential relationship between imports and the level of the uncertainty measure as
depicted for taris in gure A.1. That is, for these products with zero applied taris and
uncertainty measure equal to 0, there are no imports; the lack of imports is what led to a
lack of domestic lobbying and therefore a zero applied tari.
Of course to fully understand the implications of the endogeneity of taris, a more
complex political economy model would need to be developed. For the current empirical
analysis, it would also be useful to analyze the results of a similar regression allowing for
dierential uncertainty eects across the two types of products (zero vs. positive tari
products) or to examine the results of a similar regression run on the sub-sample of products
for which applied taris are positive. I have not yet implemented this, but will explore these
ideas further in future research.
A.2 Tari Summary Statistics By Importing Country
All taris in the table below are for year 2007 and are reported in log points.
Table A.1: Tari Summary Statistics by Importing Country





IDB WTO 5113 2.1% 0.089 0.049 0.077 0.455 0.405 0.115 0.755 0.760 0.098 0.2%





















































































































































































































Australia TRAINS CMT 5051 2.9% 0.033 0.033 0.039 0.090 0.088 0.091 0.208 0.170 0.220 0.3%
Bahrain TRAINS TRN 5025 27.2% 0.047 0.049 0.043 0.294 0.300 0.072 0.723 0.634 0.190 0.3%
Barbados TRAINS CMT 5221 2.2% 0.114 0.049 0.136 0.571 0.531 0.104 0.822 0.854 0.134 0.2%
Belize TRAINS CMT 5199 2.1% 0.095 0.049 0.089 0.452 0.405 0.101 0.749 0.760 0.121 0.0%
Benin TRAINS TRN 5052 60.9% 0.105 0.095 0.060 0.289 0.405 0.203 0.814 1.000 0.340 29.5%
Bolivia TRAINS CMT 5224 0.0% 0.080 0.095 0.027 0.336 0.336 0.004 0.640 0.619 0.035 0.0%
Botswana TRAINS INV 5030 4.0% 0.069 0.000 0.097 0.162 0.140 0.139 0.290 0.305 0.253 0.8%
Brazil TRAINS CMT 5052 0.0% 0.114 0.131 0.054 0.272 0.300 0.058 0.452 0.455 0.135 0.3%
Burkina
Faso
TRAINS TRN 5052 60.8% 0.105 0.095 0.060 0.398 0.693 0.303 0.838 1.000 0.339 29.4%
Burundi TRAINS CMT 5205 78.0% 0.113 0.095 0.077 0.577 0.693 0.218 0.952 1.000 0.169 20.5%
Cameroon TRAINS TRN 5031 86.7% 0.161 0.095 0.080 0.587 0.588 0.012 0.971 1.000 0.078 0.0%





TRAINS INV 5031 38.1% 0.161 0.095 0.080 0.306 0.262 0.063 0.657 0.574 0.308 0.0%
Chad TRAINS INV 5031 86.5% 0.161 0.095 0.080 0.587 0.588 0.004 0.970 1.000 0.079 0.0%
Chile TRAINS CMT 5223 0.0% 0.058 0.058 0.003 0.224 0.223 0.014 0.485 0.483 0.018 0.0%





















































































































































































































Colombia TRAINS CMT 5224 0.0% 0.116 0.140 0.061 0.347 0.300 0.128 0.567 0.559 0.145 0.0%
Congo,
Rep.
TRAINS INV 5031 83.8% 0.161 0.095 0.080 0.239 0.262 0.061 0.865 1.000 0.320 0.2%
Costa
Rica
TRAINS CMT 5052 0.0% 0.054 0.033 0.068 0.355 0.372 0.082 0.676 0.725 0.151 0.1%
Cote
d'Ivoire
TRAINS TRN 5052 66.6% 0.101 0.095 0.059 0.105 0.068 0.062 0.820 1.000 0.363 49.2%
Croatia TRAINS CMT 4986 0.1% 0.042 0.012 0.052 0.057 0.049 0.048 0.056 0.000 0.092 3.9%




TRAINS CMT 5052 0.0% 0.065 0.000 0.081 0.297 0.336 0.077 0.578 0.590 0.153 0.0%
Ecuador TRAINS CMT 5224 0.0% 0.109 0.095 0.058 0.195 0.203 0.064 0.280 0.284 0.125 0.2%
El Sal-
vador
TRAINS CMT 5052 0.0% 0.055 0.033 0.066 0.309 0.336 0.085 0.615 0.630 0.148 0.0%
European
Union
TRAINS CMT 5019 0.7% 0.047 0.029 0.079 0.049 0.032 0.077 0.020 0.000 0.105 7.9%
Fiji IDB WTO 4995 48.9% 0.074 0.030 0.077 0.337 0.336 0.004 0.814 0.740 0.206 0.0%
Gabon TRAINS TRN 5031 0.0% 0.114 0.095 0.060 0.213 0.140 0.137 0.281 0.163 0.207 38.0%





















































































































































































































Ghana TRAINS CMT 5209 85.6% 0.120 0.095 0.061 0.649 0.688 0.116 0.979 1.000 0.060 0.0%
Guatemala TRAINS CMT 5052 0.0% 0.052 0.037 0.059 0.346 0.372 0.100 0.667 0.699 0.129 0.0%
Guinea-
Bissau
TRAINS INV 5052 2.3% 0.111 0.095 0.061 0.396 0.405 0.023 0.675 0.711 0.105 0.0%
Guyana IDB WTO 5051 0.0% 0.097 0.049 0.097 0.443 0.405 0.097 0.724 0.760 0.137 0.1%




TRAINS CMT 5052 53.5% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.535 1.000 0.499 0.0%
Iceland TRAINS CMT 5048 8.0% 0.052 0.000 0.188 0.111 0.049 0.158 0.279 0.177 0.320 0.7%
India TRAINS TRN 5052 29.7% 0.151 0.118 0.096 0.376 0.336 0.210 0.673 0.583 0.277 1.5%
Indonesia TRAINS INV 5041 3.4% 0.064 0.049 0.066 0.312 0.336 0.076 0.624 0.684 0.156 0.1%
Israel TRAINS CMT 4766 30.0% 0.052 0.000 0.096 0.132 0.072 0.185 0.467 0.249 0.403 3.0%
Japan TRAINS CMT 5051 0.4% 0.037 0.000 0.105 0.042 0.000 0.136 0.017 0.000 0.104 8.1%
Jordan TRAINS CMT 5023 0.0% 0.082 0.000 0.114 0.141 0.140 0.108 0.185 0.177 0.178 14.2%
Kenya TRAINS CMT 5214 85.4% 0.114 0.095 0.101 0.666 0.693 0.086 0.977 1.000 0.067 0.0%
Korea,
Rep.
TRAINS CMT 5022 5.4% 0.092 0.077 0.167 0.132 0.122 0.185 0.180 0.128 0.249 3.2%
























































































































































































































TRAINS CMT 5222 0.4% 0.044 0.049 0.045 0.071 0.095 0.044 0.096 0.000 0.132 0.5%
Lesotho TRAINS INV 5030 0.0% 0.069 0.000 0.096 0.550 0.470 0.209 0.807 0.847 0.120 0.0%
Macao IDB WTO 5052 71.3% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.713 1.000 0.452 0.0%
Macedonia,
FYR
TRAINS CMT 4993 0.0% 0.059 0.049 0.070 0.059 0.049 0.070 0.001 0.000 0.011 9.7%
MadagascarTRAINS CMT 5048 70.0% 0.115 0.095 0.056 0.243 0.262 0.043 0.827 1.000 0.280 1.6%
Malaysia TRAINS CMT 5189 16.2% 0.063 0.000 0.088 0.159 0.095 0.273 0.349 0.177 0.343 2.2%
Mali TRAINS TRN 5052 60.0% 0.105 0.095 0.060 0.290 0.470 0.194 0.811 1.000 0.340 28.7%
Mauritius TRAINS TRN 4964 81.9% 0.028 0.000 0.071 0.632 0.798 0.296 0.960 1.000 0.169 1.0%
Mexico IDB WTO 5194 0.6% 0.110 0.095 0.100 0.299 0.300 0.034 0.517 0.559 0.177 0.2%
Moldova IDB WTO 5151 0.1% 0.041 0.039 0.047 0.064 0.063 0.045 0.078 0.000 0.120 0.3%
Mongolia TRAINS CMT 5049 0.0% 0.048 0.049 0.006 0.161 0.182 0.052 0.348 0.414 0.149 1.0%
Morocco TRAINS CMT 5224 0.0% 0.118 0.095 0.108 0.338 0.336 0.085 0.543 0.619 0.206 24.7%
MozambiqueTRAINS CMT 5224 86.4% 0.096 0.072 0.065 0.680 0.693 0.090 0.983 1.000 0.063 0.6%
Namibia TRAINS CMT 5024 4.0% 0.069 0.000 0.096 0.162 0.140 0.140 0.290 0.305 0.254 0.8%
Nepal TRAINS TRN 5033 0.5% 0.115 0.095 0.067 0.231 0.223 0.076 0.360 0.388 0.166 2.7%
New
Zealand





















































































































































































































Nicaragua TRAINS CMT 5052 0.0% 0.053 0.033 0.062 0.347 0.336 0.045 0.683 0.733 0.082 0.0%
Niger TRAINS TRN 5052 3.3% 0.106 0.095 0.060 0.381 0.405 0.182 0.612 0.711 0.261 11.3%
Norway TRAINS CMT 5040 0.0% 0.056 0.000 0.228 0.113 0.025 0.323 0.129 0.053 0.208 0.5%
Oman TRAINS CMT 5025 0.0% 0.049 0.049 0.054 0.121 0.140 0.097 0.233 0.305 0.147 1.3%
Pakistan TRAINS CMT 5189 1.3% 0.128 0.095 0.084 0.457 0.470 0.150 0.668 0.777 0.276 0.0%
Panama TRAINS CMT 5224 0.1% 0.067 0.058 0.066 0.208 0.262 0.090 0.400 0.428 0.205 1.6%
Paraguay TRAINS CMT 5224 0.0% 0.096 0.095 0.061 0.290 0.300 0.040 0.521 0.550 0.137 1.2%
Peru TRAINS CMT 5224 0.0% 0.096 0.113 0.052 0.263 0.262 0.013 0.477 0.449 0.112 0.0%
Philippines TRAINS CMT 5223 33.0% 0.059 0.030 0.056 0.225 0.182 0.094 0.642 0.567 0.287 0.7%
Qatar TRAINS TRN 5008 0.0% 0.046 0.049 0.035 0.139 0.140 0.070 0.297 0.305 0.127 0.1%
Saudi
Arabia
TRAINS CMT 4991 0.1% 0.045 0.049 0.017 0.103 0.113 0.042 0.198 0.228 0.126 2.4%
Senegal TRAINS TRN 5052 0.0% 0.111 0.095 0.061 0.262 0.262 0.004 0.438 0.487 0.137 0.1%
Singapore TRAINS CMT 5224 30.3% 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.078 0.095 0.159 0.463 0.317 0.373 0.0%
South
Africa
TRAINS CMT 5024 4.0% 0.069 0.000 0.096 0.162 0.140 0.140 0.290 0.305 0.254 0.8%
Sri
Lanka
TRAINS TRN 5051 62.1% 0.097 0.058 0.090 0.256 0.281 0.156 0.774 1.000 0.327 6.0%
St.
Lucia





















































































































































































































Swaziland TRAINS INV 5024 4.0% 0.069 0.000 0.096 0.162 0.140 0.140 0.290 0.305 0.254 0.8%
SwitzerlandTRAINS CMT 5051 0.2% 0.071 0.017 0.163 0.088 0.022 0.198 0.043 0.000 0.147 4.4%
Taiwan,
China
IDB WTO 5191 0.0% 0.050 0.037 0.066 0.053 0.039 0.071 0.009 0.000 0.041 1.9%
Tanzania TRAINS CMT 5214 86.7% 0.114 0.095 0.101 0.788 0.788 0.000 0.988 1.000 0.036 0.0%
Thailand TRAINS CMT 4568 38.0% 0.087 0.049 0.102 0.221 0.262 0.089 0.612 0.574 0.360 1.4%




TRAINS CMT 5052 0.0% 0.064 0.000 0.099 0.437 0.405 0.120 0.745 0.802 0.156 1.0%
Turkey TRAINS CMT 4933 49.1% 0.079 0.036 0.153 0.226 0.158 0.210 0.663 0.940 0.373 3.3%





TRAINS TRN 5025 0.0% 0.046 0.049 0.025 0.130 0.140 0.081 0.271 0.305 0.116 0.0%
United
States
TRAINS CMT 4985 0.1% 0.030 0.015 0.043 0.032 0.020 0.044 0.007 0.000 0.044 6.8%
Uruguay TRAINS CMT 5224 0.0% 0.099 0.100 0.063 0.273 0.300 0.052 0.481 0.478 0.146 0.0%
Zimbabwe TRAINS TRN 5022 78.3% 0.145 0.095 0.131 0.620 0.916 0.392 0.932 1.000 0.221 13.6%
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A.3 Number of Exporters Receiving Preferences from
each Importer
The table below presents the number of exporters receiving preferences from each importer,
where preferences are considered granted when at least x% of HS6 lines exhibit preferential
taris for that exporter, for Year 2007, x = 10, 25, 50. Number of preferential partners only
reported for importers included in the sample.
Cuto Share of Products with
Preferential Taris =
10 25 50
Albania 5 5 5
Antigua and Barbuda 0 0 0
Argentina 11 11 11
Australia 179 73 73
Bahrain 22 22 22
Barbados 18 16 16
Belize 14 14 14
Benin 7 0 0
Bolivia 11 11 11
Botswana 17 13 4
Brazil 11 11 11
Burkina Faso 7 0 0
Burundi 15 15 15
Cameroon 5 5 5
Canada 180 180 54
Central African Republic 5 5 5
Chad 5 5 5
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Cuto Share of Products with
Preferential Taris =
10 25 50
Chile 50 50 49
China 16 11 9
Colombia 26 11 11
Congo, Rep. 5 5 5
Costa Rica 4 4 4
Cote d'Ivoire 7 0 0
Croatia 34 34 2
Dominica 14 14 14
Dominican Republic 21 21 0
Ecuador 11 11 11
El Salvador 4 4 4
European Union 189 189 189
Fiji 0 0 0
Gabon 5 5 5
Georgia 0 0 0
Ghana 14 0 0
Guatemala 4 4 4
Guinea-Bissau 7 0 0
Guyana 0 0 0
Honduras 4 4 4
Hong Kong, China 0 0 0
Iceland 80 1 0
India 0 0 0
Indonesia 11 11 9
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Cuto Share of Products with
Preferential Taris =
10 25 50
Israel 36 35 0
Japan 158 158 53
Jordan 21 21 21
Kenya 16 16 16
Korea, Rep. 19 15 15
Kuwait 21 21 21
Kyrgyz Republic 60 60 60
Lesotho 17 13 4
Macao 0 0 0
Macedonia, FYR 5 5 5
Madagascar 25 25 25
Malaysia 10 10 0
Mali 7 0 0
Mauritius 25 0 0
Mexico 28 13 6
Moldova 0 0 0
Mongolia 0 0 0
Morocco 56 55 55
Mozambique 13 13 0
Namibia 17 13 4
Nepal 6 6 0
New Zealand 146 146 0
Nicaragua 4 4 4
Niger 7 0 0
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Cuto Share of Products with
Preferential Taris =
10 25 50
Norway 50 0 0
Oman 21 21 21
Pakistan 7 6 1
Panama 4 3 3
Paraguay 11 11 11
Peru 9 9 9
Philippines 10 10 9
Qatar 21 21 21
Saudi Arabia 21 21 21
Senegal 7 0 0
Singapore 0 0 0
South Africa 45 41 4
Sri Lanka 6 6 6
St. Lucia 14 14 14
Swaziland 17 13 4
Switzerland 194 193 193
Taiwan, China 0 0 0
Tanzania 15 15 15
Thailand 0 0 0
Togo 7 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago 15 15 0
Turkey 209 209 209
Uganda 16 16 16
United Arab Emirates 21 21 21
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Cuto Share of Products with
Preferential Taris =
10 25 50
United States 154 154 77
Uruguay 11 11 11
Zimbabwe 16 16 15
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A.4 Quantication by Importer
This table presents the predicted percent increase in number of products products exported
by a given exporter resulting from the given policy change in the quantication exercise.
Table A.3: Quantication by Importer





-56.9 26.4 -90.2 33.1 -164 61.3 85 1 1
Argentina 62.5 46.3 -1.27 0.639 60.7 45.6 99 0 1
Australia 11.9 8.23 6.34 3.43 20.9 12.7 106 1 1
Bahrain -4.45 2.67 103 52.3 106 53.5 70 1 0
Barbados -40.6 42.4 -309 135 -396 169 97 1 1
Belize -23.6 12.8 81.7 30.6 68 28.1 67 0 0
Benin -64 38.6 71.6 43.7 19.5 42.9 70 1 1
Bolivia -94.9 43.4 -234 91.2 -364 143 83 0 1
Botswana 22.5 18.8 -22.2 9.15 -12.1 12.7 39 1 0
Brazil 78.7 44.5 35.1 16.9 132 68.8 125 1 1
Burkina
Faso
-9.61 5.72 44.6 38.3 38.1 34.4 56 1 0
Burundi -15.2 9.13 69.4 27 54.8 22.5 58 1 0
Cameroon 16.2 9.84 -192 84.7 -178 80.1 99 0 1
























26.4 10.6 -35.7 16.6 -17.8 14.5 45 0 0
Chad 24.4 13.6 -58 24 -34.5 16.1 40 0 0
Chile 3290 1500 334 152 3700 1680 59 0 1
China 123 54.8 -3.39 4.2 42.5 22.1 131 1 1
Colombia 45.3 43.4 -117 62.5 -111 59.1 116 1 0
Congo,
Rep.
8.46 3.69 -9.26 3.8 -1.55 3.24 54 0 0
Costa
Rica
59.7 48.4 40.3 17.9 105 61.1 103 1 1
Cote
d'Ivoire
-14.6 8.46 39.6 24.5 27.1 19.6 102 1 0
Croatia 34.6 27.2 5.49 6.99 73.5 54.6 103 1 1























Importer Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev U log_tau
Ecuador 72.3 91.7 42.3 28.6 152 158 87 1 1
El Sal-
vador
42.4 42 49.2 22.8 98.3 60 84 1 1
European
Union
13.7 6.01 -0.541 0.0769 9.58 4.41 14 1 1
Fiji -15 10.9 126 105 120 99.9 86 1 0
Gabon -46.8 23.1 37 26.7 17.5 21.7 83 1 0
Georgia 7.86 14.8 10.2 6.27 19.1 17.6 82 1 1
Ghana 52.4 33.3 -219 84.7 -169 63.4 117 1 1
Guatemala 43.1 30.2 32 10.8 78.5 36.3 91 1 1
Guinea-
Bissau
-71 38.4 -457 205 -603 256 37 0 0
Guyana -46.1 31.3 -162 63.9 -230 97.5 76 1 1




0 0 17.7 11.4 0 0 136 1
Iceland -2.45 2.09 -0.691 0.481 -3.43 2.43 71 0 0



















Importer Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev U log_tau
Indonesia 31.7 26 30.9 13.7 66.9 40.4 59 1 1
Israel 13.2 19.5 4.71 4.02 18.4 22.9 88 0 1
Japan 7.66 5.21 -0.204 0.295 5.68 3.86 44 1 1
Jordan 61.5 81.7 5.42 4.58 77.4 94.7 63 0 1
Kenya 18.6 12.3 38.8 15.2 57.7 22.7 102 0 1
Korea,
Rep.
3.13 2.39 2.6 1.75 7.74 5.62 132 1 1




41 51.6 8.65 10.5 58.3 63.8 78 1 1
Lesotho 22 24.7 408 169 456 207 31 0 1
Macao 0 0 49.8 40.1 0 0 97 1
Macedonia,
FYR
-48.8 45.7 0.252 0.496 7.55 6.7 78 1 0
Madagascar41.2 27 23.3 14.6 66.1 39.4 91 1 1
Malaysia 11.7 8.8 18.1 10.3 35.6 18.2 131 1 1
Mali -55.7 34.2 52.9 33.7 4.11 33.3 96 1 1



















Importer Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev U log_tau
Mexico 71.9 41.4 -42.4 23.2 8.07 37.7 104 1 1
Moldova 21.2 17.1 11.3 18.3 57.5 37.7 96 1 1
Mongolia -544 235 46.1 25.6 -485 210 71 1 1
Morocco 17.9 19.5 53.2 32.5 103 69.3 82 1 1
Mozambique36.9 40 10.5 6.75 47.5 46.2 102 0 1
Namibia 35.7 35 -61.8 93.1 -50.4 92.1 74 1 0
Nepal -49.1 56.8 116 51.1 158 66.3 68 1 1
New
Zealand
42.8 29.8 18.3 8.93 66.8 41.3 45 1 1
Nicaragua 39.8 40.6 0.401 0.186 40.2 40.8 91 0 1
Niger -63 28.8 22.6 9.18 -34.1 24.3 74 1 1
Norway 9.59 13.3 7.71 6.88 21.7 20.6 98 1 0
Oman -27.5 15.2 56.8 41.4 60.8 42.7 77 1 1
Pakistan -24.7 44.8 267 140 284 148 127 1 1
Panama 13.9 8.86 58 27.6 96.5 42.3 72 1 1
Paraguay 100 80.4 85.4 38.1 217 128 74 1 1
Peru 3.82 11.2 -301 164 -403 201 107 1 1
Philippines 6.18 4.75 27 12.6 36.1 17.7 102 1 1



















Importer Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev U log_tau
Saudi
Arabia
60.1 32.4 48.3 25.3 144 71.1 123 1 1
Senegal -11.3 11.2 193 77.3 286 105 95 1 1
Singapore 0 0 31.4 12.5 0 0 97 1
South
Africa
45.3 46.7 -22.4 18.2 7.94 35.3 106 1 1
Sri
Lanka
15 9.37 6.89 3.31 22.2 11.4 96 0 1
St.
Lucia
5.52 19 -168 74 -190 91.8 67 1 1
Swaziland 13.5 11.2 -35.4 20.1 -34.5 20.2 42 1 0
Taiwan,
China
45.9 61.7 -1.07 1.22 19.5 29 146 1 1
Tanzania -1.72 1.41 197 87 195 86.3 99 0 0
Thailand 16.3 10.8 25.4 12.7 47.7 21.5 136 1 1























Importer Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev U log_tau
Turkey 9.02 6.34 26.8 12.4 37.2 18.5 11 1 1





72.7 47.1 -47.5 26.5 7.62 22.7 118 1 1
United
States
2.48 1.48 0.441 0.23 9.55 5.04 35 1 1
Uruguay 58.7 37.7 43.8 30.7 120 71.8 94 1 1
Zimbabwe -19.8 14.7 38.9 27 19.8 21.9 78 1 1
A.5 Alternative Data Treatments
In evaluating the results presented above in Section 2.7, I identify a prediction each for
x = τ, U in each the pooled (P ) and by-importer (I) regressions that I expect to hold
ex-ante:
Px: For the pooled regression, I expect the point estimate b̂x to be negative and signif-
icant (at the 5% level).
Ix: For the by-importer regressions, I expect that the percentage of exporters for which
b̂x is negative and signicant > The percentage of importers for which b̂x is positive and
signicant.
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Predictions Px (for x = τ, U) simply assert that the observed signs of the point estimates
on the coecients of the applied tari level and the uncertainty measure are those that would
be expected based on the theoretic model presented above. Predictions Ix (for x = τ, U)
then apply this theoretical prediction to the by-importer regressions by stating that we
should be more likely to see a negative signicant eect than a positive signicant eect of
both the MFN tari level and of the uncertainty resulting from binding overhang.
Labeling each prediction according to the parameter x = τ, U and either P for the
pooled regression or I for the by-importer regressions, we can then summarize the results
presented in Sections 2.7.1 and 2.4 according to which predictions are conrmed by each
specication as shown in Table A.4, where predictions that are not conrmed by the given
specication are grayed out.
Recall that the baseline data treatment on which these results are based included the
following assumptions: products for which the MFN exceeded the bound rate were dropped,
the uncertainty measure for products with no bound rate was set to one, and the preference
indicator was dened according to a 25% (of product lines with preferences) cuto (further
supplemented by the PTAs identied in the Baier Bergstrand dataset). In order to check
the robustness of these results to alternative methods of dealing with MFN rates exceeding
bound rates, unbound lines, and alternative preference cutos, I re-run both the pooled and
the by-importer regressions for each possible combination along the following 3 dimensions:
• For products where the reported MFN tari exceeds the Bound tari, 1 of 3 possible
actions is taken in dening the uncertainty measure for that product:
 umdrop: products for which this is the case are dropped from the analysis (as
was done above)
 um0: U is set to zero, the minimum possible value
 um1: U is set to one, the maximum possible value
• For products with no bound tari, 1 of 2 possible actions is taken in dening the
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Table A.4: Alternative Data Treatments
prefcuto ub1 ubdrop
25 umdrop Pτ PU Pτ PU
Iτ IU Iτ IU
um0 Pτ PU Pτ PU
Iτ IU Iτ IU
um1 Pτ PU Pτ PU
Iτ IU Iτ IU
10 umdrop Pτ PU Pτ PU
Iτ IU Iτ IU
um0 Pτ PU Pτ PU
Iτ IU Iτ IU
um1 Pτ PU Pτ PU
Iτ IU Iτ IU
50 umdrop Pτ PU Pτ PU
Iτ IU Iτ IU
um0 Pτ PU Pτ PU
Iτ IU Iτ IU
um1 Pτ PU Pτ PU
Iτ IU Iτ IU
uncertainty measure for that product:
 ub1: U is set to one, the maximum possible value (as was done above)
 ubdrop: products for which this is the case are dropped from the analysis
• The indicator for whether or not an exporter receives preferences from a given importer
is dened according to a cuto percentage of products for which a preferential tari
exists between that importer-exporter pair (as supplemented by the Baier Bergstrand
dataset of PTAs):
 pref25: 25% cuto (as was used above)
 pref10: 10% cuto
 pref50: 50% cuto
Tables analogous to Tables 2.3-2.5 exist for each of the 18 possible combinations along these
3 dimensions. In order to summarize what these tables would show, I include in Table A.4 a
summary of which of the 4 predictions are conrmed by each specication/data treatment,
where predictions that are not conrmed by the given specication are grayed out.
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Comparing the results of these regressions based on the various versions of the data, we
see that the results shown in the previous section (for the version of the data where products
with MFN exceeding bound taris are dropped (umdrop), the uncertainty measure for
unbound lines set to one (ub1) and a preference indicator dened by the 25% cuto) are
largely robust to these various denitions and cutos, with one major exception: in several
cases, fulllment of the predictions about the sign of the uncertainty coecient disappears
in the um1 case, that is, when products for which the MFN rate exceeds the bound rate
are assigned an uncertainty measure equal to 1.
In comparing the results obtained using various cuto levels to dene the existence
of preferential agreements, we see from Table A.4 that the cuto chosen makes almost
no dierence in the results. Recall that the preference indicator used in determining which
bilateral pairs to include in the sample is constructed using both the cuto share of products
with preferential taris as well as the database of PTAs constructed by Baier and Bergstrand
(2007), thus, the sample of countries included in the sample may not change greatly with the
cuto chosen, as any preferential arrangements which are not picked up by the preferential




B.1 Proof: Constant Export Productivity Cutos over
H(n) states
In this appendix, I drop sector subscript k for convenience, with the understanding that the
proof is valid for each sector k. I assume that for each r 6= s either
ϕcr,s(H
(n+1)) ≤ ϕcr,s(H(n)) ∀n = 0, 1, 2, . . . (B.1)
or
ϕcr,s(H
(n+1)) ≥ ϕcr,s(H(n)) ∀n = 0, 1, 2, . . . (B.2)
and further assume that productivity follows some continuous distribution, that no shock is
large enough to cause the constraint NEr(ζ) ≥ 0 to bind, and that the economy eventually
reaches its long term steady state equilibrium, Hdet. I show that under these assump-




0, 1, 2, . . . , ∀r, s (see section 3.3.4 for notation denitions). This proof relies on the equi-
librium equations determining cuto productivities ϕcr,s(H
(n)) as well as the free entry
conditions that determine the mass of new entrants into production, NEr(H
(n)), in each
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high-tari period, and so the two subsections below derive these equations under each pos-
sible ordering of the high tari cutos given in (B.2) and (B.1) and the nal subsection uses
these equations to prove the result.
Export Productivity Cutos in High Tari States
For a rm of productivity level ϕ in region r, I let Vϕ,r,s(ζ) be the present discounted value
of selling in market s in state ζ, taking into account current and expected future prot ows
from exporting from r to s (or selling domestically for r = s). In a given state ζ, region
r rms who have entered into production in some previous period will choose to incur the
sunk cost to export to region s, fexpr,s , and begin exporting to s if the value of exporting
exceeds the value of waiting to begin exporting to s by at least the amount of this sunk
cost. That is, in state ζ a country r rm with productivity ϕ will enter export market s if
Vϕ,r,s(ζ)− V waitϕ,r,s (ζ) ≥ wrfexpr,s
The value of being a region r producer selling in region s in each state for a productivity
ϕ rm in state H(n) is then:
Vϕ,r,s(H
(n)) = ϕσ−1Ar,s(H
(n)) + (1− δ)Vϕ,r,s(H(n+1))




while the value of waiting to enter a given export market is:
V waitϕ,r,s (H





, V waitϕ,r,s (H
(n+1))
]
Expression (B.3) gives the present discounted value of exporting from r to s for a produc-
tivity ϕ rm regardless of the ordering of the cutos over time, as once a rm pays the xed
cost and enters a given export market he will continue to sell in that market until hit by the
exogenous death shock. The value of waiting to begin exporting in state H(n), V waitϕ,r,s (H
(n)),




Cutos Ranked According to (B.1) In the case where ϕcr,s(H
(n+1)) ≤ ϕcr,s(H(n)), for
rms below the cuto productivity in state H(n), there may be a positive value of waiting to
enter in a later period when the cuto is lower. For the marginal rm who is just indierent
between entering and waiting in state H(n) in this case, we can be sure he will choose to
enter in state H(n+1) and so the value of waiting for ϕ = ϕcr,s(H
(n)) in this case is
V waitϕcr,s(H(n)),r,s
(H(n)) = (1− δ)
[
Vϕcr,s,r,s(H







(1− δ)i−nAr,s(H(i))− (1− δ)wrfexpr,s
For a rm with productivity ϕ = ϕcr,s(H
(n)), we have(
Vϕ,r,s(H














And so for this marginal rm who is just indierent between selling only in the domestic

























, r 6= s (B.4)
Cutos Ranked According to (B.2) If ϕcr,s(H
(n+1)) ≥ ϕcr,s(H(n)), that is, if the cuto
productivity to export from r to s is increasing over time after the arrival of the high tari
shock, it will be the case that for ϕ ≤ ϕcr,s(H(n)), V waitϕ,r,s (H(n)) = 0 since for rms below the
H(n) state productivity cuto, export conditions from r to s will only continue to worsen
over time and they will never enter that export market.











And so for this marginal rm who is just indierent between selling only in the domestic
1I assume throughout the paper that xed exporting costs are suciently high that this cuto never falls
below the minimum possible productivity draw, b.
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, r 6= s (B.5)
Free Entry Condition in High Tari States
Under the assumption of free entry, a prospective rm will chose to pay the sunk cost, fsunkr ,
and enter into production in state ζ if and only if V entryr (ζ) − wrfsunkr ≥ V wait to enterr (ζ)
where V entryr (ζ) is the value of entering into production in state ζ and V
wait to enter
r (ζ) is
the value of not entering, but retaining the option of entering in some future period.2
For a given state ζ, the value of entering into production for a rm who draws produc-
tivity ϕ will be:





































I assume that the death shock applies equally to current and potential rms so that
the same discount factor is used by all when discounting future periods. Then, the value of
2Note that V wait to enterr indexed by one country denotes the value of waiting to enter into production
while V waitr,s indexed by two countries denotes the value of waiting to begin exporting to region s. These
are two distinct values.
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waiting to enter into production in a given state will be given by
V wait to enterr (H










V wait to enterr (H
(n+1))
]
where the nal equality follows from the fact that in equilibrium, free entry implies that
V entryr (ζ)− wrfsunkr ≤ V wait to enterr (ζ)∀ζ (with strict inequality only in the case when the
constraint NEr(ζ) ≥ 0 is binding). I make the explicit assumption that the condition






Letting DECr,s be a binary indicator equal to 1 when the export cutos from r to s are
ranked according to (B.1) (that is, decreasing over time), and zero otherwise, I can write





















































since under the assumption that ϕcr,s(H
(n+1)) ≤ ϕcr,s(Hn)∀n, we have that the value of
waiting to export will be given by
V waitϕ,r,s (H









while in the case where ϕcr,s(H
(n+1)) > ϕcr,s(H




(n+1))dF (ϕ) = 0.
Then, in state H(n), we have that V entryr (H



































































































− (1− δ)V wait to enterr (H(n+1))
= ϕ̃σ−1r,r (H
(n))Ar,r(H
























































































































































Setting this expression equal to the sunk cost of entry we have that in equilibrium:
ϕ̃σ−1r,r (H
(n))Ar,r(H











































det)∀n = 0, 1, 2, . . .











for any s. Given this,































q,r is constant across n and the function






















































It follows that Θnr is a continuous function of export cuto productivities (assuming that
the distribution function of productivities is continuous), average export productivities, and
aggregate economic conditions in periods n+1 and later. I take as given that all endogenous
variables converge to their steady state values as n → ∞, and in implementing the model
numerically, I make the further assumption that after N periods, all endogenous variables
have returned to their (high tari) steady state value, denoted by state Hdet. Given this,
and the fact that for any n, given all endogenous variable values for periodsH(n+1) and later,
we can uniquely solve for ϕcq,r(H
(N−1)), by plugging in these the steady state equilibrium
Hdet values for each of these endogenous variables in states N, N + 1, . . .. Taking limits as
n → ∞ of (B.7), it is clear that ϕcq,r(H(N−1)) = ϕcq,r(Hdet),∀q, r , q 6= r. This then implies
that ϕ̃q,r(H
(N−1)) = ϕ̃q,r(H
det),∀q, r , q 6= r (from the denition of ϕ̃q,r, see (3.9)) and
Aq,r(H
(N−1)) = Aq,r(H
det), as implied by (B.4) and (B.5). Back substituting again to solve
for ϕcq,r(H
(N−2)) then yields ϕcq,r(H
(N−2)) = ϕcq,r(H
det),∀q, r , q 6= r, and so on, so that
for all n = 1, 2, . . ., we have that ϕcq,r(H
(n)) = ϕcq,r(H
det),∀q, r , q 6= r and Aq,r(H(n)) =
Aq,r(H
det),∀q, r , q 6= r.
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In understanding the assumptions driving this result, I rst note that the functional form
assumed for productivity distribution plays no role in this proof, other than the requirement
that the cumulative distribution function be continuous. The result follows from the fact
that under free entry, the aggregate economic conditions in the domestic market adjust (via
the number of rms who enter) to compensate for any changes in economic conditions or
cutos in export markets so that the value of entering into production for the marginal rm
is the same, regardless of state. Further, the aggregate economic conditions for export, Ar,s,
can be pinned down from just knowing the corresponding export productivity cuto. Then,
since Ar,s completely determines ϕ
c
r,s and vice versa, and since each is a function of next
period (and later) values, it follows that for both to eventually equal some nal limiting
value, they must equal this in every high tari period.
B.2 Derivation of Free Entry Condition
In this appendix I derive the free entry condition for each sector-country based on the
equilibrium condition, V entryk,r (ζ) − wrfsunkk,r = V wait to enterk,r (ζ). In the derivations below,
I drop the sector subscript k for ease of notation; it is understood that all values and
endogenous variables are also sector specic.
The expected (over ϕ) value of entry in a given state is given by:
V entryr (L) =
∫ ∞
b































δ + γ − δγ
+
(1− δ)γ




































δ + γ − δγ
+
(1− δ)γ
















































































which follows from the fact that ϕcr,s(H
(n+1)) = ϕcr,s(H)∀n, and so we have that the
value of waiting to export for ϕ < ϕcr,s(H
(n+1)) is zero.
I assume that the death shock applies equally to current and potential rms so that
the same discount factor is used by all when discounting future periods. Then, the value of
waiting to enter into production in a given state will be given by










V wait to enterr,t (ζ
′)
]
where the nal equality follows from the fact that in equilibrium, free entry implies that
V entryr (ζ) − wrfsunkr ≤ V waitr (ζ)∀ζ (with strict inequality only in the case when the con-
straint NEr(ζ) ≥ 0 is binding).3 So,
V wait to enterr (L) = (1− δ)
(
(1− γ)V wait to enterr (L) + γV waitr (H(0))
)
⇒ V wait to enterr (L) =
γ(1− δ)
(δ + γ − δγ)
V wait to enterr (H
(0))
3Note that V wait to enterr indexed by one country denotes the value of waiting to enter into production
while VWaitr,s indexed by two countries denotes the value of waiting to begin exporting to region s. These
are two distinct values.
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and
V wait to enterr (H
(n)) = (1− δ)V wait to enterr (H(n+1)), n
= 0, 1, 2, . . .
Then, I can write the dierence between the value of entering into production and waiting
to enter in state L as:
V entryr (L)− V wait to enterr (L)
=
ϕ̃σ−1r,r (L)Ar,r(L)
δ + γ − δγ
+
(1− δ)γ









































(δ + γ − δγ)




δ + γ − δγ
+
γ(1− δ)
(δ + γ − δγ)
 wrfsunkr︸ ︷︷ ︸





































































, ϕcr,s(L) 6= ϕcr,s(H)
is the average productivity level between high and low state cutos and 1RankBr,s is a
binary indicator equal to one when ϕcr,s(L) > ϕ
c
r,s(H). Then, in equilibrium, the mass of
new entrants in state L is determined by:
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And in state H(n),
V entryr (H
















dF (ϕ)− V waitr (H(n))


















− (1− δ)V waitr (H(n+1))





























− (1− δ)V waitr (H(n+1))
= ϕ̃σ−1r,r (H)Ar,r(H)
+ (1− δ)




















































B.3 Derivation of Cuto Export Productivity in Low
Tari State
In state ζ a country r-sector k rm with productivity ϕ will enter export market s if
Vϕ,k,r,s(ζ)− V waitϕ,k,r,s(ζ) ≥ wrf
exp
k,r,s
The expressions for these values as a function of the state and productivity level are as
follows:
For ϕ ≤ ϕck,r,s(L) and r 6= s:
V waitϕ,k,r,s(L) =

0 if 1RankBk,r,s = 0 or










if 1RankBk,r,s = 1 andϕ ≥ ϕck,r,s(H(0))
Vϕ,k,r,s(L) =
πϕ,k,r,s(L) + (1− δ)γVϕ,k,r,s(H(0))
δ + γ − δγ
Which implies that for ϕ ≤ ϕck,r,s(L) (and ϕ > ϕck,r,s(H(0)) in the case where cutos are
ranked according to B),






πϕ,k,r,s(L) + (1− δ)γ
∑∞
i=0(1− δ)iϕσ−1Ak,r,s(H(i)) if 1RankBk,r,s = 0
πϕ,k,r,s(L) + (1− δ)γwrfexpk,r,s if 1RankBk,r,s = 1
And, since for the marginal rm who is just indierent between selling in the domestic





For a sector k region r with export cutos to s ranked according to Ranking A (see 3.8),
then:




























For a region r with sector k cutos for exporting to market s ranked according to Ranking
B, (see (3.8)), we have:
(δ + γ − δγ)wrfexpk,r,s = πϕ,r,s(L) + (1− δ)γwr(H
(0))fexpk,r,s















B.4 Proof: Cutos Increasing in Probability of Tari
Hike
As shown in section 3.3.6, the cuto productivity in sector k, country r to choose to enter










and for a sec-
tor k and country r with s cutos ranked according to Ranking A , that is, for which































⇒ Ak,r,s(Hdet) ≤ Ak,r,s(L)














































So that for a country with ϕck,r,s(L) ≤ ϕck,r,s(Hdet), it is also the case that the export cuto
productivity is increasing in γ, the probability that the high tari shock will arrive in any
given period.
B.5 Summary of Equilibrium Conditions
Variable Associated Equation














































































, n = 0, 1, 2, . . .





















































(H(n)), r 6= s, n =























n = 0, 1, 2, . . .



































, n = 0, 1, . . .





























































































































































































B.6 Conjecture: Constant Cutos across L and H states
in sectors with constant taris
In this section, I hypothesize that under the assumption of Pareto distributed productivity,
for any sector k with τk,r,s ≡ τk,r,s(L) = τk,r,s(H)∀r 6= s, that is, any sector for which
no bilateral taris change with the arrival of the high tari shock, it will be the case that
ϕck,r,s(L) = ϕ
c
k,r,s(H), that is, that productivity cutos to export in this sector do not
change, despite changes in the aggregate economy that may be caused by tari shocks in
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other sectors. To simplify notation, for the remainder of this section I drop the k industry
subscript; it is assumed that all industry specic variables in this section are for an industry
k which is not directly aected by the tari shock.
Now using fact that cutos ϕcr,s(H) ≡ ϕcr,s(H(n)) as well as aggregate economic con-
ditions Ar,s(H) ≡ Ar,s(H(n)) are constant across n and also assuming homogenous good
produced in all countries (so that wages do not depend on the state ζ ∈ {L,H(n)}) and
Pareto distributed productivity, the free entry condition in state L implies that in equilib-
rium, for each r:


















































































= (δ + γ − δγ)wrfsunkr





r,s + γ(1− δ)wrfexpr,s ∗ (1− 1RankBr,s)
Ar,s(L) +
γ(1−δ)








this can be written as:
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⇒ ϕ̃σ−1r,r (L)Ar,r(L) +
[























































































The free entry condition in any H state yields













































Subtracting the free entry condition (B.10) in state L from (B.11) in state H, we have
that for each r:


































































































































Γr,s ∗ (1− 1RankBr,s) + Λr,s ∗ 1RankBr,s
]
= 0




































Γr,s ∗ (1− 1RankBr,s) + Λr,s ∗ 1RankBr,s
]
= 0





























q,r as before, and now τq,r does not depend
on the state since we are considering an industry k which is not directly aected by the tari
shock.
Now, the free entry condition in state H, (B.11), can be rewritten entirely in terms of




















Equations (B.12) and (B.13) together yield 2 ∗ C(C − 1) equations (where C is the
number of countries) in 2 ∗ C(C − 1) unknowns, ϕcq,r(L) and ϕcq,r(H) for each q 6= r.
Although I cannot solve for these variables explicitly in order to verify that there is a
unique solution to the system of equations, I can verify that there is a solution which
satises ϕcq,r(L) = ϕ
c
q,r(H)∀q 6= r: If ϕcr,s(H) = ϕcr,s(L), then by denition 1RankBr,s = 0,
and it is clear that Γr,s = 0.
4 Then, for ϕcq,r(H) = ϕ
c
q,r(L)∀q 6= r, we have that equation
(B.12) is satised.
4It is also true that in this case Λr,s = 0, as one would expect given that 1RankBr,s changes values from
0 to 1 exactly at when ϕcr,s(H) = ϕ
c
r,s(L); that is, all of the above equations continue to be valid if we
dene 1RankBr,s =
{
0 forϕcr,s(L) < ϕ
c
r,s(H)
1 forϕcr,s(L) ≥ ϕcr,s(H)
rather than 1RankBr,s =
{
0 forϕcr,s(L) ≤ ϕcr,s(H)








C.1 Preference Program Use: Chilean Exports to US
Figure C.1 presents the breakdown of exports to the US by preference program, here by
number of HTS8 lines. Here we see that for several products it appears that Chile-US FTA
preferences replace GSP preferences after 2004 (and that there is a phase-in period of a year
for some of these products). It also appears that Chile-US preferences cover more products
than were covered under GSP, which is indeed the case.
Figure C.2 presents the value of Chile-US exports in 2001 for each sector broken down
by the preference program under which goods were imported. We see that the largest use of
GSP preferences by dollar value in 2001 is in the Chemicals sector, followed by Base Metals,
Wood, and Vegetable Products. For all of these sectors but Chemicals, this large GSP trade
value is due to the fact that the sector trade value is large, while the share of trade for which
products enter under GSP is less than 20% (for Chemicals it is over 60%) (see gure 4.2).
C.2 Additional Regression Results
Table C.1 presents the results of the same dierence in dierence regressions run in section
4.4, now where observations are weighted by trade ow value to give more weight to large
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Figure C.1: US Imports from Chile by Preference Scheme: HTS8 Count
Source: US International Trade Commission.
Figure C.2: US Imports from Chile by Preference Scheme
Source: US International Trade Commission.
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Table C.1: Regression Results: FTA Impact on Trade
Dependent Var: Change in Log Export Value Change in Log No. Exporters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Year 0.0870*** 0.0833*** 0.0473*** 0.0376***
(0.00269) (0.00278) (0.00603) (0.00801)
FTA 0.383*** 0.242*** -0.00553 0.0208





Constant -173.4*** -166.0*** -94.19*** -74.90***
(5.386) (5.567) (12.07) (16.02)
Observations 2,021 2,021 449 449
R-squared 0.907 0.908 0.700 0.706
Standard errors reported in parentheses; signicance reported as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
trading partners of Chile. We see that when weighting by trade ow value, the change in
log export value does reect a positive signicant eect of having an FTA with Chile in
force, and that there also appear to be positive eects of the agreement in the years leading
up to its implementation. Weighting by trade value in the regressions with log number of
exporters as the dependent variable now yields no signicant eect of having an FTA in
force when only controlling for pre and post FTA years, but does show a positive signicant
eect of being 2 years prior to implementation or later.
C.3 Tari Aggregation Method
I present here the same tari information as presented in column 1 of Table 4.1, that is,
the sector level applied tari faced by Chilean exporters to the US, now with an additional
column for each tari aggregated using an alternative method; rather than reporting the
Eective Applied Rate as reported by WITS, in this alternative aggregation method I
take the applied tari rate faced by Chilean exporters to the US in 2001 to be the minimum
between the reported GSP preferential rate and the MFN rate at the HTS8 level. I then
aggregate up to the sector level using bilateral trade weights.
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1 Live Animals 0.3% 3.0%
2 Veg Products 0.8% 0.8%
3 Fats and Oils 0.2% 0.2%
4 Prepared Food 1.6% 3.1%
5 Minerals 0.2% 0.3%
6 Chemicals 0.0% 0.1%
7 Plastics 0.0% 0.0%
8 Hides and Skin 0.8% 1.2%
9 Wood 0.3% 0.0%
10 Pulp 0.0% 0.0%
11 Textiles 15.5% 18.7%
12 Footwear 8.9% 9.1%
13 Stone/Ceramics 0.0% 0.0%
14 Precious Stones/Metal 0.0% 0.0%
15 Base Metals 0.8% 0.1%
16 Machinery 0.0% 0.0%
17 Vehicles 0.0% 0.1%
18 Precision Instruments 0.0% 0.0%
19 Arms and Ammunition 0.0% 0.0%
20 Misc. Manufacturing 0.0% 0.0%
Source: Original aggregation- TRAINS eectively applied tari data, including AVEs com-
puted using UNCTAD method 1; Alternative aggregation-TRAINS tari line level data,
including AVEs computed using UNCTAD method 1.
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Figure C.3: Simulated Increase in Exporters: CHL to ROW
C.4 Additional By-Sector Results for Chile
Figures C.3 and C.4 respectively now present the model simulation results (with and without
the eect of the 9.98% tari threat) on the mass of exporters from Chile to the ROW region
and the mass of domestic producing rms in each sector in Chile. We see that the relative
eect of including the tari threat in the model is smaller when considering the impact on
Chilean exports not to the US, but the Rest of the World, however the eect is still present.
This increased mass of exporters to other regions is driven by a larger increase (or smaller
decrease) in the mass of domestic rms producing in Chile simulated by the model that
takes into account the tari hike threat.
The gures presented thus far show model simulation results as percent changes from
the non-FTA steady state equilibrium to the FTA steady state equilibrium, which does
not dierentiate between sectors which may be of more or less importance to the Chilean
economy. Figure C.5 shows these simulation results by sector now in levels rather than
percentages. The largest dierence between the two models in dollar amounts occurs in the
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Figure C.4: Simulated Increase in Chilean Firms
Wood and Wood Articles sector, where the model that ignores the eect of the tari hike
threat prior to the FTA predicts that trade ows from Chile to the USA will increase by 38.8
million USD, while the model that assumes initial trade ows were aected by the threat
of a tari hike (with 9.98% probability in any future period) predicts that the FTA will
increase trade ows from Chile to the USA in the Wood and Wood Articles sector by 72.1
million USD. For each Wood, Chemicals, Vegetable Products, and Base Metals sectors, the
simulated increase in Chile-US exports generated by the model with the tari threat is over
8 million USD greater than in the model without this. Overall, the model without the tari
threat eect predicts that Chilean exports to the United States will increase by 5.84% as a
result of the FTA, while the model with the eect of the tari threat predicts that exports
will increase by 7.05%. These are both within the range of increased trade predicted by
the International Trade Commission in their report (they give a range of 6-14% increase for
Chile to US exports)..
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Figure C.5: Simulated Increase in Trade: CHL to USA
C.5 Additional By-Sector Results for Mercosur
Figures C.6 and C.7 present the results of the two models for simulated percent increases
in exports from Mercosur to Chile and the US respectively. It is clear that the additional
impact of including the eects of reducing tari uncertainty is less pronounced for Mercosur
exports relative to Chilean exports, as would be expected given that any impact on Mercosur
exports must come through indirect general equilibrium eects. The eect of the tari threat
elimination via the FTA on Mercosur-US trade is even smaller; for most sectors, trade from
Mercosur to the US is predicted to increase by less when taking into account the eect of
the tari threat elimination, however the magnitude of these dierences with the predicted
increase from the model without the tari threat is extremely small.
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Figure C.6: Simulated Increase in Trade: Mercosur to CHL
Figure C.7: Simulated Increase in Trade: Mercosur to USA
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C.6 Calibration Equations
The equations below are taken directly from the equilibrium conditions of the deterministic
general equilibrium model. A variable name followed by 0 indicates that this is a baseline
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